path: root/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-CVE-2013-1740.patch

nss: CVE-2013-1740

Upstream-Status: Backport

the patch comes from:
http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2013-1740
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=919877
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=713933

changeset:   10946:f28426e944ae
user:        Wan-Teh Chang <wtc@google.com>
date:        Tue Nov 26 16:44:39 2013 -0800
summary:     Bug 713933: Handle the return value of both ssl3_HandleRecord calls

changeset:   10945:774c7dec7565
user:        Wan-Teh Chang <wtc@google.com>
date:        Mon Nov 25 19:16:23 2013 -0800
summary:     Bug 713933: Declare the |falseStart| local variable in the smallest

changeset:   10848:141fae8fb2e8
user:        Wan-Teh Chang <wtc@google.com>
date:        Mon Sep 23 11:25:41 2013 -0700
summary:     Bug 681839: Allow SSL_HandshakeNegotiatedExtension to be called before the handshake is finished, r=brian@briansmith.org

changeset:   10898:1b9c43d28713
user:        Brian Smith <brian@briansmith.org>
date:        Thu Oct 31 15:40:42 2013 -0700
summary:     Bug 713933: Make SSL False Start work with asynchronous certificate validation, r=wtc

Signed-off-by: Li Wang <li.wang@windriver.com>
---
 nss/lib/ssl/ssl.def     |    7 ++
 nss/lib/ssl/ssl.h       |   54 +++++++++++---
 nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c   |  188 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 nss/lib/ssl/ssl3gthr.c  |   63 ++++++++++++----
 nss/lib/ssl/sslauth.c   |   10 +--
 nss/lib/ssl/sslimpl.h   |   22 +++++-
 nss/lib/ssl/sslinfo.c   |   10 +--
 nss/lib/ssl/sslreveal.c |    9 +--
 nss/lib/ssl/sslsecur.c  |  139 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 nss/lib/ssl/sslsock.c   |   12 ++-
 10 files changed, 386 insertions(+), 128 deletions(-)

diff --git a/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.def b/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.def
index fbf7fc5..e937bd4 100644
--- a/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.def
+++ b/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.def
@@ -163,3 +163,10 @@ SSL_SetStapledOCSPResponses;
 ;+    local:
 ;+*;
 ;+};
+;+NSS_3.15.3 {    # NSS 3.15.3 release
+;+    global:
+SSL_RecommendedCanFalseStart;
+SSL_SetCanFalseStartCallback;
+;+    local:
+;+*;
+;+};
diff --git a/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.h b/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.h
index 6db0e34..ddeaaef 100644
--- a/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.h
+++ b/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.h
@@ -121,14 +121,17 @@ SSL_IMPORT PRFileDesc *DTLS_ImportFD(PRFileDesc *model, PRFileDesc *fd);
 #define SSL_ENABLE_FALSE_START         22 /* Enable SSL false start (off by */
                                           /* default, applies only to       */
                                           /* clients). False start is a     */
-/* mode where an SSL client will start sending application data before      */
-/* verifying the server's Finished message. This means that we could end up */
-/* sending data to an imposter. However, the data will be encrypted and     */
-/* only the true server can derive the session key. Thus, so long as the    */
-/* cipher isn't broken this is safe. Because of this, False Start will only */
-/* occur on RSA or DH ciphersuites where the cipher's key length is >= 80   */
-/* bits. The advantage of False Start is that it saves a round trip for     */
-/* client-speaks-first protocols when performing a full handshake.          */
+/* mode where an SSL client will start sending application data before
+ * verifying the server's Finished message. This means that we could end up
+ * sending data to an imposter. However, the data will be encrypted and
+ * only the true server can derive the session key. Thus, so long as the
+ * cipher isn't broken this is safe. The advantage of false start is that
+ * it saves a round trip for client-speaks-first protocols when performing a
+ * full handshake.
+ *
+ * In addition to enabling this option, the application must register a
+ * callback using the SSL_SetCanFalseStartCallback function.
+ */
 
 /* For SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0, by default we prevent chosen plaintext attacks
  * on SSL CBC mode cipher suites (see RFC 4346 Section F.3) by splitting
@@ -653,14 +656,45 @@ SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SetMaxServerCacheLocks(PRUint32 maxLocks);
 SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache(const char * envString);
 
 /*
-** Set the callback on a particular socket that gets called when we finish
-** performing a handshake.
+** Set the callback that gets called when a TLS handshake is complete. The
+** handshake callback is called after verifying the peer's Finished message and
+** before processing incoming application data.
+**
+** For the initial handshake: If the handshake false started (see
+** SSL_ENABLE_FALSE_START), then application data may already have been sent
+** before the handshake callback is called. If we did not false start then the
+** callback will get called before any application data is sent.
 */
 typedef void (PR_CALLBACK *SSLHandshakeCallback)(PRFileDesc *fd,
                                                  void *client_data);
 SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_HandshakeCallback(PRFileDesc *fd, 
 			          SSLHandshakeCallback cb, void *client_data);
 
+/* Applications that wish to enable TLS false start must set this callback
+** function. NSS will invoke the functon to determine if a particular
+** connection should use false start or not. SECSuccess indicates that the
+** callback completed successfully, and if so *canFalseStart indicates if false
+** start can be used. If the callback does not return SECSuccess then the
+** handshake will be canceled. NSS's recommended criteria can be evaluated by
+** calling SSL_RecommendedCanFalseStart.
+**
+** If no false start callback is registered then false start will never be
+** done, even if the SSL_ENABLE_FALSE_START option is enabled.
+**/
+typedef SECStatus (PR_CALLBACK *SSLCanFalseStartCallback)(
+    PRFileDesc *fd, void *arg, PRBool *canFalseStart);
+
+SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SetCanFalseStartCallback(
+    PRFileDesc *fd, SSLCanFalseStartCallback callback, void *arg);
+
+/* This function sets *canFalseStart according to the recommended criteria for
+** false start. These criteria may change from release to release and may depend
+** on which handshake features have been negotiated and/or properties of the
+** certifciates/keys used on the connection.
+*/
+SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_RecommendedCanFalseStart(PRFileDesc *fd,
+                                                  PRBool *canFalseStart);
+
 /*
 ** For the server, request a new handshake.  For the client, begin a new
 ** handshake.  If flushCache is non-zero, the SSL3 cache entry will be 
diff --git a/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c b/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
index 61d24d9..f39ba09 100644
--- a/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
+++ b/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
@@ -2535,7 +2535,7 @@ ssl3_SendRecord(   sslSocket *        ss,
     SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] SendRecord type: %s nIn=%d",
 		SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ssl3_DecodeContentType(type),
 		nIn));
-    PRINT_BUF(3, (ss, "Send record (plain text)", pIn, nIn));
+    PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Send record (plain text)", pIn, nIn));
 
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) );
 
@@ -6674,36 +6674,73 @@ done:
     return rv;
 }
 
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_CheckFalseStart(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
+    PORT_Assert( !ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending );
+    PORT_Assert( !ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart );
+
+    if (!ss->canFalseStartCallback) {
+       SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: no false start callback so no false start",
+                   SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+    } else {
+       PRBool maybeFalseStart;
+       SECStatus rv;
+
+       /* An attacker can control the selected ciphersuite so we only wish to
+        * do False Start in the case that the selected ciphersuite is
+        * sufficiently strong that the attack can gain no advantage.
+        * Therefore we always require an 80-bit cipher. */
+        ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss);
+        maybeFalseStart = ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipher_def->secret_key_size >= 10;
+        ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
+
+       if (!maybeFalseStart) {
+           SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: no false start due to weak cipher",
+                       SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+       } else {
+           rv = (ss->canFalseStartCallback)(ss->fd,
+                                            ss->canFalseStartCallbackData,
+                                            &ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart);
+           if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+               SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: false start callback returned %s",
+                           SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd,
+                           ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart ? "TRUE" : "FALSE"));
+           } else {
+               SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: false start callback failed (%s)",
+                           SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd,
+                           PR_ErrorToName(PR_GetError())));
+           }
+           return rv;
+       }
+    }
+
+    ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart = PR_FALSE;
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
 PRBool
-ssl3_CanFalseStart(sslSocket *ss) {
-    PRBool rv;
+ssl3_WaitingForStartOfServerSecondRound(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+    PRBool result = PR_FALSE;
 
