diff options
author | Changhyeok Bae <changhyeok.bae@gmail.com> | 2019-02-08 05:21:07 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org> | 2019-02-08 14:11:45 +0000 |
commit | 2c3a905061b501b1c79e191a1f275fdb9768a2d6 (patch) | |
tree | 48366ae4386a54cbafef1cdfb1c6fa9a643e2ac2 | |
parent | 85f82e94849f1c1b5e150c2e38c03eae19a2b370 (diff) | |
download | openembedded-core-2c3a905061b501b1c79e191a1f275fdb9768a2d6.tar.gz |
wpa-supplicant: update to 2.7
CVE patches is already applied in v2.7
Signed-off-by: Changhyeok Bae <changhyeok.bae@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
10 files changed, 5 insertions, 1202 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple1.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple1.patch deleted file mode 100644 index d4d49e7fca..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple1.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,191 +0,0 @@ -The WPA2 four-way handshake protocol is vulnerable to replay attacks which can -result in unauthenticated clients gaining access to the network. - -Backport a number of patches from upstream to fix this. - -CVE: CVE-2017-13077 -CVE: CVE-2017-13078 -CVE: CVE-2017-13079 -CVE: CVE-2017-13080 -CVE: CVE-2017-13081 -CVE: CVE-2017-13082 -CVE: CVE-2017-13086 -CVE: CVE-2017-13087 -CVE: CVE-2017-13088 - -Upstream-Status: Backport -Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com> - -From cf4cab804c7afd5c45505528a8d16e46163243a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be> -Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2017 15:15:35 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 1/8] hostapd: Avoid key reinstallation in FT handshake - -Do not reinstall TK to the driver during Reassociation Response frame -processing if the first attempt of setting the TK succeeded. This avoids -issues related to clearing the TX/RX PN that could result in reusing -same PN values for transmitted frames (e.g., due to CCM nonce reuse and -also hitting replay protection on the receiver) and accepting replayed -frames on RX side. - -This issue was introduced by the commit -0e84c25434e6a1f283c7b4e62e483729085b78d2 ('FT: Fix PTK configuration in -authenticator') which allowed wpa_ft_install_ptk() to be called multiple -times with the same PTK. While the second configuration attempt is -needed with some drivers, it must be done only if the first attempt -failed. - -Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be> ---- - src/ap/ieee802_11.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- - src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 11 +++++++++++ - src/ap/wpa_auth.h | 3 ++- - src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c | 10 ++++++++++ - src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h | 1 + - 5 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c -index 4e04169..333035f 100644 ---- a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c -+++ b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c -@@ -1841,6 +1841,7 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd, - { - struct ieee80211_ht_capabilities ht_cap; - struct ieee80211_vht_capabilities vht_cap; -+ int set = 1; - - /* - * Remove the STA entry to ensure the STA PS state gets cleared and -@@ -1848,9 +1849,18 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd, - * FT-over-the-DS, where a station re-associates back to the same AP but - * skips the authentication flow, or if working with a driver that - * does not support full AP client state. -+ * -+ * Skip this if the STA has already completed FT reassociation and the -+ * TK has been configured since the TX/RX PN must not be reset to 0 for -+ * the same key. - */ -- if (!sta->added_unassoc) -+ if (!sta->added_unassoc && -+ (!(sta->flags & WLAN_STA_AUTHORIZED) || -+ !wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(sta->wpa_sm))) { - hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr); -+ wpa_auth_sm_event(sta->wpa_sm, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED); -+ set = 0; -+ } - - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211N - if (sta->flags & WLAN_STA_HT) -@@ -1873,11 +1883,11 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd, - sta->flags & WLAN_STA_VHT ? &vht_cap : NULL, - sta->flags | WLAN_STA_ASSOC, sta->qosinfo, - sta->vht_opmode, sta->p2p_ie ? 1 : 0, -- sta->added_unassoc)) { -+ set)) { - hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr, - HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211, HOSTAPD_LEVEL_NOTICE, - "Could not %s STA to kernel driver", -- sta->added_unassoc ? "set" : "add"); -+ set ? "set" : "add"); - - if (sta->added_unassoc) { - hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr); -diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c -index 3587086..707971d 100644 ---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c -+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c -@@ -1745,6 +1745,9 @@ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event) - #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ - break; - #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ -+ case WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED: -+ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE; -+ return 0; - } - - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R -@@ -3250,6 +3253,14 @@ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) - } - - -+int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) -+{ -+ if (!sm || !wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) -+ return 0; -+ return sm->tk_already_set; -+} -+ -+ - int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, - struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry) - { -diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h -index 0de8d97..97461b0 100644 ---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h -+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h -@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, - u8 *data, size_t data_len); - enum wpa_event { - WPA_AUTH, WPA_ASSOC, WPA_DISASSOC, WPA_DEAUTH, WPA_REAUTH, -- WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT -+ WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED - }; - void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); - int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event); -@@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); - int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); - int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); - int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); -+int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); - int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, - struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry); - struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry * -diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c -index 42242a5..e63b99a 100644 ---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c -+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c -@@ -780,6 +780,14 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) - return; - } - -+ if (sm->tk_already_set) { -+ /* Must avoid TK reconfiguration to prevent clearing of TX/RX -+ * PN in the driver */ -+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, -+ "FT: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver"); -+ return; -+ } -+ - /* FIX: add STA entry to kernel/driver here? The set_key will fail - * most likely without this.. At the moment, STA entry is added only - * after association has been completed. This function will be called -@@ -792,6 +800,7 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) - - /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */ - sm->pairwise_set = TRUE; -+ sm->tk_already_set = TRUE; - } - - -@@ -898,6 +907,7 @@ static int wpa_ft_process_auth_req(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, - - sm->pairwise = pairwise; - sm->PTK_valid = TRUE; -+ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE; - wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm); - - buflen = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) + -diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h -index 72b7eb3..7fd8f05 100644 ---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h -+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h -@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ struct wpa_state_machine { - struct wpa_ptk PTK; - Boolean PTK_valid; - Boolean pairwise_set; -+ Boolean tk_already_set; - int keycount; - Boolean Pair; - struct wpa_key_replay_counter { --- -2.7.4
\ No newline at end of file diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple2.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple2.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 501bb4b56b..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple2.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,267 +0,0 @@ -The WPA2 four-way handshake protocol is vulnerable to replay attacks which can -result in unauthenticated clients gaining access to the network. - -Backport a number of patches from upstream to fix this. - -CVE: CVE-2017-13077 -CVE: CVE-2017-13078 -CVE: CVE-2017-13079 -CVE: CVE-2017-13080 -CVE: CVE-2017-13081 -CVE: CVE-2017-13082 -CVE: CVE-2017-13086 -CVE: CVE-2017-13087 -CVE: CVE-2017-13088 - -Upstream-Status: Backport -Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com> - -From 927f891007c402fefd1ff384645b3f07597c3ede Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be> -Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 16:03:24 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 2/8] Prevent reinstallation of an already in-use group key - -Track the current GTK and IGTK that is in use and when receiving a -(possibly retransmitted) Group Message 1 or WNM-Sleep Mode Response, do -not install the given key if it is already in use. This prevents an -attacker from trying to trick the client into resetting or lowering the -sequence counter associated to the group key. - -Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be> ---- - src/common/wpa_common.h | 11 +++++ - src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 116 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ - src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 4 ++ - 3 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h -index af1d0f0..d200285 100644 ---- a/src/common/wpa_common.h -+++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h -@@ -217,6 +217,17 @@ struct wpa_ptk { - size_t tk_len; - }; - -+struct wpa_gtk { -+ u8 gtk[WPA_GTK_MAX_LEN]; -+ size_t gtk_len; -+}; -+ -+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W -+struct wpa_igtk { -+ u8 igtk[WPA_IGTK_MAX_LEN]; -+ size_t igtk_len; -+}; -+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ - - /* WPA IE version 1 - * 00-50-f2:1 (OUI:OUI type) -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c -index 3c47879..95bd7be 100644 ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c -@@ -714,6 +714,15 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, - const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk; - u8 gtk_buf[32]; - -+ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */ -+ if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len && -+ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) { -+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, -+ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)", -+ gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ - wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Group Key", gd->gtk, gd->gtk_len); - wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, - "WPA: Installing GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)", -@@ -748,6 +757,9 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, - } - os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf)); - -+ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len; -+ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len); -+ - return 0; - } - -@@ -854,6 +866,48 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, - } - - -+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W -+static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, -+ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk) -+{ -+ size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher); -+ u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid); -+ -+ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */ -+ if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len && -+ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) { -+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, -+ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)", -+ keyidx); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, -+ "WPA: IGTK keyid %d pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x", -+ keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn)); -+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK", igtk->igtk, len); -+ if (keyidx > 4095) { -+ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, -+ "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx); -+ return -1; -+ } -+ if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher), -+ broadcast_ether_addr, -+ keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn), -+ igtk->igtk, len) < 0) { -+ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, -+ "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver"); -+ return -1; -+ } -+ -+ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len; -+ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len); -+ -+ return 0; -+} -+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ -+ -+ - static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm, - struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *ie) - { -@@ -864,30 +918,14 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm, - if (ie->igtk) { - size_t len; - const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk; -- u16 keyidx; -+ - len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher); - if (ie->igtk_len != WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN + len) - return -1; -+ - igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk; -- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid); -- wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK keyid %d " -- "pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x", -- keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn)); -- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK", -- igtk->igtk, len); -- if (keyidx > 4095) { -- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, -- "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx); -- return -1; -- } -- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher), -- broadcast_ether_addr, -- keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn), -- igtk->igtk, len) < 0) { -- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, -- "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver"); -+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0) - return -1; -- } - } - - return 0; -@@ -2307,7 +2345,7 @@ void wpa_sm_deinit(struct wpa_sm *sm) - */ - void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid) - { -- int clear_ptk = 1; -+ int clear_keys = 1; - - if (sm == NULL) - return; -@@ -2333,11 +2371,11 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid) - /* Prepare for the next transition */ - wpa_ft_prepare_auth_request(sm, NULL); - -- clear_ptk = 0; -+ clear_keys = 0; - } - #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ - -- if (clear_ptk) { -+ if (clear_keys) { - /* - * IEEE 802.11, 8.4.10: Delete PTK SA on (re)association if - * this is not part of a Fast BSS Transition. -@@ -2347,6 +2385,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid) - os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk)); - sm->tptk_set = 0; - os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk)); -+ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk)); -+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W -+ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk)); -+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ - } - - #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS -@@ -2877,6 +2919,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm) - os_memset(sm->pmk, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk)); - os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk)); - os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk)); -+ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk)); -+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W -+ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk)); -+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R - os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey)); - os_memset(sm->pmk_r0, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk_r0)); -@@ -2949,29 +2995,11 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf) - os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd)); - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W - } else if (subelem_id == WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK) { -- struct wpa_igtk_kde igd; -- u16 keyidx; -- -- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd)); -- keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher); -- os_memcpy(igd.keyid, buf + 2, 2); -- os_memcpy(igd.pn, buf + 4, 6); -- -- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igd.keyid); -- os_memcpy(igd.igtk, buf + 10, keylen); -- -- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install IGTK (WNM SLEEP)", -- igd.igtk, keylen); -- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher), -- broadcast_ether_addr, -- keyidx, 0, igd.pn, sizeof(igd.pn), -- igd.igtk, keylen) < 0) { -- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the IGTK in " -- "WNM mode"); -- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd)); -+ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk; -+ -+ igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2); -+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0) - return -1; -- } -- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd)); - #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ - } else { - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Unknown element id"); -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h -index f653ba6..afc9e37 100644 ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h -@@ -31,6 +31,10 @@ struct wpa_sm { - u8 rx_replay_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN]; - int rx_replay_counter_set; - u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN]; -+ struct wpa_gtk gtk; -+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W -+ struct wpa_igtk igtk; -+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ - - struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */ - --- -2.7.4
