diff options
| author |   Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com> | 2021-08-20 16:55:16 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer |   Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com> | 2021-08-22 12:04:08 -1000 |
| commit | 1765005f73303d9857f9fde93efb1cc8534964f1 (patch) | |
| tree | 90ff356e21b777bd9be3c5ae2373f5d47aac3e3e | |
| parent | 721a14f13005dc0b5bddaac131c444b97be700a8 (diff) | |
| download | openembedded-core-1765005f73303d9857f9fde93efb1cc8534964f1.tar.gz | |
qemu: Security fix for CVE-2020-29443
Source: Qemu.org
MR: 109315
Type: Security Fix
Disposition: Backport from https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=813212288970c39b1800f63e83ac6e96588095c6
ChangeID: c0296e285169cc937cc9758c9d84ac690297ee54
Description:
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
| -rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-29443.patch | 45 |
2 files changed, 46 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc index 76bfb4fcf9..bd1a83955f 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc @@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \ file://CVE-2020-25624_1.patch \ file://CVE-2020-25624_2.patch \ file://CVE-2020-25625.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-29443.patch \ " UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar" diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-29443.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-29443.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1528d5c2fd --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-29443.patch @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +From 813212288970c39b1800f63e83ac6e96588095c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> +Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2020 13:09:26 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] ide: atapi: assert that the buffer pointer is in range + +A case was reported where s->io_buffer_index can be out of range. +The report skimped on the details but it seems to be triggered +by s->lba == -1 on the READ/READ CD paths (e.g. by sending an +ATAPI command with LBA = 0xFFFFFFFF). For now paper over it +with assertions. The first one ensures that there is no overflow +when incrementing s->io_buffer_index, the second checks for the +buffer overrun. + +Note that the buffer overrun is only a read, so I am not sure +if the assertion failure is actually less harmful than the overrun. + +Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> +Message-id: 20201201120926.56559-1-pbonzini@redhat.com +Reviewed-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> +Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> + +Upstream-Status: Backport +CVE: CVE-2020-29443 +Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com> + +--- + hw/ide/atapi.c | 2 ++ + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/hw/ide/atapi.c b/hw/ide/atapi.c +index 14a2b0bb2f..e79157863f 100644 +--- a/hw/ide/atapi.c ++++ b/hw/ide/atapi.c +@@ -276,6 +276,8 @@ void ide_atapi_cmd_reply_end(IDEState *s) + s->packet_transfer_size -= size; + s->elementary_transfer_size -= size; + s->io_buffer_index += size; ++ assert(size <= s->io_buffer_total_len); ++ assert(s->io_buffer_index <= s->io_buffer_total_len); + + /* Some adapters process PIO data right away. In that case, we need + * to avoid mutual recursion between ide_transfer_start +-- +2.25.1 + |