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From 5942c26888ba12ad5e0d92fb62f23d7cde6dc159 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2020 06:25:56 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Bug 1631576 - Force a fixed length for DSA exponentiation
 r=pereida,bbrumley

Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D72011

Upstream-Status: Backport [https://hg.mozilla.org/projects/nss/rev/daa823a4a29bcef0fec33a379ec83857429aea2e]

Authored-by: Robert Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
---
 nss/lib/freebl/dsa.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/nss/lib/freebl/dsa.c b/nss/lib/freebl/dsa.c
index aef3539..389c9de 100644
--- a/nss/lib/freebl/dsa.c
+++ b/nss/lib/freebl/dsa.c
@@ -313,13 +313,14 @@ DSA_NewKeyFromSeed(const PQGParams *params,
 
 static SECStatus
 dsa_SignDigest(DSAPrivateKey *key, SECItem *signature, const SECItem *digest,
-               const unsigned char *kb)
+               const unsigned char *kbytes)
 {
     mp_int p, q, g; /* PQG parameters */
     mp_int x, k;    /* private key & pseudo-random integer */
     mp_int r, s;    /* tuple (r, s) is signature) */
     mp_int t;       /* holding tmp values */
     mp_int ar;      /* holding blinding values */
+    mp_digit fuzz;  /* blinding multiplier for q */
     mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
     SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
     unsigned int dsa_subprime_len, dsa_signature_len, offset;
@@ -373,6 +374,7 @@ dsa_SignDigest(DSAPrivateKey *key, SECItem *signature, const SECItem *digest,
     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&s));
     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&t));
     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&ar));
+
     /*
     ** Convert stored PQG and private key into MPI integers.
     */
@@ -380,14 +382,28 @@ dsa_SignDigest(DSAPrivateKey *key, SECItem *signature, const SECItem *digest,
     SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->params.subPrime, &q);
     SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->params.base, &g);
     SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->privateValue, &x);
-    OCTETS_TO_MPINT(kb, &k, dsa_subprime_len);
+    OCTETS_TO_MPINT(kbytes, &k, dsa_subprime_len);
+
+    /* k blinding  create a single value that has the high bit set in
+     * the mp_digit*/
+    if (RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(&fuzz, sizeof(mp_digit)) != SECSuccess) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
+        rv = SECFailure;
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+    fuzz |= 1ULL << ((sizeof(mp_digit) * PR_BITS_PER_BYTE - 1));
     /*
     ** FIPS 186-1, Section 5, Step 1
     **
     ** r = (g**k mod p) mod q
     */
-    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_exptmod(&g, &k, &p, &r)); /* r = g**k mod p */
-    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mod(&r, &q, &r));         /* r = r mod q    */
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mul_d(&q, fuzz, &t)); /* t = q*fuzz */
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_add(&k, &t, &t));     /* t = k+q*fuzz */
+    /* length of t is now fixed, bits in k have been blinded */
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_exptmod(&g, &t, &p, &r)); /* r = g**t mod p */
+    /* r is now g**(k+q*fuzz) == g**k mod p */
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mod(&r, &q, &r)); /* r = r mod q    */
+
     /*
     ** FIPS 186-1, Section 5, Step 2
     **
@@ -411,15 +427,24 @@ dsa_SignDigest(DSAPrivateKey *key, SECItem *signature, const SECItem *digest,
     /* Using mp_invmod on k directly would leak bits from k. */
     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mul(&k, &ar, &k));       /* k = k * ar */
     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&k, &t, &q, &k)); /* k = k * t mod q */
-    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_invmod(&k, &q, &k));     /* k = k**-1 mod q */
+    /* k is now k*t*ar */
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_invmod(&k, &q, &k)); /* k = k**-1 mod q */
+    /* k is now (k*t*ar)**-1 */
     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&k, &t, &q, &k)); /* k = k * t mod q */
-    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(localDigest, &s);       /* s = HASH(M)     */
+    /* k is now (k*ar)**-1 */
+    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(localDigest, &s); /* s = HASH(M)     */
     /* To avoid leaking secret bits here the addition is blinded. */
-    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mul(&x, &ar, &x));        /* x = x * ar */
-    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&x, &r, &q, &x));  /* x = x * r mod q */
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mul(&x, &ar, &x)); /* x = x * ar */
+    /* x is now x*ar */
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&x, &r, &q, &x)); /* x = x * r mod q */
+    /* x is now x*r*ar */
     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&s, &ar, &q, &t)); /* t = s * ar mod q */
-    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_add(&t, &x, &s));         /* s = t + x */
-    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&s, &k, &q, &s));  /* s = s * k mod q */
+    /* t is now hash(M)*ar */
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_add(&t, &x, &s)); /* s = t + x */
+    /* s is now (HASH(M)+x*r)*ar */
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&s, &k, &q, &s)); /* s = s * k mod q */
+    /* s is now (HASH(M)+x*r)*ar*(k*ar)**-1 = (k**-1)*(HASH(M)+x*r) */
+
     /*
     ** verify r != 0 and s != 0
     ** mentioned as optional in FIPS 186-1.
-- 
2.18.1