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
 
-    /* XXX: does not take into account whether we are waiting for
-     * SSL_AuthCertificateComplete or SSL_RestartHandshakeAfterCertReq. If/when
-     * that is done, this function could return different results each time it
-     * would be called.
-     */
+    switch (ss->ssl3.hs.ws) {
+    case wait_new_session_ticket:
+        result = PR_TRUE;
+        break;
+    case wait_change_cipher:
+        result = !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn);
+        break;
+    case wait_finished:
+        break;
+    default:
+        PR_NOT_REACHED("ssl3_WaitingForStartOfServerSecondRound");
+    }
 
-    ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss);
-    rv = ss->opt.enableFalseStart &&
-	 !ss->sec.isServer &&
-	 !ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming &&
-	 ss->ssl3.cwSpec &&
-
-	 /* An attacker can control the selected ciphersuite so we only wish to
-	  * do False Start in the case that the selected ciphersuite is
-	  * sufficiently strong that the attack can gain no advantage.
-	  * Therefore we require an 80-bit cipher and a forward-secret key
-	  * exchange. */
-	 ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipher_def->secret_key_size >= 10 &&
-	(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_dhe_dss ||
-	 ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_dhe_rsa ||
-	 ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_ecdsa ||
-	 ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_rsa);
-    ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
-    return rv;
+    return result;
 }
 
 static SECStatus ssl3_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss);
@@ -6785,6 +6822,9 @@ ssl3_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss)
     }
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending &&
 	(sendClientCert || ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert || ss->firstHsDone)) {
+        SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: deferring ssl3_SendClientSecondRound because"
+                    " certificate authentication is still pending.",
+                    SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
 	ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = ssl3_SendClientSecondRound;
 	return SECWouldBlock;
     }
@@ -6822,14 +6862,50 @@ ssl3_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss)
 	goto loser;	/* err code was set. */
     }
 
-    /* XXX: If the server's certificate hasn't been authenticated by this
-     * point, then we may be leaking this NPN message to an attacker.
+    /* This must be done after we've set ss->ssl3.cwSpec in
+     * ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs because SSL_GetChannelInfo uses information
+     * from cwSpec. This must be done before we call ssl3_CheckFalseStart
+     * because the false start callback (if any) may need the information from
+     * the functions that depend on this being set.
      */
+    ss->enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
+
     if (!ss->firstHsDone) {
+        /* XXX: If the server's certificate hasn't been authenticated by this
+         * point, then we may be leaking this NPN message to an attacker.
+         */
 	rv = ssl3_SendNextProto(ss);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    goto loser;	/* err code was set. */
 	}
+
+        if (ss->opt.enableFalseStart) {
+            if (!ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending) {
+                /* When we fix bug 589047, we will need to know whether we are
+                 * false starting before we try to flush the client second
+                 * round to the network. With that in mind, we purposefully
+                 * call ssl3_CheckFalseStart before calling ssl3_SendFinished,
+                 * which includes a call to ssl3_FlushHandshake, so that
+                 * no application develops a reliance on such flushing being
+                 * done before its false start callback is called.
+                 */
+                ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
+                rv = ssl3_CheckFalseStart(ss);
+                ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);
+                if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                    goto loser;
+                }
+            } else {
+                /* The certificate authentication and the server's Finished
+                 * message are racing each other. If the certificate
+                 * authentication wins, then we will try to false start in
+                 * ssl3_AuthCertificateComplete.
+                 */
+                SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: deferring false start check because"
+                            " certificate authentication is still pending.",
+                            SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+            }
+        }
     }
 
     rv = ssl3_SendFinished(ss, 0);
@@ -6844,10 +6920,7 @@ ssl3_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss)
     else
 	ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher;
 
-    /* Do the handshake callback for sslv3 here, if we can false start. */
-    if (ss->handshakeCallback != NULL && ssl3_CanFalseStart(ss)) {
-	(ss->handshakeCallback)(ss->fd, ss->handshakeCallbackData);
-    }
+    PORT_Assert(ssl3_WaitingForStartOfServerSecondRound(ss));
 
     return SECSuccess;
 
@@ -9421,13 +9494,6 @@ ssl3_AuthCertificate(sslSocket *ss)
 
