diff options
author | 2015-07-17 11:53:24 +0300 | |
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committer | 2015-07-20 10:39:01 +0100 | |
commit | 8683206f7ba85f693751415f896a0cc62931e3c4 (patch) | |
tree | 65962014ed7e0962958ad6b8fe3efdc4eca42cd5 | |
parent | 180ce6570ba133ec5f36de3288d6ec163b54eefe (diff) | |
download | openembedded-core-8683206f7ba85f693751415f896a0cc62931e3c4.tar.gz |
libpam: Upgrade v1.1.6 -> v1.2.1
Dropped upstreamed patches(commit-id):
- add-checks-for-crypt-returning-NULL.patch(8dc056c)
- destdirfix.patch(d7e6b92)
- libpam-fix-for-CVE-2010-4708.patch(4c430f6)
Dropped backported patches(commit-id):
- pam_timestamp-fix-potential-directory-traversal-issu.patch(9dcead8)
- reflect-the-enforce_for_root-semantics-change-in-pam.patch(bd07ad3)
Forward ported patches:
- pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch
- crypt_configure.patch
Signed-off-by: Amarnath Valluri <amarnath.valluri@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
-rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/add-checks-for-crypt-returning-NULL.patch | 63 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/crypt_configure.patch | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/destdirfix.patch | 24 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/libpam-fix-for-CVE-2010-4708.patch | 41 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch | 226 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam_timestamp-fix-potential-directory-traversal-issu.patch | 63 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/reflect-the-enforce_for_root-semantics-change-in-pam.patch | 35 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.2.1.bb (renamed from meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.1.6.bb) | 10 |
8 files changed, 127 insertions, 339 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/add-checks-for-crypt-returning-NULL.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/add-checks-for-crypt-returning-NULL.patch deleted file mode 100644 index d364cea97e..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/add-checks-for-crypt-returning-NULL.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,63 +0,0 @@ -Backport from linux-pam git repo. - -[YOCTO #4107] - -Upstream-Status: Backport - -Signed-off-by: Kang Kai <kai.kang@windriver.com> - -From 8dc056c1c8bc7acb66c4decc49add2c3a24e6310 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> -Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2013 15:04:26 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] Add checks for crypt() returning NULL. - -modules/pam_pwhistory/opasswd.c (compare_password): Add check for crypt() NULL return. -modules/pam_unix/bigcrypt.c (bigcrypt): Likewise. ---- - modules/pam_pwhistory/opasswd.c | 2 +- - modules/pam_unix/bigcrypt.c | 9 +++++++++ - 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/modules/pam_pwhistory/opasswd.c b/modules/pam_pwhistory/opasswd.c -index 274fdb9..836d713 100644 ---- a/modules/pam_pwhistory/opasswd.c -+++ b/modules/pam_pwhistory/opasswd.c -@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ compare_password(const char *newpass, const char *oldpass) - outval = crypt (newpass, oldpass); - #endif - -- return strcmp(outval, oldpass) == 0; -+ return outval != NULL && strcmp(outval, oldpass) == 0; - } - - /* Check, if the new password is already in the opasswd file. */ -diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/bigcrypt.c b/modules/pam_unix/bigcrypt.c -index e10d1c5..e1d57a0 100644 ---- a/modules/pam_unix/bigcrypt.c -+++ b/modules/pam_unix/bigcrypt.c -@@ -109,6 +109,10 @@ char *bigcrypt(const char *key, const char *salt) - #else - tmp_ptr = crypt(plaintext_ptr, salt); /* libc crypt() */ - #endif -+ if (tmp_ptr == NULL) { -+ free(dec_c2_cryptbuf); -+ return NULL; -+ } - /* and place in the static area */ - strncpy(cipher_ptr, tmp_ptr, 13); - cipher_ptr += ESEGMENT_SIZE + SALT_SIZE; -@@ -130,6 +134,11 @@ char *bigcrypt(const char *key, const char *salt) - #else - tmp_ptr = crypt(plaintext_ptr, salt_ptr); - #endif -+ if (tmp_ptr == NULL) { -+ _pam_overwrite(dec_c2_cryptbuf); -+ free(dec_c2_cryptbuf); -+ return NULL; -+ } - - /* skip the salt for seg!=0 */ - strncpy(cipher_ptr, (tmp_ptr + SALT_SIZE), ESEGMENT_SIZE); --- -1.7.5.4 - diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/crypt_configure.