\ No newline at end of file diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple3.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple3.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 2e22655851..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple3.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,201 +0,0 @@ -The WPA2 four-way handshake protocol is vulnerable to replay attacks which can -result in unauthenticated clients gaining access to the network. - -Backport a number of patches from upstream to fix this. - -CVE: CVE-2017-13077 -CVE: CVE-2017-13078 -CVE: CVE-2017-13079 -CVE: CVE-2017-13080 -CVE: CVE-2017-13081 -CVE: CVE-2017-13082 -CVE: CVE-2017-13086 -CVE: CVE-2017-13087 -CVE: CVE-2017-13088 - -Upstream-Status: Backport -Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com> - -From 8280294e74846ea342389a0cd17215050fa5afe8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> -Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:12:24 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH 3/8] Extend protection of GTK/IGTK reinstallation of WNM-Sleep - Mode cases - -This extends the protection to track last configured GTK/IGTK value -separately from EAPOL-Key frames and WNM-Sleep Mode frames to cover a -corner case where these two different mechanisms may get used when the -GTK/IGTK has changed and tracking a single value is not sufficient to -detect a possible key reconfiguration. - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> ---- - src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- - src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 2 ++ - 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c -index 95bd7be..7a2c68d 100644 ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c -@@ -709,14 +709,17 @@ struct wpa_gtk_data { - - static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, - const struct wpa_gtk_data *gd, -- const u8 *key_rsc) -+ const u8 *key_rsc, int wnm_sleep) - { - const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk; - u8 gtk_buf[32]; - - /* Detect possible key reinstallation */ -- if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len && -- os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) { -+ if ((sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len && -+ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) || -+ (sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len && -+ os_memcmp(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk, -+ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len) == 0)) { - wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, - "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)", - gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len); -@@ -757,8 +760,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, - } - os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf)); - -- sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len; -- os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len); -+ if (wnm_sleep) { -+ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len; -+ os_memcpy(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk, -+ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len); -+ } else { -+ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len; -+ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len); -+ } - - return 0; - } -@@ -852,7 +861,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, - (wpa_supplicant_check_group_cipher(sm, sm->group_cipher, - gtk_len, gtk_len, - &gd.key_rsc_len, &gd.alg) || -- wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc))) { -+ wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 0))) { - wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, - "RSN: Failed to install GTK"); - os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd)); -@@ -868,14 +877,18 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, - - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W - static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, -- const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk) -+ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk, -+ int wnm_sleep) - { - size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher); - u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid); - - /* Detect possible key reinstallation */ -- if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len && -- os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) { -+ if ((sm->igtk.igtk_len == len && -+ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) || -+ (sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len == len && -+ os_memcmp(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk, -+ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len) == 0)) { - wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, - "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)", - keyidx); -@@ -900,8 +913,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, - return -1; - } - -- sm->igtk.igtk_len = len; -- os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len); -+ if (wnm_sleep) { -+ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len = len; -+ os_memcpy(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk, -+ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len); -+ } else { -+ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len; -+ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len); -+ } - - return 0; - } -@@ -924,7 +943,7 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm, - return -1; - - igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk; -- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0) -+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 0) < 0) - return -1; - } - -@@ -1574,7 +1593,7 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_2(struct wpa_sm *sm, - if (wpa_supplicant_rsc_relaxation(sm, key->key_rsc)) - key_rsc = null_rsc; - -- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc) || -+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 0) || - wpa_supplicant_send_2_of_2(sm, key, ver, key_info) < 0) - goto failed; - os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd)); -@@ -2386,8 +2405,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid) - sm->tptk_set = 0; - os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk)); - os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk)); -+ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep)); - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W - os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk)); -+ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep)); - #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ - } - -@@ -2920,8 +2941,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm) - os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk)); - os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk)); - os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk)); -+ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep)); - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W - os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk)); -+ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep)); - #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R - os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey)); -@@ -2986,7 +3009,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf) - - wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install GTK (WNM SLEEP)", - gd.gtk, gd.gtk_len); -- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc)) { -+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 1)) { - os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd)); - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the GTK in " - "WNM mode"); -@@ -2998,7 +3021,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf) - const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk; - - igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2); -- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0) -+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 1) < 0) - return -1; - #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ - } else { -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h -index afc9e37..9a54631 100644 ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h -@@ -32,8 +32,10 @@ struct wpa_sm { - int rx_replay_counter_set; - u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN]; - struct wpa_gtk gtk; -+ struct wpa_gtk gtk_wnm_sleep; - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W - struct wpa_igtk igtk; -+ struct wpa_igtk igtk_wnm_sleep; - #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ - - struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */ --- -2.7.4
\ No newline at end of file diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple4.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple4.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 6c1948696e..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple4.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,96 +0,0 @@ -The WPA2 four-way handshake protocol is vulnerable to replay attacks which can -result in unauthenticated clients gaining access to the network. - -Backport a number of patches from upstream to fix this. - -CVE: CVE-2017-13077 -CVE: CVE-2017-13078 -CVE: CVE-2017-13079 -CVE: CVE-2017-13080 -CVE: CVE-2017-13081 -CVE: CVE-2017-13082 -CVE: CVE-2017-13086 -CVE: CVE-2017-13087 -CVE: CVE-2017-13088 - -Upstream-Status: Backport -Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com> - -From 8f82bc94e8697a9d47fa8774dfdaaede1084912c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be> -Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2017 04:22:51 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 4/8] Prevent installation of an all-zero TK - -Properly track whether a PTK has already been installed to the driver -and the TK part cleared from memory. This prevents an attacker from -trying to trick the client into installing an all-zero TK. - -This fixes the earlier fix in commit -ad00d64e7d8827b3cebd665a0ceb08adabf15e1e ('Fix TK configuration to the -driver in EAPOL-Key 3/4 retry case') which did not take into account -possibility of an extra message 1/4 showing up between retries of -message 3/4. - -Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be> ---- - src/common/wpa_common.h | 1 + - src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 5 ++--- - src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 1 - - 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h -index d200285..1021ccb 100644 ---- a/src/common/wpa_common.h -+++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h -@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ struct wpa_ptk { - size_t kck_len; - size_t kek_len; - size_t tk_len; -+ int installed; /* 1 if key has already been installed to driver */ - }; - - struct wpa_gtk { -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c -index 7a2c68d..0550a41 100644 ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c -@@ -510,7 +510,6 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_4(struct wpa_sm *sm, - os_memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); - } - sm->tptk_set = 1; -- sm->tk_to_set = 1; - - kde = sm->assoc_wpa_ie; - kde_len = sm->assoc_wpa_ie_len; -@@ -615,7 +614,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm, - enum wpa_alg alg; - const u8 *key_rsc; - -- if (!sm->tk_to_set) { -+ if (sm->ptk.installed) { - wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, - "WPA: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver"); - return 0; -@@ -659,7 +658,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm, - - /* TK is not needed anymore in supplicant */ - os_memset(sm->ptk.tk, 0, WPA_TK_MAX_LEN); -- sm->tk_to_set = 0; -+ sm->ptk.installed = 1; - - if (sm->wpa_ptk_rekey) { - eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_rekey_ptk, sm, NULL); -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h -index 9a54631..41f371f 100644 ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h -@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ struct wpa_sm { - struct wpa_ptk ptk, tptk; - int ptk_set, tptk_set; - unsigned int msg_3_of_4_ok:1; -- unsigned int tk_to_set:1; - u8 snonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN]; - u8 anonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN]; /* ANonce from the last 1/4 msg */ - int renew_snonce; --- -2.7.4
