diff options
author | Fan Xin <fan.xin@jp.fujitsu.com> | 2015-11-19 19:46:47 +0900 |
---|---|---|
committer | Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org> | 2015-12-01 21:30:58 +0000 |
commit | 80af821d1240a1fc2b32379b75801571db562657 (patch) | |
tree | dc19d2eeebca3c0cde11e0953c947326da035656 | |
parent | 12c3f7b5501c0035f72c115fa2eac7aaad927057 (diff) | |
download | openembedded-core-80af821d1240a1fc2b32379b75801571db562657.tar.gz |
wpa-supplicant: upgrade to 2.5
wpa-supplicant: upgrade to 2.5
1. upgrade to 2.5
2. remove eight patches since they have been applied in 2.5
3. update SRC_URI, HOMEPAGE and BUGTRACKER to use w1.fi instead
Signed-off-by: Fan Xin <fan.xin@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
9 files changed, 6 insertions, 452 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 882674fe5b..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,45 +0,0 @@ -Upstream-Status: Backport - -Signed-off-by: Fan Xin <fan.xin@jp.fujitsu.com> - -From ef566a4d4f74022e1fdb0a2addfe81e6de9f4aae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> -Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2015 02:21:53 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH] AP WMM: Fix integer underflow in WMM Action frame parser - -The length of the WMM Action frame was not properly validated and the -length of the information elements (int left) could end up being -negative. This would result in reading significantly past the stack -buffer while parsing the IEs in ieee802_11_parse_elems() and while doing -so, resulting in segmentation fault. - -This can result in an invalid frame being used for a denial of service -attack (hostapd process killed) against an AP with a driver that uses -hostapd for management frame processing (e.g., all mac80211-based -drivers). - -Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and -reporting this issue. - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> ---- - src/ap/wmm.c | 3 +++ - 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/src/ap/wmm.c b/src/ap/wmm.c -index 6d4177c..314e244 100644 ---- a/src/ap/wmm.c -+++ b/src/ap/wmm.c -@@ -274,6 +274,9 @@ void hostapd_wmm_action(struct hostapd_data *hapd, - return; - } - -+ if (left < 0) -+ return; /* not a valid WMM Action frame */ -+ - /* extract the tspec info element */ - if (ieee802_11_parse_elems(pos, left, &elems, 1) == ParseFailed) { - hostapd_logger(hapd, mgmt->sa, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211, --- -1.9.1 - diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch deleted file mode 100644 index a2bafc8c46..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,77 +0,0 @@ -Upstream-Status: Backport - -Signed-off-by: Fan Xin <fan.xin@jp.fujitsu.com> - -From dd2f043c9c43d156494e33d7ce22db96e6ef42c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> -Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:37:45 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH 1/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix payload length validation for Commit - and Confirm - -The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not -checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read -overflow when processing an invalid message. - -Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before -processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to -make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm -message before the previous exchanges have been completed. - -Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and -reporting this issue. - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> ---- - src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c -index f2b0926..a629437 100644 ---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c -+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c -@@ -355,6 +355,23 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data, - BIGNUM *mask = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL; - u16 offset; - u8 *ptr, *scalar = NULL, *element = NULL; -+ size_t prime_len, order_len; -+ -+ if (data->state != PWD_Commit_Req) { -+ ret->ignore = TRUE; -+ goto fin; -+ } -+ -+ prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime); -+ order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order); -+ -+ if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, -+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)", -+ (unsigned int) payload_len, -+ (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len)); -+ goto fin; -+ } - - if (((data->private_value = BN_new()) == NULL) || - ((data->my_element = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL) || -@@ -554,6 +571,18 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data, - u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr; - int offset; - -+ if (data->state != PWD_Confirm_Req) { -+ ret->ignore = TRUE; -+ goto fin; -+ } -+ -+ if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, -+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)", -+ (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN); -+ goto fin; -+ } -+ - /* - * first build up the ciphersuite which is group | random_function | - * prf --- -1.9.1 - diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch deleted file mode 100644 index e108a931c0..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,47 +0,0 @@ -From 9ed4eee345f85e3025c33c6e20aa25696e341ccd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> -Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2015 11:32:11 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH] P2P: Validate SSID element length before copying it - (CVE-2015-1863) - -This fixes a possible memcpy overflow for P2P dev->oper_ssid in -p2p_add_device(). The length provided by the peer device (0..255 bytes) -was used without proper bounds checking and that could have resulted in -arbitrary data of up to 223 bytes being written beyond the end of the -dev->oper_ssid[] array (of which about 150 bytes would be beyond the -heap allocation) when processing a corrupted management frame for P2P -peer discovery purposes. - -This could result in corrupted state in heap, unexpected program -behavior due to corrupted P2P peer device information, denial of service -due to process crash, exposure of memory contents during GO Negotiation, -and potentially arbitrary code execution. - -Thanks to Google security team for reporting this issue and smart -hardware research group of Alibaba security team for discovering it. - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> - -Upstream-Status: Backport - -Signed-off-by: Yue Tao <yue.tao@windriver.com> - ---- - src/p2p/p2p.c | 1 + - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) - -diff --git a/src/p2p/p2p.c b/src/p2p/p2p.c -index f584fae..a45fe73 100644 ---- a/src/p2p/p2p.c -+++ b/src/p2p/p2p.c -@@ -778,6 +778,7 @@ int p2p_add_device(struct p2p_data *p2p, const u8 *addr, int freq, - if (os_memcmp(addr, p2p_dev_addr, ETH_ALEN) != 0) - os_memcpy(dev->interface_addr, addr, ETH_ALEN); - if (msg.ssid && -+ msg.ssid[1] <= sizeof(dev->oper_ssid) && - (msg.ssid[1] != P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN || - os_memcmp(msg.ssid + 2, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN) - != 0)) { --- -1.7.9.5 - diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 2568ea1124..