 	    ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending = PR_TRUE;
 	    rv = SECSuccess;
-
-	    /* XXX: Async cert validation and False Start don't work together
-	     * safely yet; if we leave False Start enabled, we may end up false
-	     * starting (sending application data) before we
-	     * SSL_AuthCertificateComplete has been called.
-	     */
-	    ss->opt.enableFalseStart = PR_FALSE;
 	}
 
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
@@ -9551,6 +9617,12 @@ ssl3_AuthCertificateComplete(sslSocket *ss, PRErrorCode error)
     } else if (ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget != NULL) {
 	sslRestartTarget target = ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget;
 	ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = NULL;
+
+        if (target == ssl3_FinishHandshake) {
+            SSL_TRC(3,("%d: SSL3[%p]: certificate authentication lost the race"
+                       " with peer's finished message", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+        }
+
 	rv = target(ss);
 	/* Even if we blocked here, we have accomplished enough to claim
 	 * success. Any remaining work will be taken care of by subsequent
@@ -9560,7 +9632,29 @@ ssl3_AuthCertificateComplete(sslSocket *ss, PRErrorCode error)
 	    rv = SECSuccess;
 	}
     } else {
-	rv = SECSuccess;
+        SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: certificate authentication won the race with"
+                    " peer's finished message", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+        PORT_Assert(!ss->firstHsDone);
+        PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer);
+        PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming);
+        PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_new_session_ticket ||
+                    ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_change_cipher ||
+                    ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_finished);
+ 
+        /* ssl3_SendClientSecondRound deferred the false start check because
+         * certificate authentication was pending, so we do it now if we still
+          * haven't received any of the server's second round yet.
+         */
+        if (ss->opt.enableFalseStart &&
+            !ss->firstHsDone &&
+            !ss->sec.isServer &&
+            !ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming &&
+            ssl3_WaitingForStartOfServerSecondRound(ss)) {
+            rv = ssl3_CheckFalseStart(ss);
+        } else {
+            rv = SECSuccess;
+        }
     }
 
 done:
@@ -10023,9 +10117,6 @@ xmit_loser:
         return rv;
     }
 
-    ss->gs.writeOffset = 0;
-    ss->gs.readOffset  = 0;
-
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_rsa) {
 	effectiveExchKeyType = kt_rsa;
     } else {
@@ -10090,6 +10181,9 @@ xmit_loser:
     return rv;
 }
 
+/* The return type is SECStatus instead of void because this function needs
+ * to have type sslRestartTarget.
+ */
 SECStatus
 ssl3_FinishHandshake(sslSocket * ss)
 {
@@ -10099,19 +10193,16 @@ ssl3_FinishHandshake(sslSocket * ss)
 
     /* The first handshake is now completed. */
     ss->handshake           = NULL;
-    ss->firstHsDone         = PR_TRUE;
 
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.cacheSID) {
 	(*ss->sec.cache)(ss->sec.ci.sid);
 	ss->ssl3.hs.cacheSID = PR_FALSE;
     }
 
+    ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart = PR_FALSE; /* False Start phase is complete */
     ss->ssl3.hs.ws = idle_handshake;
 
-    /* Do the handshake callback for sslv3 here, if we cannot false start. */
-    if (ss->handshakeCallback != NULL && !ssl3_CanFalseStart(ss)) {
-	(ss->handshakeCallback)(ss->fd, ss->handshakeCallbackData);
-    }
+    ssl_FinishHandshake(ss);
 
     return SECSuccess;
 }
@@ -11045,7 +11136,6 @@ process_it:
 
     ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
     return rv;
-
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3gthr.c b/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3gthr.c
index 6d62515..03e369d 100644
--- a/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3gthr.c
+++ b/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3gthr.c
@@ -275,11 +275,17 @@ ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake(sslSocket *ss, int flags)
 {
     SSL3Ciphertext cText;
     int            rv;
-    PRBool         canFalseStart = PR_FALSE;
+    PRBool         keepGoing = PR_TRUE;
 
     SSL_TRC(30, ("ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake"));
 
+    /* ssl3_HandleRecord may end up eventually calling ssl_FinishHandshake,
+     * which requires the 1stHandshakeLock, which must be acquired before the
+     * RecvBufLock.
+     */
+    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
+
     do {
 	PRBool handleRecordNow = PR_FALSE;
 
