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authorRoss Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>2022-04-26 13:07:20 +0100
committerAnuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@intel.com>2022-04-28 10:45:16 +0800
commit7a97531169d662fe0466db5992566bcdbe3a0d5f (patch)
tree5ccde979e5344bffe4b942279b5b3b3ca66c89d2 /meta/recipes-core/images/build-appliance-image_15.0.0.bb
parentd411ea3114cde55ae68a2d437e854c5b17f78131 (diff)
downloadopenembedded-core-7a97531169d662fe0466db5992566bcdbe3a0d5f.tar.gz
bitbake.conf: mark all directories as safe for git to read
Recent git releases containing [1] have an ownership check when opening repositories, and refuse to open a repository if it is owned by a different user. This breaks any use of git in do_install, as that is executed by the (fake) root user. Whilst not common, this does happen. Setting the git configuration safe.directories=* disables this check, so that git is usable in fakeroot tasks. This can be set globally via the internal environment variable GIT_CONFIG_PARAMETERS, we can't use GIT_CONFIG_*_KEY/VALUE as that isn't present in all the releases which have the ownership check. We already set GIT_CEILING_DIRECTORIES to ensure that git doesn't recurse up out of the work directory, so this isn't a security issue. [1] https://github.com/git/git/commit/8959555cee7ec045958f9b6dd62e541affb7e7d9 Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org> (cherry picked from commit 8bed8e6993e7297bdcd68940aa0d47ef47120117) Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@intel.com>
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