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/crypt_configure.patch index efa82fb9b9..bec82a5f10 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/crypt_configure.patch +++ b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/crypt_configure.patch @@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com> Index: Linux-PAM-1.1.6/configure.in =================================================================== ---- Linux-PAM-1.1.6.org/configure.in -+++ Linux-PAM-1.1.6/configure.in +--- Linux-PAM-1.1.6.org/configure.ac ++++ Linux-PAM-1.1.6/configure.ac @@ -400,7 +400,9 @@ AS_IF([test "x$ac_cv_header_xcrypt_h" = [crypt_libs="crypt"]) diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/destdirfix.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/destdirfix.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 52145ecb34..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/destdirfix.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,24 +0,0 @@ -Avoid the failure: - -| mkdir -p /etc/security/namespace.d -| mkdir: cannot create directory `/etc/security/namespace.d': Permission denied - -if /etc/security/namespace.d doesn't exist. The DESTDIR prefix is missing. - -RP 2012/8/19 - -Upstream-Status: Pending - -Index: Linux-PAM-1.1.6/modules/pam_namespace/Makefile.am -=================================================================== ---- Linux-PAM-1.1.6.orig/modules/pam_namespace/Makefile.am 2012-08-15 11:08:43.000000000 +0000 -+++ Linux-PAM-1.1.6/modules/pam_namespace/Makefile.am 2012-08-19 12:25:32.311038943 +0000 -@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ - secureconf_SCRIPTS = namespace.init - - install-data-local: -- mkdir -p $(namespaceddir) -+ mkdir -p $(DESTDIR)$(namespaceddir) - endif - - diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/libpam-fix-for-CVE-2010-4708.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/libpam-fix-for-CVE-2010-4708.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 5d2b69aae0..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/libpam-fix-for-CVE-2010-4708.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,41 +0,0 @@ -Upstream-Status: Backport - -Fix for CVE-2010-4708 - -Change default for user_readenv to 0 and document the -new default for user_readenv. - -This fix is got from: -http://pam.cvs.sourceforge.net/viewvc/pam/Linux-PAM/modules/pam_env -/pam_env.c?r1=1.22&r2=1.23&view=patch -http://pam.cvs.sourceforge.net/viewvc/pam/Linux-PAM/modules/pam_env -/pam_env.8.xml?r1=1.7&r2=1.8&view=patch - -Signed-off-by: Wenzong Fan <wenzong.fan@windriver.com> - ---- ---- a/modules/pam_env/pam_env.c 2012-09-05 13:57:47.000000000 +0800 -+++ b/modules/pam_env/pam_env.c 2012-09-05 13:58:05.000000000 +0800 -@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ - #define DEFAULT_READ_ENVFILE 1 - - #define DEFAULT_USER_ENVFILE ".pam_environment" --#define DEFAULT_USER_READ_ENVFILE 1 -+#define DEFAULT_USER_READ_ENVFILE 0 - - #include "config.h" - ---- a/modules/pam_env/pam_env.8.xml 2012-09-05 13:58:24.000000000 +0800 -+++ b/modules/pam_env/pam_env.8.xml 2012-09-05 13:59:36.000000000 +0800 -@@ -147,7 +147,10 @@ - <listitem> - <para> - Turns on or off the reading of the user specific environment -- file. 0 is off, 1 is on. By default this option is on. -+ file. 0 is off, 1 is on. By default this option is off as user -+ supplied environment variables in the PAM environment could affect -+ behavior of subsequent modules in the stack without the consent -+ of the system administrator. - </para> - </listitem> - </varlistentry> diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch index b285e96c27..423267f707 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch +++ b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch @@ -1,6 +1,9 @@ -Debian patch to add a new 'nullok_secure' option to pam_unix, which -accepts users with null passwords only when the applicant is connected -from a tty listed in /etc/securetty. +From 9bdc197474795f2d000c2bc04f58f7cef8898f21 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Amarnath Valluri <amarnath.valluri@intel.com> +Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 13:07:20 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] Debian patch to add a new 'nullok_secure' option to pam_unix, + which accepts users with null passwords only when the applicant is connected + from a tty listed in /etc/securetty. Authors: Sam Hartman <hartmans@debian.org>, Steve Langasek <vorlon@debian.org> @@ -8,10 +11,24 @@ Authors: Sam Hartman <hartmans@debian.org>, Upstream-Status: Pending Signed-off-by: Ming Liu <ming.liu@windriver.com> -=================================================================== -diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am b/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am ---- a/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am 2013-07-05 09:51:31.014483164 +0800 -+++ b/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am 2013-07-05 10:26:12.884484000 +0800 + +v2: + - Forward ported from v1.1.6 to v1.2.1 + +Signed-off-by: Amarnath Valluri <amarnath.valluri@intel.com> +--- + modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am | 3 ++- + modules/pam_unix/README | 11 ++++++++++- + modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8 | 9 ++++++++- + modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml | 19 ++++++++++++++++++- + modules/pam_unix/support.