@@ -368,20 +374,48 @@ ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake(sslSocket *ss, int flags)
 	if (rv < 0) {
 	    return ss->recvdCloseNotify ? 0 : rv;
 	}
+        if (rv == (int) SECSuccess && ss->gs.buf.len > 0) {
+            /* We have application data to return to the application. This
+             * prioritizes returning application data to the application over
+             * completing any renegotiation handshake we may be doing.
+             */
+            PORT_Assert(ss->firstHsDone);
+            PORT_Assert(cText.type == content_application_data);
+            break;
+        }
 
-	/* If we kicked off a false start in ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone, break
-	 * out of this loop early without finishing the handshake.
-	 */
-	if (ss->opt.enableFalseStart) {
-	    ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
-	    canFalseStart = (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_change_cipher ||
-			     ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_new_session_ticket) &&
-		            ssl3_CanFalseStart(ss);
-	    ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+        PORT_Assert(keepGoing);
+        ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+        if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == idle_handshake) {
+            /* We are done with the current handshake so stop trying to
+             * handshake. Note that it would be safe to test ss->firstHsDone
+             * instead of ss->ssl3.hs.ws. By testing ss->ssl3.hs.ws instead,
+             * we prioritize completing a renegotiation handshake over sending
+             * application data.
+             */
+            PORT_Assert(ss->firstHsDone);
+            PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart);
+            keepGoing = PR_FALSE;
+        } else if (ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart) {
+            /* Prioritize sending application data over trying to complete
+             * the handshake if we're false starting.
+             *
+             * If we were to do this check at the beginning of the loop instead
+             * of here, then this function would become be a no-op after
+             * receiving the ServerHelloDone in the false start case, and we
+             * would never complete the handshake.
+             */
+            PORT_Assert(!ss->firstHsDone);
+ 
+            if (ssl3_WaitingForStartOfServerSecondRound(ss)) {
+                keepGoing = PR_FALSE;
+            } else {
+                ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart = PR_FALSE;
+            }
 	}
-    } while (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake &&
-             !canFalseStart &&
-             ss->gs.buf.len == 0);
+        ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+     } while (keepGoing);
+
 
     ss->gs.readOffset = 0;
     ss->gs.writeOffset = ss->gs.buf.len;
@@ -404,7 +438,10 @@ ssl3_GatherAppDataRecord(sslSocket *ss, int flags)
 {
     int            rv;
 
+    /* ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake requires both of these locks. */
+    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
+
     do {
 	rv = ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake(ss, flags);
     } while (rv > 0 && ss->gs.buf.len == 0);
diff --git a/nss/lib/ssl/sslauth.c b/nss/lib/ssl/sslauth.c
index d2f57bf..cb956d4 100644
--- a/nss/lib/ssl/sslauth.c
+++ b/nss/lib/ssl/sslauth.c
@@ -60,7 +60,6 @@ SSL_SecurityStatus(PRFileDesc *fd, int *op, char **cp, int *kp0, int *kp1,
     sslSocket *ss;
     const char *cipherName;
     PRBool isDes = PR_FALSE;
-    PRBool enoughFirstHsDone = PR_FALSE;
 
     ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
     if (!ss) {
@@ -78,14 +77,7 @@ SSL_SecurityStatus(PRFileDesc *fd, int *op, char **cp, int *kp0, int *kp1,
 	*op = SSL_SECURITY_STATUS_OFF;
     }
 
-    if (ss->firstHsDone) {
-	enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
-    } else if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 &&
-	       ssl3_CanFalseStart(ss)) {
-	enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
-    }
-
-    if (ss->opt.useSecurity && enoughFirstHsDone) {
+    if (ss->opt.useSecurity && ss->enoughFirstHsDone) {
 	if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
 	    cipherName = ssl_cipherName[ss->sec.cipherType];
 	} else {
diff --git a/nss/lib/ssl/sslimpl.h b/nss/lib/ssl/sslimpl.h
index 90e9567..bf0d67f 100644
--- a/nss/lib/ssl/sslimpl.h
+++ b/nss/lib/ssl/sslimpl.h
@@ -842,6 +842,8 @@ const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *suite_def;
     /* Shared state between ssl3_HandleFinished and ssl3_FinishHandshake */
     PRBool                cacheSID;
 
