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-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2021-3697-video-readers-jpeg-Block-int-underflow-wild-pointer.patch84
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 84 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2021-3697-video-readers-jpeg-Block-int-underflow-wild-pointer.patch b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2021-3697-video-readers-jpeg-Block-int-underflow-wild-pointer.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index e9fc52df86..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2021-3697-video-readers-jpeg-Block-int-underflow-wild-pointer.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
-From 22a3f97d39f6a10b08ad7fd1cc47c4dcd10413f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
-Date: Wed, 7 Jul 2021 15:38:19 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH] video/readers/jpeg: Block int underflow -> wild pointer write
-
-Certain 1 px wide images caused a wild pointer write in
-grub_jpeg_ycrcb_to_rgb(). This was caused because in grub_jpeg_decode_data(),
-we have the following loop:
-
-for (; data->r1 < nr1 && (!data->dri || rst);
- data->r1++, data->bitmap_ptr += (vb * data->image_width - hb * nc1) * 3)
-
-We did not check if vb * width >= hb * nc1.
-
-On a 64-bit platform, if that turns out to be negative, it will underflow,
-be interpreted as unsigned 64-bit, then be added to the 64-bit pointer, so
-we see data->bitmap_ptr jump, e.g.:
-
-0x6180_0000_0480 to
-0x6181_0000_0498
- ^
- ~--- carry has occurred and this pointer is now far away from
- any object.
-
-On a 32-bit platform, it will decrement the pointer, creating a pointer
-that won't crash but will overwrite random data.
-
-Catch the underflow and error out.
-
-Fixes: CVE-2021-3697
-
-Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
-Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-CVE: CVE-2021-3697
-
-Reference to upstream patch:
-https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=22a3f97d39f6a10b08ad7fd1cc47c4dcd10413f6
-
-Signed-off-by: Yongxin Liu <yongxin.liu@windriver.com>
----
- grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c | 10 +++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c b/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
-index 579bbe8a4..09596fbf5 100644
---- a/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
-+++ b/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
-@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
- #include <grub/mm.h>
- #include <grub/misc.h>
- #include <grub/bufio.h>
-+#include <grub/safemath.h>
-
- GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
-
-@@ -699,6 +700,7 @@ static grub_err_t
- grub_jpeg_decode_data (struct grub_jpeg_data *data)
- {
- unsigned c1, vb, hb, nr1, nc1;
-+ unsigned stride_a, stride_b, stride;
- int rst = data->dri;
- grub_err_t err = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
-
-@@ -711,8 +713,14 @@ grub_jpeg_decode_data (struct grub_jpeg_data *data)
- return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
- "jpeg: attempted to decode data before start of stream");
-
-+ if (grub_mul(vb, data->image_width, &stride_a) ||
-+ grub_mul(hb, nc1, &stride_b) ||
-+ grub_sub(stride_a, stride_b, &stride))
-+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
-+ "jpeg: cannot decode image with these dimensions");
-+
- for (; data->r1 < nr1 && (!data->dri || rst);
-- data->r1++, data->bitmap_ptr += (vb * data->image_width - hb * nc1) * 3)
-+ data->r1++, data->bitmap_ptr += stride * 3)
- for (c1 = 0; c1 < nc1 && (!data->dri || rst);
- c1++, rst--, data->bitmap_ptr += hb * 3)
- {
---
-2.34.1
-