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- + modules/pam_unix/support.h | 8 ++++++-- + 6 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am b/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am +index 56ed591..9a372ac 100644 +--- a/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am ++++ b/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am @@ -30,7 +30,8 @@ if HAVE_VERSIONING pam_unix_la_LDFLAGS += -Wl,--version-script=$(srcdir)/../modules.map endif @@ -22,10 +39,33 @@ diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am b/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am securelib_LTLIBRARIES = pam_unix.la -diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8 b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8 ---- a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8 2013-07-05 09:52:16.825108201 +0800 -+++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8 2013-07-05 10:28:34.724483774 +0800 -@@ -220,7 +220,14 @@ A little more extreme than debug\&. +diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/README b/modules/pam_unix/README +index 3935dba..7880d91 100644 +--- a/modules/pam_unix/README ++++ b/modules/pam_unix/README +@@ -67,7 +67,16 @@ nullok + + The default action of this module is to not permit the user access to a + service if their official password is blank. The nullok argument overrides +- this default. ++ this default and allows any user with a blank password to access the ++ service. ++ ++nullok_secure ++ ++ The default action of this module is to not permit the user access to a ++ service if their official password is blank. The nullok_secure argument ++ overrides this default and allows any user with a blank password to access ++ the service as long as the value of PAM_TTY is set to one of the values ++ found in /etc/securetty. + + try_first_pass + +diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8 b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8 +index 339178b..a4bd906 100644 +--- a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8 ++++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8 +@@ -92,7 +92,14 @@ Turns off informational messages namely messages about session open and close vi .RS 4 The default action of this module is to not permit the user access to a service if their official password is blank\&. The \fBnullok\fR @@ -41,10 +81,11 @@ diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8 b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8 .RE .PP \fBtry_first_pass\fR -diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml ---- a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml 2013-07-05 09:52:38.775108523 +0800 -+++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml 2013-07-05 10:30:23.084483630 +0800 -@@ -135,7 +135,24 @@ +diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml +index a8b64bb..1ced6f4 100644 +--- a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml ++++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml +@@ -159,7 +159,24 @@ <para> The default action of this module is to not permit the user access to a service if their official password is blank. @@ -70,36 +111,15 @@ diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml </para> </listitem> </varlistentry> -diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/README b/modules/pam_unix/README ---- a/modules/pam_unix/README 2013-07-05 09:51:52.205107846 +0800 -+++ b/modules/pam_unix/README 2013-07-05 10:27:10.774484537 +0800 -@@ -57,7 +57,16 @@ nullok - - The default action of this module is to not permit the user access to a - service if their official password is blank. The nullok argument overrides -- this default. -+ this default and allows any user with a blank password to access the -+ service. -+ -+nullok_secure -+ -+ The default action of this module is to not permit the user access to a -+ service if their official password is blank. The nullok_secure argument -+ overrides this default and allows any user with a blank password to access -+ the service as long as the value of PAM_TTY is set to one of the values -+ found in /etc/securetty. - - try_first_pass - -diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/support.c b/modules/pam_unix/support.c ---- a/modules/pam_unix/support.c 2013-07-05 09:50:49.134482523 +0800 -+++ b/modules/pam_unix/support.c 2013-07-05 09:56:26.924484267 +0800 -@@ -84,14 +84,22 @@ int _set_ctrl(pam_handle_t *pamh, int fl +diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/support.c b/modules/pam_unix/support.c +index abccd82..2361957 100644 +--- a/modules/pam_unix/support.c ++++ b/modules/pam_unix/support.c +@@ -189,13 +189,22 @@ int _set_ctrl(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int *remember, int *rounds, /* now parse the arguments to this module */ for (; argc-- > 0; ++argv) { -- int j; -+ int j, sl; ++ int sl; D(("pam_unix arg: %s", *argv)); @@ -108,48 +128,46 @@ diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/support.c b/modules/pam_unix/support.c - && !strncmp(*argv, unix_args[j].token, strlen(unix_args[j].token))) { - break; + if (unix_args[j].token) { -+ sl = strlen(unix_args[j].token); -+ if (unix_args[j].token[sl-1] == '=') { -+ /* exclude argument from comparison */ -+ if (!strncmp(*argv, unix_args[j].token, sl)) -+ break; -+ } else { ++ sl = strlen(unix_args[j].token); ++ if (unix_args[j].token[sl-1] == '=') { ++ /* exclude argument from comparison */ ++ if (!strncmp(*argv, unix_args[j].token, sl)) ++ break; ++ } else { + /* compare full strings */ -+ if (!strcmp(*argv, unix_args[j].token)) -+ break; -+ } ++ if (!strcmp(*argv, unix_args[j].token)) ++ break; ++ } } } -@@ -461,6 +469,7 @@ static int _unix_run_helper_binary(pam_h - child = fork(); +@@ -566,6 +575,7 @@ static int _unix_run_helper_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *passwd, if (child == 0) { - int i=0; -+ int nullok = off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl); - struct rlimit rlim; static char *envp[] = { NULL }; - char *args[] = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }; -@@ -488,7 +497,18 @@ static int _unix_run_helper_binary(pam_h + const char *args[] = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }; ++ int nullok = off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl); + + /* XXX - should really tidy up PAM here too */ + +@@ -593,7 +603,16 @@ static int _unix_run_helper_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *passwd, /* exec binary helper */ - args[0] = strdup(CHKPWD_HELPER); - args[1] = x_strdup(user); + args[0] = CHKPWD_HELPER; + args[1] = user; - if (off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl)) { /* this means we've succeeded */ -+ + if (on(UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE, ctrl)) { -+ const void *uttyname; -+ retval = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, &uttyname); -+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS || uttyname == NULL -+ || _pammodutil_tty_secure(pamh, (const char *)uttyname) != PAM_SUCCESS) -+ { -+ nullok = 0; -+ } ++ const void *uttyname; ++ retval = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, &uttyname); ++ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS || uttyname == NULL ++ || _pammodutil_tty_secure(pamh, (const char *)uttyname) != PAM_SUCCESS) { ++ nullok = 0; ++ } + } + + if (nullok) { - args[2]=strdup("nullok"); + args[2]="nullok"; } else { - args[2]=strdup("nonull"); -@@ -567,6 +587,17 @@ _unix_blankpasswd (pam_handle_t *pamh, u + args[2]="nonull"; +@@ -678,6 +697,17 @@ _unix_blankpasswd (pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned int ctrl, const char *name) if (on(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl)) return 0; /* will fail but don't let on yet */ @@ -167,56 +185,56 @@ diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/support.c b/modules/pam_unix/support.c /* UNIX passwords area */ retval = get_pwd_hash(pamh, name, &pwd, &salt); -@@ -653,7 +684,8 @@ int _unix_verify_password(pam_handle_t * +@@ -764,7 +794,7 @@ int _unix_verify_password(pam_handle_t * pamh, const char *name } } } else { - retval = verify_pwd_hash(p, salt, off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl)); -+ retval = verify_pwd_hash(p, salt, -+ _unix_blankpasswd(pamh, ctrl, name)); ++ retval = verify_pwd_hash(p, salt, _unix_blankpasswd(pamh, ctrl, name)); } if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS) { -diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/support.h b/modules/pam_unix/support.h ---- a/modules/pam_unix/support.h 2013-07-05 09:51:10.385107934 +0800 -+++ b/modules/pam_unix/support.h 2013-07-05 10:23:54.815107842 +0800 -@@ -90,8 +90,9 @@ typedef struct { - password hash algorithms */ - #define UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS 26 /* new password hashes will use blowfish */ +diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/support.h b/modules/pam_unix/support.h +index 3729ce0..43cdbea 100644 +--- a/modules/pam_unix/support.h ++++ b/modules/pam_unix/support.h +@@ -99,8 +99,9 @@ typedef struct { #define UNIX_MIN_PASS_LEN 