+    PRBool                canFalseStart;   /* Can/did we False Start */
+
     /* clientSigAndHash contains the contents of the signature_algorithms
      * extension (if any) from the client. This is only valid for TLS 1.2
      * or later. */
@@ -1116,6 +1118,10 @@ struct sslSocketStr {
     unsigned long    clientAuthRequested;
     unsigned long    delayDisabled;       /* Nagle delay disabled */
     unsigned long    firstHsDone;         /* first handshake is complete. */
+    unsigned long    enoughFirstHsDone;   /* enough of the first handshake is
+                                           * done for callbacks to be able to
+                                           * retrieve channel security
+                                           * parameters from the SSL socket. */
     unsigned long    handshakeBegun;     
     unsigned long    lastWriteBlocked;   
     unsigned long    recvdCloseNotify;    /* received SSL EOF. */
@@ -1156,6 +1162,8 @@ const unsigned char *  preferredCipher;
     void                     *badCertArg;
     SSLHandshakeCallback      handshakeCallback;
     void                     *handshakeCallbackData;
+    SSLCanFalseStartCallback  canFalseStartCallback;
+    void                     *canFalseStartCallbackData;
     void                     *pkcs11PinArg;
     SSLNextProtoCallback      nextProtoCallback;
     void                     *nextProtoArg;
@@ -1358,7 +1366,19 @@ extern void      ssl3_SetAlwaysBlock(sslSocket *ss);
 
 extern SECStatus ssl_EnableNagleDelay(sslSocket *ss, PRBool enabled);
 
-extern PRBool    ssl3_CanFalseStart(sslSocket *ss);
+extern void      ssl_FinishHandshake(sslSocket *ss);
+
+/* Returns PR_TRUE if we are still waiting for the server to respond to our
+ * client second round. Once we've received any part of the server's second
+ * round then we don't bother trying to false start since it is almost always
+ * the case that the NewSessionTicket, ChangeCipherSoec, and Finished messages
+ * were sent in the same packet and we want to process them all at the same
+ * time. If we were to try to false start in the middle of the server's second
+ * round, then we would increase the number of I/O operations
+ * (SSL_ForceHandshake/PR_Recv/PR_Send/etc.) needed to finish the handshake.
+ */
+extern PRBool    ssl3_WaitingForStartOfServerSecondRound(sslSocket *ss);
+
 extern SECStatus
 ssl3_CompressMACEncryptRecord(ssl3CipherSpec *   cwSpec,
 		              PRBool             isServer,
diff --git a/nss/lib/ssl/sslinfo.c b/nss/lib/ssl/sslinfo.c
index 9f2597e..d0c23b7 100644
--- a/nss/lib/ssl/sslinfo.c
+++ b/nss/lib/ssl/sslinfo.c
@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ SSL_GetChannelInfo(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLChannelInfo *info, PRUintn len)
     sslSocket *      ss;
     SSLChannelInfo   inf;
     sslSessionID *   sid;
-    PRBool           enoughFirstHsDone = PR_FALSE;
 
     if (!info || len < sizeof inf.length) { 
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
@@ -43,14 +42,7 @@ SSL_GetChannelInfo(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLChannelInfo *info, PRUintn len)
     memset(&inf, 0, sizeof inf);
     inf.length = PR_MIN(sizeof inf, len);
 
-    if (ss->firstHsDone) {
-	enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
-    } else if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 &&
-	       ssl3_CanFalseStart(ss)) {
-	enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
-    }
-
-    if (ss->opt.useSecurity && enoughFirstHsDone) {
+    if (ss->opt.useSecurity && ss->enoughFirstHsDone) {
         sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
 	inf.protocolVersion  = ss->version;
 	inf.authKeyBits      = ss->sec.authKeyBits;
diff --git a/nss/lib/ssl/sslreveal.c b/nss/lib/ssl/sslreveal.c
index dc14794..d972998 100644
--- a/nss/lib/ssl/sslreveal.c
+++ b/nss/lib/ssl/sslreveal.c
@@ -77,7 +77,6 @@ SSL_HandshakeNegotiatedExtension(PRFileDesc * socket,
 {
   /* some decisions derived from SSL_GetChannelInfo */
   sslSocket * sslsocket = NULL;
-  PRBool enoughFirstHsDone = PR_FALSE;
 
   if (!pYes) {
     PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
@@ -93,14 +92,8 @@ SSL_HandshakeNegotiatedExtension(PRFileDesc * socket,
 
