summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0011-EAP-pwd-server-Verify-received-scalar-and-element.patch
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0011-EAP-pwd-server-Verify-received-scalar-and-element.patch')
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0011-EAP-pwd-server-Verify-received-scalar-and-element.patch61
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 61 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0011-EAP-pwd-server-Verify-received-scalar-and-element.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0011-EAP-pwd-server-Verify-received-scalar-and-element.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 87095bf7f4..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0011-EAP-pwd-server-Verify-received-scalar-and-element.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-From 70ff850e89fbc8bc7da515321b4d15b5eef70581 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Mathy Vanhoef <mathy.vanhoef@nyu.edu>
-Date: Sun, 31 Mar 2019 17:13:06 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 11/14] EAP-pwd server: Verify received scalar and element
-
-When processing an EAP-pwd Commit frame, the peer's scalar and element
-(elliptic curve point) were not validated. This allowed an adversary to
-bypass authentication, and impersonate any user if the crypto
-implementation did not verify the validity of the EC point.
-
-Fix this vulnerability by assuring the received scalar lies within the
-valid range, and by checking that the received element is not the point
-at infinity and lies on the elliptic curve being used. (CVE-2019-9498)
-
-The vulnerability is only exploitable if OpenSSL version 1.0.2 or lower
-is used, or if LibreSSL or wolfssl is used. Newer versions of OpenSSL
-(and also BoringSSL) implicitly validate the elliptic curve point in
-EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(), preventing the attack.
-
-Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <mathy.vanhoef@nyu.edu>
-Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-CVE: CVE-2019-9498
----
- src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-index d0fa54a..74979da 100644
---- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-@@ -718,6 +718,26 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
- goto fin;
- }
-
-+ /* verify received scalar */
-+ if (crypto_bignum_is_zero(data->peer_scalar) ||
-+ crypto_bignum_is_one(data->peer_scalar) ||
-+ crypto_bignum_cmp(data->peer_scalar,
-+ crypto_ec_get_order(data->grp->group)) >= 0) {
-+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
-+ "EAP-PWD (server): received scalar is invalid");
-+ goto fin;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* verify received element */
-+ if (!crypto_ec_point_is_on_curve(data->grp->group,
-+ data->peer_element) ||
-+ crypto_ec_point_is_at_infinity(data->grp->group,
-+ data->peer_element)) {
-+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
-+ "EAP-PWD (server): received element is invalid");
-+ goto fin;
-+ }
-+
- /* check to ensure peer's element is not in a small sub-group */
- if (!crypto_bignum_is_one(cofactor)) {
- if (crypto_ec_point_mul(data->grp->group, data->peer_element,
---
-2.7.4
-