27 /* min length for password */ -+#define UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE 28 /* NULL passwords allowed only on secure ttys */ + #define UNIX_QUIET 28 /* Don't print informational messages */ + #define UNIX_DES 29 /* DES, default */ ++#define UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE 30 /* NULL passwords allowed only on secure ttys */ /* -------------- */ --#define UNIX_CTRLS_ 28 /* number of ctrl arguments defined */ -+#define UNIX_CTRLS_ 29 /* number of ctrl arguments defined */ +-#define UNIX_CTRLS_ 30 /* number of ctrl arguments defined */ ++#define UNIX_CTRLS_ 31 /* number of ctrl arguments defined */ #define UNIX_DES_CRYPT(ctrl) (off(UNIX_MD5_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_BIGCRYPT,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_SHA256_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_SHA512_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS,ctrl)) -@@ -109,7 +110,7 @@ static const UNIX_Ctrls unix_args[UNIX_C - /* UNIX_NOT_SET_PASS */ {"not_set_pass", _ALL_ON_, 0100}, - /* UNIX__PRELIM */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_^(0600), 0200}, - /* UNIX__UPDATE */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_^(0600), 0400}, --/* UNIX__NONULL */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_, 01000}, -+/* UNIX__NONULL */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_^(0x10000000), 0x200}, - /* UNIX__QUIET */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_, 02000}, - /* UNIX_USE_AUTHTOK */ {"use_authtok", _ALL_ON_, 04000}, - /* UNIX_SHADOW */ {"shadow", _ALL_ON_, 010000}, -@@ -127,7 +128,8 @@ static const UNIX_Ctrls unix_args[UNIX_C - /* UNIX_SHA512_PASS */ {"sha512", _ALL_ON_^(0260420000), 040000000}, - /* UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS */ {"rounds=", _ALL_ON_, 0100000000}, - /* UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS */ {"blowfish", _ALL_ON_^(0260420000), 0200000000}, --/* UNIX_MIN_PASS_LEN */ {"minlen=", _ALL_ON_, 0400000000}, -+/* UNIX_MIN_PASS_LEN */ {"minlen=", _ALL_ON_, 0400000000}, -+/* UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE */ {"nullok_secure", _ALL_ON_^(0x200), 0x10000000}, +@@ -118,7 +119,7 @@ static const UNIX_Ctrls unix_args[UNIX_CTRLS_] = + /* UNIX_NOT_SET_PASS */ {"not_set_pass", _ALL_ON_, 0100, 0}, + /* UNIX__PRELIM */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_^(0600), 0200, 0}, + /* UNIX__UPDATE */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_^(0600), 0400, 0}, +-/* UNIX__NONULL */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_, 01000, 0}, ++/* UNIX__NONULL */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_^(0x10000000), 0200, 0}, + /* UNIX__QUIET */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_, 02000, 0}, + /* UNIX_USE_AUTHTOK */ {"use_authtok", _ALL_ON_, 04000, 0}, + /* UNIX_SHADOW */ {"shadow", _ALL_ON_, 010000, 0}, +@@ -139,6 +140,7 @@ static const UNIX_Ctrls unix_args[UNIX_CTRLS_] = + /* UNIX_MIN_PASS_LEN */ {"minlen=", _ALL_ON_, 0400000000, 0}, + /* UNIX_QUIET */ {"quiet", _ALL_ON_, 01000000000, 0}, + /* UNIX_DES */ {"des", _ALL_ON_^(0260420000), 0, 1}, ++/* UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE */ {"nullok_secure", _ALL_ON_^(0x200), 0x10000000, 0}, }; #define UNIX_DEFAULTS (unix_args[UNIX__NONULL].flag) -@@ -163,6 +165,9 @@ extern int _unix_read_password(pam_handl +@@ -171,6 +173,8 @@ extern int _unix_read_password(pam_handle_t * pamh + ,const char *prompt2 ,const char *data_name ,const void **pass); - +extern int _pammodutil_tty_secure(const pam_handle_t *pamh, -+ const char *uttyname); -+ ++ const char *uttyname); + extern int _unix_run_verify_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned int ctrl, const char *user, int *daysleft); - #endif /* _PAM_UNIX_SUPPORT_H */ +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam_timestamp-fix-potential-directory-traversal-issu.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam_timestamp-fix-potential-directory-traversal-issu.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 06cca13abe..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam_timestamp-fix-potential-directory-traversal-issu.