   *pYes = PR_FALSE;
 
-  if (sslsocket->firstHsDone) {
-    enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
-  } else if (sslsocket->ssl3.initialized && ssl3_CanFalseStart(sslsocket)) {
-    enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
-  }
-
   /* according to public API SSL_GetChannelInfo, this doesn't need a lock */
-  if (sslsocket->opt.useSecurity && enoughFirstHsDone) {
+  if (sslsocket->opt.useSecurity) {
     if (sslsocket->ssl3.initialized) { /* SSL3 and TLS */
       /* now we know this socket went through ssl3_InitState() and
        * ss->xtnData got initialized, which is the only member accessed by
diff --git a/nss/lib/ssl/sslsecur.c b/nss/lib/ssl/sslsecur.c
index 49bb42b..d0df442 100644
--- a/nss/lib/ssl/sslsecur.c
+++ b/nss/lib/ssl/sslsecur.c
@@ -97,23 +97,13 @@ ssl_Do1stHandshake(sslSocket *ss)
 	    ss->securityHandshake = 0;
 	}
 	if (ss->handshake == 0) {
-	    ssl_GetRecvBufLock(ss);
-	    ss->gs.recordLen = 0;
-	    ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss);
-
-	    SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: handshake is completed",
-			SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
-            /* call handshake callback for ssl v2 */
-	    /* for v3 this is done in ssl3_HandleFinished() */
-	    if ((ss->handshakeCallback != NULL) && /* has callback */
-		(!ss->firstHsDone) &&              /* only first time */
-		(ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0)) {  /* not ssl3 */
-		ss->firstHsDone     = PR_TRUE;
-		(ss->handshakeCallback)(ss->fd, ss->handshakeCallbackData);
+            /* for v3 this is done in ssl3_FinishHandshake */
+            if (!ss->firstHsDone && ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
+                ssl_GetRecvBufLock(ss);
+                ss->gs.recordLen = 0;
+                ssl_FinishHandshake(ss);
+                ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss);
 	    }
-	    ss->firstHsDone         = PR_TRUE;
-	    ss->gs.writeOffset = 0;
-	    ss->gs.readOffset  = 0;
 	    break;
 	}
 	rv = (*ss->handshake)(ss);
@@ -134,6 +124,24 @@ ssl_Do1stHandshake(sslSocket *ss)
     return rv;
 }
 
+void
+ssl_FinishHandshake(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
+    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
+
+    SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: handshake is completed", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+    ss->firstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
+    ss->enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
+    ss->gs.writeOffset = 0;
+    ss->gs.readOffset  = 0;
+
+    if (ss->handshakeCallback) {
+       (ss->handshakeCallback)(ss->fd, ss->handshakeCallbackData);
+    }
+}
+
 /*
  * Handshake function that blocks.  Used to force a
  * retry on a connection on the next read/write.
@@ -206,6 +214,7 @@ SSL_ResetHandshake(PRFileDesc *s, PRBool asServer)
     ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss);
 
     ss->firstHsDone = PR_FALSE;
+    ss->enoughFirstHsDone = PR_FALSE;
     if ( asServer ) {
 	ss->handshake = ssl2_BeginServerHandshake;
 	ss->handshaking = sslHandshakingAsServer;
@@ -221,6 +230,8 @@ SSL_ResetHandshake(PRFileDesc *s, PRBool asServer)
     ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss);
 
     ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+    ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart = PR_FALSE;
+    ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = NULL;
 