\ No newline at end of file diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple5.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple5.patch deleted file mode 100644 index b262dcac55..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple5.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,81 +0,0 @@ -The WPA2 four-way handshake protocol is vulnerable to replay attacks which can -result in unauthenticated clients gaining access to the network. - -Backport a number of patches from upstream to fix this. - -CVE: CVE-2017-13077 -CVE: CVE-2017-13078 -CVE: CVE-2017-13079 -CVE: CVE-2017-13080 -CVE: CVE-2017-13081 -CVE: CVE-2017-13082 -CVE: CVE-2017-13086 -CVE: CVE-2017-13087 -CVE: CVE-2017-13088 - -Upstream-Status: Backport -Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com> - -From 12fac09b437a1dc8a0f253e265934a8aaf4d2f8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> -Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:32:57 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH 5/8] Fix PTK rekeying to generate a new ANonce - -The Authenticator state machine path for PTK rekeying ended up bypassing -the AUTHENTICATION2 state where a new ANonce is generated when going -directly to the PTKSTART state since there is no need to try to -determine the PMK again in such a case. This is far from ideal since the -new PTK would depend on a new nonce only from the supplicant. - -Fix this by generating a new ANonce when moving to the PTKSTART state -for the purpose of starting new 4-way handshake to rekey PTK. - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> ---- - src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++--- - 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c -index 707971d..bf10cc1 100644 ---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c -+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c -@@ -1901,6 +1901,21 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2) - } - - -+static int wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) -+{ -+ if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, -+ "WPA: Failed to get random data for ANonce"); -+ sm->Disconnect = TRUE; -+ return -1; -+ } -+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign new ANonce", sm->ANonce, -+ WPA_NONCE_LEN); -+ sm->TimeoutCtr = 0; -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+ - SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPMK) - { - u8 msk[2 * PMK_LEN]; -@@ -2458,9 +2473,12 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK) - SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION); - else if (sm->ReAuthenticationRequest) - SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2); -- else if (sm->PTKRequest) -- SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART); -- else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) { -+ else if (sm->PTKRequest) { -+ if (wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(sm) < 0) -+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED); -+ else -+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART); -+ } else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) { - case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE: - break; - case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT: --- -2.7.4
\ No newline at end of file diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple6.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple6.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 15183f40c1..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple6.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,149 +0,0 @@ -The WPA2 four-way handshake protocol is vulnerable to replay attacks which can -result in unauthenticated clients gaining access to the network. - -Backport a number of patches from upstream to fix this. - -CVE: CVE-2017-13077 -CVE: CVE-2017-13078 -CVE: CVE-2017-13079 -CVE: CVE-2017-13080 -CVE: CVE-2017-13081 -CVE: CVE-2017-13082 -CVE: CVE-2017-13086 -CVE: CVE-2017-13087 -CVE: CVE-2017-13088 - -Upstream-Status: Backport -Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com> - -From 6c4bed4f47d1960ec04981a9d50e5076aea5223d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> -Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:03:15 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH 6/8] TDLS: Reject TPK-TK reconfiguration - -Do not try to reconfigure the same TPK-TK to the driver after it has -been successfully configured. This is an explicit check to avoid issues -related to resetting the TX/RX packet number. There was already a check -for this for TPK M2 (retries of that message are ignored completely), so -that behavior does not get modified. - -For TPK M3, the TPK-TK could have been reconfigured, but that was -followed by immediate teardown of the link due to an issue in updating -the STA entry. Furthermore, for TDLS with any real security (i.e., -ignoring open/WEP), the TPK message exchange is protected on the AP path -and simple replay attacks are not feasible. - -As an additional corner case, make sure the local nonce gets updated if -the peer uses a very unlikely "random nonce" of all zeros. - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> ---- - src/rsn_supp/tdls.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- - 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c -index e424168..9eb9738 100644 ---- a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c -@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ struct wpa_tdls_peer { - u8 tk[16]; /* TPK-TK; assuming only CCMP will be used */ - } tpk; - int tpk_set; -+ int tk_set; /* TPK-TK configured to the driver */ - int tpk_success; - int tpk_in_progress; - -@@ -192,6 +193,20 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer) - u8 rsc[6]; - enum wpa_alg alg; - -+ if (peer->tk_set) { -+ /* -+ * This same TPK-TK has already been configured to the driver -+ * and this new configuration attempt (likely due to an -+ * unexpected retransmitted frame) would result in clearing -+ * the TX/RX sequence number which can break security, so must -+ * not allow that to happen. -+ */ -+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TDLS: TPK-TK for the peer " MACSTR -+ " has already been configured to the driver - do not reconfigure", -+ MAC2STR(peer->addr)); -+ return -1; -+ } -+ - os_memset(rsc, 0, 6); - - switch (peer->cipher) { -@@ -209,12 +224,15 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer) - return -1; - } - -+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Configure pairwise key for peer " MACSTR, -+ MAC2STR(peer->addr)); - if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, alg, peer->addr, -1, 1, - rsc, sizeof(rsc), peer->tpk.tk, key_len) < 0) { - wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "TDLS: Failed to set TPK to the " - "driver"); - return -1; - } -+ peer->tk_set = 1; - return 0; - } - -@@ -696,7 +714,7 @@ static void wpa_tdls_peer_clear(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer) - peer->cipher = 0; - peer->qos_info = 0; - peer->wmm_capable = 0; -- peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0; -+ peer->tk_set = peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0; - peer->chan_switch_enabled = 0; - os_memset(&peer->tpk, 0, sizeof(peer->tpk)); - os_memset(peer->inonce, 