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,63 +0,0 @@ -From 9dcead87e6d7f66d34e7a56d11a30daca367dffb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Dmitry V. Levin" <ldv@altlinux.org> -Date: Wed, 26 Mar 2014 22:17:23 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH] pam_timestamp: fix potential directory traversal issue - (ticket #27) - -commit 9dcead87e6d7f66d34e7a56d11a30daca367dffb upstream - -pam_timestamp uses values of PAM_RUSER and PAM_TTY as components of -the timestamp pathname it creates, so extra care should be taken to -avoid potential directory traversal issues. - -* modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c (check_tty): Treat -"." and ".." tty values as invalid. -(get_ruser): Treat "." and ".." ruser values, as well as any ruser -value containing '/', as invalid. - -Fixes CVE-2014-2583. - -Reported-by: Sebastian Krahmer <krahmer@suse.de> - -Upstream-Status: Backport - -Signed-off-by: Yue Tao <Yue.Tao@windriver.com> -Signed-off-by: Wenzong Fan <wenzong.fan@windriver.com> ---- - modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c | 13 ++++++++++++- - 1 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c b/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c -index 5193733..b3f08b1 100644 ---- a/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c -+++ b/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c -@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ check_tty(const char *tty) - tty = strrchr(tty, '/') + 1; - } - /* Make sure the tty wasn't actually a directory (no basename). */ -- if (strlen(tty) == 0) { -+ if (!strlen(tty) || !strcmp(tty, ".") || !strcmp(tty, "..")) { - return NULL; - } - return tty; -@@ -243,6 +243,17 @@ get_ruser(pam_handle_t *pamh, char *ruserbuf, size_t ruserbuflen) - if (pwd != NULL) { - ruser = pwd->pw_name; - } -+ } else { -+ /* -+ * This ruser is used by format_timestamp_name as a component -+ * of constructed timestamp pathname, so ".", "..", and '/' -+ * are disallowed to avoid potential path traversal issues. -+ */ -+ if (!strcmp(ruser, ".") || -+ !strcmp(ruser, "..") || -+ strchr(ruser, '/')) { -+ ruser = NULL; -+ } - } - if (ruser == NULL || strlen(ruser) >= ruserbuflen) { - *ruserbuf = '\0'; --- -1.7.5.4 - diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/reflect-the-enforce_for_root-semantics-change-in-pam.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/reflect-the-enforce_for_root-semantics-change-in-pam.patch deleted file mode 100644 index c13535ecc2..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/reflect-the-enforce_for_root-semantics-change-in-pam.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,35 +0,0 @@ -Backport from linux-pam git repo. - -[YOCTO #4107] - -Upstream-Status: Backport - -Signed-off-by: Kang Kai <kai.kang@windriver.com> - -From bd07ad3adc626f842a4391d256541883426fd389 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> -Date: Tue, 13 Nov 2012 09:19:05 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] Reflect the enforce_for_root semantics change in - pam_pwhistory xtest. - -xtests/tst-pam_pwhistory1.pamd: Use enforce_for_root as the test is -running with real uid == 0. ---- - xtests/tst-pam_pwhistory1.pamd | 2 +- - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/xtests/tst-pam_pwhistory1.pamd b/xtests/tst-pam_pwhistory1.pamd -index 68e1b94..d60db7c 100644 ---- a/xtests/tst-pam_pwhistory1.pamd -+++ b/xtests/tst-pam_pwhistory1.pamd -@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ - #%PAM-1.0 - auth required pam_permit.so - account required pam_permit.so --password required pam_pwhistory.so remember=10 retry=1 -+password required pam_pwhistory.so remember=10 retry=1 enforce_for_root - password required pam_unix.so use_authtok md5 - session required pam_permit.so --- -1.7.11.7 - diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.1.6.bb b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.2.1.bb index d347bdc43b..ac3097ef7c 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.1.6.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.2.1.bb @@ -18,19 +18,15 @@ SRC_URI = "http://linux-pam.org/library/Linux-PAM-${PV}.tar.bz2 \ file://pam.d/common-session-noninteractive \ file://pam.d/other \ file://libpam-xtests.patch \ - file://destdirfix.patch \ file://fixsepbuild.patch \ - file://reflect-the-enforce_for_root-semantics-change-in-pam.patch \ - file://add-checks-for-crypt-returning-NULL.patch \ - file://libpam-fix-for-CVE-2010-4708.patch \ file://pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch \ file://pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch \ - file://pam_timestamp-fix-potential-directory-traversal-issu.patch \ file://libpam-xtests-remove-bash-dependency.patch \ file://crypt_configure.patch \ " -SRC_URI[md5sum] = "7b73e58b7ce79ffa321d408de06db2c4" -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "bab887d6280f47fc3963df3b95735a27a16f0f663636163ddf3acab5f1149fc2" + +SRC_URI[md5sum] = "9dc53067556d2dd567808fd509519dd6" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "342b1211c0d3b203a7df2540a5b03a428a087bd8a48c17e49ae268f992b334d9" SRC_URI_append_libc-uclibc = " file://pam-no-innetgr.patch" SRC_URI_append_libc-musl = " file://pam-no-innetgr.patch" |