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,53 +0,0 @@ -Upstream-Status: Backport - -Signed-off-by: Fan Xin <fan.xin@jp.fujitsu.com> - -From 5acd23f4581da58683f3cf5e36cb71bbe4070bd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> -Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2015 17:08:33 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH] WPS: Fix HTTP chunked transfer encoding parser - -strtoul() return value may end up overflowing the int h->chunk_size and -resulting in a negative value to be stored as the chunk_size. This could -result in the following memcpy operation using a very large length -argument which would result in a buffer overflow and segmentation fault. - -This could have been used to cause a denial service by any device that -has been authorized for network access (either wireless or wired). This -would affect both the WPS UPnP functionality in a WPS AP (hostapd with -upnp_iface parameter set in the configuration) and WPS ER -(wpa_supplicant with WPS_ER_START control interface command used). - -Validate the parsed chunk length value to avoid this. In addition to -rejecting negative values, we can also reject chunk size that would be -larger than the maximum configured body length. - -Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and -reporting this issue. - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> ---- - src/wps/httpread.c | 7 +++++++ - 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/src/wps/httpread.c b/src/wps/httpread.c -index 2f08f37..d2855e3 100644 ---- a/src/wps/httpread.c -+++ b/src/wps/httpread.c -@@ -533,6 +533,13 @@ static void httpread_read_handler(int sd, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx) - if (!isxdigit(*cbp)) - goto bad; - h->chunk_size = strtoul(cbp, NULL, 16); -+ if (h->chunk_size < 0 || -+ h->chunk_size > h->max_bytes) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, -+ "httpread: Invalid chunk size %d", -+ h->chunk_size); -+ goto bad; -+ } - /* throw away chunk header - * so we have only real data - */ --- -1.9.1 - diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch deleted file mode 100644 index c477c2f93c..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,70 +0,0 @@ -Upstream-Status: Backport - -Signed-off-by: Fan Xin <fan.xin@jp.fujitsu.com> - -From e28a58be26184c2a23f80b410e0997ef1bd5d578 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> -Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:40:44 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH 2/5] EAP-pwd server: Fix payload length validation for Commit - and Confirm - -The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not -checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read -overflow when processing an invalid message. - -Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before -processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to -make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm -message before the previous exchanges have been completed. - -Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and -reporting this issue. - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> ---- - src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ - 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c -index 66bd5d2..3189105 100644 ---- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c -+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c -@@ -656,9 +656,21 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data, - BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL; - EC_POINT *K = NULL, *point = NULL; - int res = 0; -+ size_t prime_len, order_len; - - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Received commit response"); - -+ prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime); -+ order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order); -+ -+ if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, -+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)", -+ (unsigned int) payload_len, -+ (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len)); -+ goto fin; -+ } -+ - if (((data->peer_scalar = BN_new()) == NULL) || - ((data->k = BN_new()) == NULL) || - ((cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) || -@@ -774,6 +786,13 @@ eap_pwd_process_confirm_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data, - u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr; - int offset; - -+ if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, -+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)", -+ (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN); -+ goto fin; -+ } -+ - /* build up the ciphersuite: group | random_function | prf */ - grp = htons(data->group_num); - ptr = (u8 *) &cs; --- -1.9.1 - diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch deleted file mode 100644 index e46ce436e1..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,56 +0,0 @@ -Upstream-Status: Backport - -Signed-off-by: Fan Xin <fan.xin@jp.fujitsu.com> - -From 477c74395acd0123340457ba6f15ab345d42016e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> -Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:23:04 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH 3/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment - reassembly - -The remaining number of bytes in the message could be smaller than the -Total-Length field size, so the length needs to be explicitly checked -prior to reading the field and decrementing the len variable. This could -have resulted in the remaining length becoming negative and interpreted -as a huge positive integer. - -In addition, check that there is no already started fragment in progress -before allocating a new buffer for reassembling fragments. This avoid a -potential memory leak when processing invalid message. - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> ---- - src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 12 ++++++++++++ - 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c -index a629437..1d2079b 100644 ---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c -+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c -@@ -866,11 +866,23 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret, - * if it's the first fragment there'll be a length field - */ - if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) { -+ if (len < 2) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, -+ "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field"); -+ ret->ignore = TRUE; -+ return NULL; -+ } - tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos); - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments whose " - "total length = %d", tot_len); - if (tot_len > 15000) - return NULL; -+ if (data->inbuf) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, -+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use"); -+ ret->ignore = TRUE; -+ return NULL; -+ } - data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len); - if (data->inbuf == NULL) { - wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "Out of memory to buffer " --- -1.9.1 - diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch deleted file mode 100644 index a4c02b4745..