0, WPA_NONCE_LEN); -@@ -1159,6 +1177,7 @@ skip_rsnie: - wpa_tdls_peer_free(sm, peer); - return -1; - } -+ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */ - wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Initiator Nonce for TPK handshake", - peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN); - os_memcpy(ftie->Snonce, peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN); -@@ -1751,6 +1770,19 @@ static int wpa_tdls_addset_peer(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer, - } - - -+static int tdls_nonce_set(const u8 *nonce) -+{ -+ int i; -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < WPA_NONCE_LEN; i++) { -+ if (nonce[i]) -+ return 1; -+ } -+ -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+ - static int wpa_tdls_process_tpk_m1(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr, - const u8 *buf, size_t len) - { -@@ -2004,7 +2036,8 @@ skip_rsn: - peer->rsnie_i_len = kde.rsn_ie_len; - peer->cipher = cipher; - -- if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0) { -+ if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0 || -+ !tdls_nonce_set(peer->inonce)) { - /* - * There is no point in updating the RNonce for every obtained - * TPK M1 frame (e.g., retransmission due to timeout) with the -@@ -2020,6 +2053,7 @@ skip_rsn: - "TDLS: Failed to get random data for responder nonce"); - goto error; - } -+ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */ - } - - #if 0 --- -2.7.4
\ No newline at end of file diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple7.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple7.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 2e12bc7555..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple7.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,60 +0,0 @@ -The WPA2 four-way handshake protocol is vulnerable to replay attacks which can -result in unauthenticated clients gaining access to the network. - -Backport a number of patches from upstream to fix this. - -CVE: CVE-2017-13077 -CVE: CVE-2017-13078 -CVE: CVE-2017-13079 -CVE: CVE-2017-13080 -CVE: CVE-2017-13081 -CVE: CVE-2017-13082 -CVE: CVE-2017-13086 -CVE: CVE-2017-13087 -CVE: CVE-2017-13088 - -Upstream-Status: Backport -Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com> - -From 53c5eb58e95004f86e65ee9fbfccbc291b139057 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> -Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:25:02 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH 7/8] WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response without pending - request - -Commit 03ed0a52393710be6bdae657d1b36efa146520e5 ('WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep -Mode Response if WNM-Sleep Mode has not been used') started ignoring the -response when no WNM-Sleep Mode Request had been used during the -association. This can be made tighter by clearing the used flag when -successfully processing a response. This adds an additional layer of -protection against unexpected retransmissions of the response frame. - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> ---- - wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c | 4 +++- - 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c -index 1b3409c..67a07ff 100644 ---- a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c -+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c -@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ static void ieee802_11_rx_wnmsleep_resp(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, - - if (!wpa_s->wnmsleep_used) { - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, -- "WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response frame since WNM-Sleep Mode has not been used in this association"); -+ "WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response frame since WNM-Sleep Mode operation has not been requested"); - return; - } - -@@ -299,6 +299,8 @@ static void ieee802_11_rx_wnmsleep_resp(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, - return; - } - -+ wpa_s->wnmsleep_used = 0; -+ - if (wnmsleep_ie->status == WNM_STATUS_SLEEP_ACCEPT || - wnmsleep_ie->status == WNM_STATUS_SLEEP_EXIT_ACCEPT_GTK_UPDATE) { - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Successfully recv WNM-Sleep Response " --- -2.7.4
\ No newline at end of file diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple8.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple8.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 7f5390c312..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple8.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,99 +0,0 @@ -The WPA2 four-way handshake protocol is vulnerable to replay attacks which can -result in unauthenticated clients gaining access to the network. - -Backport a number of patches from upstream to fix this. - -CVE: CVE-2017-13077 -CVE: CVE-2017-13078 -CVE: CVE-2017-13079 -CVE: CVE-2017-13080 -CVE: CVE-2017-13081 -CVE: CVE-2017-13082 -CVE: CVE-2017-13086 -CVE: CVE-2017-13087 -CVE: CVE-2017-13088 - -Upstream-Status: Backport -Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com> - -From b372ab0b7daea719749194dc554b26e6367603f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> -Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 12:06:37 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH 8/8] FT: Do not allow multiple Reassociation Response frames - -The driver is expected to not report a second association event without -the station having explicitly request a new association. As such, this -case should not be reachable. However, since reconfiguring the same -pairwise or group keys to the driver could result in nonce reuse issues, -be extra careful here and do an additional state check to avoid this -even if the local driver ends up somehow accepting an unexpected -Reassociation Response frame. - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> ---- - src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 3 +++ - src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c | 8 ++++++++ - src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 1 + - 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c -index 0550a41..2a53c6f 100644 ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c -@@ -2440,6 +2440,9 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_disassoc(struct wpa_sm *sm) - #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS - wpa_tdls_disassoc(sm); - #endif /* CONFIG_TDLS */ -+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R -+ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0; -+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ - - /* Keys are not needed in the WPA state machine anymore */ - wpa_sm_drop_sa(sm); -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c -index 205793e..d45bb45 100644 ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c -@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ static u8 * wpa_ft_gen_req_ies(struct wpa_sm *sm, size_t *len, - u16 capab; - - sm->ft_completed = 0; -+ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0; - - buf_len = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) + - 2 + sm->r0kh_id_len + ric_ies_len + 100; -@@ -681,6 +682,11 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies, - return -1; - } - -+ if (sm->ft_reassoc_completed) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Reassociation has already been completed for this FT protocol instance - ignore unexpected retransmission"); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ - if (wpa_ft_parse_ies(ies, ies_len, &parse) < 0) { - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Failed to parse IEs"); - return -1; -@@ -781,6 +787,8 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies, - return -1; - } - -+ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 1; -+ - if (wpa_ft_process_gtk_subelem(sm, parse.gtk, parse.gtk_len) < 0) - return -1; - -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h -index 41f371f..56f88dc 100644 ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h -@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ struct wpa_sm { - size_t r0kh_id_len; - u8 r1kh_id[FT_R1KH_ID_LEN]; - int ft_completed; -+ int ft_reassoc_completed; - int over_the_ds_in_progress; - u8 target_ap[ETH_ALEN]; /* over-the-DS target AP */ - int set_ptk_after_assoc; --- -2.7.4
\ No newline at end of file diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/wpa_supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/wpa_supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch deleted file mode 100644 index e800a410ea..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/wpa_supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,44 +0,0 @@ -wpa_supplicant-2.6: Fix CVE-2018-14526 - -[No upstream tracking] -- https://w1.fi/security/2018-1/unauthenticated-eapol-key-decryption.txt - -wpa: Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data - -Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data in supplicant -processing. When using WPA2, these are frames that have the Encrypted -flag set, but not the MIC flag. - -When using WPA2, EAPOL-Key frames that had the Encrypted flag set but -not the MIC flag, had their data field decrypted without first verifying -the MIC. In case the data field was encrypted using RC4 (i.e., when -negotiating TKIP as the pairwise cipher), this meant that -unauthenticated but decrypted data would then be processed. An adversary -could abuse this as a decryption oracle to recover sensitive information -in the data field of EAPOL-Key messages (e.g., the group key). - -Upstream-Status: Backport [https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c?id=3e34cfdff6b192fe337c6fb3f487f73e96582961] -CVE: CVE-2018-14526 -Signed-off-by: Andrej Valek <andrej.valek@siemens.com> - -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c -index 3c47879..6bdf923 100644 ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c -@@ -2016,6 +2016,17 @@ int wpa_sm_rx_eapol(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr, - - if ((sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN || sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_OSEN) && - (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA)) { -+ /* -+ * Only decrypt the Key Data field if the frame's authenticity -+ * was verified. When using AES-SIV (FILS), the MIC flag is not -+ * set, so this check should only be performed if mic_len != 0 -+ * which is the case in this code branch. -+ */ -+ if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)) { -+ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, -+ "WPA: Ignore EAPOL-Key with encrypted but unauthenticated data"); -+ goto out; -+ } - if (wpa_supplicant_decrypt_key_data(sm, key, ver, key_data, - &key_data_len)) - goto out; diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.6.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.7.bb index c92ed4ab93..6fc5cf5db7 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.6.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.7.bb @@ -3,9 +3,9 @@ HOMEPAGE = "http://w1.fi/wpa_supplicant/" BUGTRACKER = "http://w1.fi/security/" SECTION = "network" LICENSE = "BSD" -LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=292eece3f2ebbaa25608eed8464018a3 \ - file://README;beginline=1;endline=56;md5=3f01d778be8f953962388307ee38ed2b \ - file://wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c;beginline=1;endline=12;md5=4061612fc5715696134e3baf933e8aba" +LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=a3791c270ad6bb026707d17bf750e5ef \ + file://README;beginline=1;endline=56;md5=495cbce6008253de4b4d8f4cdfae9f4f \ + file://wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c;beginline=1;endline=12;md5=a5687903a31b8679e6a06b3afa5c819e" DEPENDS = "dbus libnl" RRECOMMENDS_${PN} = "wpa-supplicant-passphrase wpa-supplicant-cli" @@ -24,19 +24,10 @@ SRC_URI = "http://w1.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://wpa_supplicant.conf \ file://wpa_supplicant.conf-sane \ file://99_wpa_supplicant \ - file://key-replay-cve-multiple1.patch \ - file://key-replay-cve-multiple2.patch \ - file://key-replay-cve-multiple3.patch \ - file://key-replay-cve-multiple4.patch \ - file://key-replay-cve-multiple5.patch \ - file://key-replay-cve-multiple6.patch \ - file://key-replay-cve-multiple7.patch \ - file://key-replay-cve-multiple8.patch \ - file://wpa_supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch \ file://0001-replace-systemd-install-Alias-with-WantedBy.patch \ " -SRC_URI[md5sum] = "091569eb4440b7d7f2b4276dbfc03c3c" -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "b4936d34c4e6cdd44954beba74296d964bc2c9668ecaa5255e499636fe2b1450" +SRC_URI[md5sum] = "a68538fb62766f40f890125026c42c10" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "76ea6b06b7a2ea8e6d9eb1a9166166f1656e6d48c7508914f592100c95c73074" CVE_PRODUCT = "wpa_supplicant" |