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-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-14372.patch76
1 files changed, 76 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-14372.patch b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-14372.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..08e7666cde
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-14372.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+From 0d237c0b90f0c6d4a3662c569b2371ae3ed69574 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 28 Sep 2020 20:08:41 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] acpi: Don't register the acpi command when locked down
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced. Otherwise an
+attacker can instruct the GRUB to load an SSDT table to overwrite
+the kernel lockdown configuration and later load and execute
+unsigned code.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2020-14372
+
+Reported-by: Máté Kukri <km@mkukri.xyz>
+Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=3e8e4c0549240fa209acffceb473e1e509b50c95]
+CVE: CVE-2020-14372
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com>
+---
+ docs/grub.texi | 5 +++++
+ grub-core/commands/acpi.c | 15 ++++++++-------
+ 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/docs/grub.texi b/docs/grub.texi
+index 0786427..47ac7ff 100644
+--- a/docs/grub.texi
++++ b/docs/grub.texi
+@@ -3986,6 +3986,11 @@ Normally, this command will replace the Root System Description Pointer
+ (RSDP) in the Extended BIOS Data Area to point to the new tables. If the
+ @option{--no-ebda} option is used, the new tables will be known only to
+ GRUB, but may be used by GRUB's EFI emulation.
++
++Note: The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced (@pxref{Lockdown}).
++ Otherwise an attacker can instruct the GRUB to load an SSDT table to
++ overwrite the kernel lockdown configuration and later load and execute
++ unsigned code.
+ @end deffn
+
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/commands/acpi.c b/grub-core/commands/acpi.c
+index 5a1499a..1215f2a 100644
+--- a/grub-core/commands/acpi.c
++++ b/grub-core/commands/acpi.c
+@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
+ #include <grub/mm.h>
+ #include <grub/memory.h>
+ #include <grub/i18n.h>
++#include <grub/lockdown.h>
+
+ #ifdef GRUB_MACHINE_EFI
+ #include <grub/efi/efi.h>
+@@ -775,13 +776,13 @@ static grub_extcmd_t cmd;
+
+ GRUB_MOD_INIT(acpi)
+ {
+- cmd = grub_register_extcmd ("acpi", grub_cmd_acpi, 0,
+- N_("[-1|-2] [--exclude=TABLE1,TABLE2|"
+- "--load-only=TABLE1,TABLE2] FILE1"
+- " [FILE2] [...]"),
+- N_("Load host ACPI tables and tables "
+- "specified by arguments."),
+- options);
++ cmd = grub_register_extcmd_lockdown ("acpi", grub_cmd_acpi, 0,
++ N_("[-1|-2] [--exclude=TABLE1,TABLE2|"
++ "--load-only=TABLE1,TABLE2] FILE1"
++ " [FILE2] [...]"),
++ N_("Load host ACPI tables and tables "
++ "specified by arguments."),
++ options);
+ }
+
+ GRUB_MOD_FINI(acpi)