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,54 +0,0 @@ -Upstream-Status: Backport - -Signed-off-by: Fan Xin <fan.xin@jp.fujitsu.com> - -From 3035cc2894e08319b905bd6561e8bddc8c2db9fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> -Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:26:06 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH 4/5] EAP-pwd server: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment - reassembly - -The remaining number of bytes in the message could be smaller than the -Total-Length field size, so the length needs to be explicitly checked -prior to reading the field and decrementing the len variable. This could -have resulted in the remaining length becoming negative and interpreted -as a huge positive integer. - -In addition, check that there is no already started fragment in progress -before allocating a new buffer for reassembling fragments. This avoid a -potential memory leak when processing invalid message. - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> ---- - src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 10 ++++++++++ - 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c -index 3189105..2bfc3c2 100644 ---- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c -+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c -@@ -942,11 +942,21 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, - * the first fragment has a total length - */ - if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) { -+ if (len < 2) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, -+ "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field"); -+ return; -+ } - tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos); - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments, total " - "length = %d", tot_len); - if (tot_len > 15000) - return; -+ if (data->inbuf) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, -+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use"); -+ return; -+ } - data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len); - if (data->inbuf == NULL) { - wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Out of memory to " --- -1.9.1 - diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 4073600732..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,36 +0,0 @@ -Upstream-Status: Backport - -Signed-off-by: Fan Xin <fan.xin@jp.fujitsu.com> - -From 28a069a545b06b99eb55ad53f63f2c99e65a98f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> -Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:26:28 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH 5/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix asymmetric fragmentation behavior - -The L (Length) and M (More) flags needs to be cleared before deciding -whether the locally generated response requires fragmentation. This -fixes an issue where these flags from the server could have been invalid -for the following message. In some cases, this could have resulted in -triggering the wpabuf security check that would terminate the process -due to invalid buffer allocation. - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> ---- - src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 1 + - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) - -diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c -index 1d2079b..e58b13a 100644 ---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c -+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c -@@ -968,6 +968,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret, - /* - * we have output! Do we need to fragment it? - */ -+ lm_exch = EAP_PWD_GET_EXCHANGE(lm_exch); - len = wpabuf_len(data->outbuf); - if ((len + EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE) > data->mtu) { - resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD, data->mtu, --- -1.9.1 - diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.5.bb index a124cf21d9..21263771ed 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.5.bb @@ -1,11 +1,11 @@ SUMMARY = "Client for Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)" -HOMEPAGE = "http://hostap.epitest.fi/wpa_supplicant/" -BUGTRACKER = "http://hostap.epitest.fi/bugz/" +HOMEPAGE = "http://w1.fi/wpa_supplicant/" +BUGTRACKER = "http://w1.fi/security/" SECTION = "network" LICENSE = "BSD" LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=36b27801447e0662ee0138d17fe93880 \ file://README;beginline=1;endline=56;md5=7f393579f8b109fe91f3b9765d26c7d3 \ - file://wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c;beginline=1;endline=12;md5=3430fda79f2ba1dd545f0b3c4d6e4d24 " + file://wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c;beginline=1;endline=12;md5=3430fda79f2ba1dd545f0b3c4d6e4d24" DEPENDS = "dbus libnl libgcrypt" RRECOMMENDS_${PN} = "wpa-supplicant-passphrase wpa-supplicant-cli" @@ -18,23 +18,15 @@ inherit systemd SYSTEMD_SERVICE_${PN} = "wpa_supplicant.service wpa_supplicant-nl80211@.service wpa_supplicant-wired@.service" SYSTEMD_AUTO_ENABLE = "disable" -SRC_URI = "http://hostap.epitest.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz \ +SRC_URI = "http://w1.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://defconfig \ file://wpa-supplicant.sh \ file://wpa_supplicant.conf \ file://wpa_supplicant.conf-sane \ file://99_wpa_supplicant \ - file://0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch \ - file://0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch \ - file://0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch \ - file://0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch \ - file://0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch \ - file://0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch \ - file://0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch \ - file://0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch \ " -SRC_URI[md5sum] = "f0037dbe03897dcaf2ad2722e659095d" -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "058dc832c096139a059e6df814080f50251a8d313c21b13364c54a1e70109122" +SRC_URI[md5sum] = "96ff75c3a514f1f324560a2376f13110" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "cce55bae483b364eae55c35ba567c279be442ed8bab5b80a3c7fb0d057b9b316" S = "${WORKDIR}/wpa_supplicant-${PV}" |