     /*
     ** Blow away old security state and get a fresh setup.
@@ -331,6 +342,71 @@ SSL_HandshakeCallback(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLHandshakeCallback cb,
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 
+/* Register an application callback to be called when false start may happen.
+** Acquires and releases HandshakeLock.
+*/
+SECStatus
+SSL_SetCanFalseStartCallback(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLCanFalseStartCallback cb,
+                            void *arg)
+{
+    sslSocket *ss;
+
+    ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
+    if (!ss) {
+       SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_SetCanFalseStartCallback",
+                SSL_GETPID(), fd));
+       return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    if (!ss->opt.useSecurity) {
+       PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+       return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss);
+    ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+
+    ss->canFalseStartCallback     = cb;
+    ss->canFalseStartCallbackData = arg;
+
+    ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+    ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss);
+
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+SSL_RecommendedCanFalseStart(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool *canFalseStart)
+{
+    sslSocket *ss;
+
+    *canFalseStart = PR_FALSE;
+    ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
+    if (!ss) {
+       SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_RecommendedCanFalseStart",
+                SSL_GETPID(), fd));
+       return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    if (!ss->ssl3.initialized) {
+       PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+       return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
+       PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_SSL2);
+       return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    /* Require a forward-secret key exchange. */
+    *canFalseStart = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_dhe_dss ||
+                    ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_dhe_rsa ||
+                    ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_ecdsa ||
+                    ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_rsa;
+
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
 /* Try to make progress on an SSL handshake by attempting to read the 
 ** next handshake from the peer, and sending any responses.
 ** For non-blocking sockets, returns PR_ERROR_WOULD_BLOCK  if it cannot 
@@ -524,6 +600,9 @@ DoRecv(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *out, int len, int flags)
     int              amount;
     int              available;
 
+    /* ssl3_GatherAppDataRecord may call ssl_FinishHandshake, which needs the
+     * 1stHandshakeLock. */
+    ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss);
     ssl_GetRecvBufLock(ss);
 
     available = ss->gs.writeOffset - ss->gs.readOffset;
@@ -590,6 +669,7 @@ DoRecv(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *out, int len, int flags)
 
 done:
     ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss);
+    ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss);
     return rv;
 }
 
@@ -1156,7 +1236,7 @@ ssl_SecureRead(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *buf, int len)
 int
 ssl_SecureSend(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *buf, int len, int flags)
 {
-    int              rv		= 0;
+    int rv = 0;
 
     SSL_TRC(2, ("%d: SSL[%d]: SecureSend: sending %d bytes",
 		SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, len));
@@ -1191,19 +1271,15 @@ ssl_SecureSend(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *buf, int len, int flags)
     	ss->writerThread = PR_GetCurrentThread();
     /* If any of these is non-zero, the initial handshake is not done. */
     if (!ss->firstHsDone) {
-	PRBool canFalseStart = PR_FALSE;
+        PRBool falseStart = PR_FALSE;
 	ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss);
-	if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
+        if (ss->opt.enableFalseStart &&
+            ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
 	    ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
-	    if ((ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_change_cipher ||
-		ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_finished ||
-		ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_new_session_ticket) &&
-		ssl3_CanFalseStart(ss)) {
-		canFalseStart = PR_TRUE;
-	    }
+	    falseStart = ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart;
 	    ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
 	}
-	if (!canFalseStart &&
+	if (!falseStart &&
 	    (ss->handshake || ss->nextHandshake || ss->securityHandshake)) {
 	    rv = ssl_Do1stHandshake(ss);
 	}
@@ -1228,6 +1304,17 @@ ssl_SecureSend(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *buf, int len, int flags)
 	goto done;
     }
 
+    if (!ss->firstHsDone) {
+       PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
+#ifdef DEBUG
+       ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+       PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart);
+       ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+#endif
+       SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: SecureSend: sending data due to false start",
+                   SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+    }
+
     /* Send out the data using one of these functions:
      *	ssl2_SendClear, ssl2_SendStream, ssl2_SendBlock, 
      *  ssl3_SendApplicationData
diff --git a/nss/lib/ssl/sslsock.c b/nss/lib/ssl/sslsock.c
index cd4a7a7..73e069b 100644
--- a/nss/lib/ssl/sslsock.c
+++ b/nss/lib/ssl/sslsock.c
@@ -349,6 +349,8 @@ ssl_DupSocket(sslSocket *os)
 	    ss->badCertArg            = os->badCertArg;
 	    ss->handshakeCallback     = os->handshakeCallback;
 	    ss->handshakeCallbackData = os->handshakeCallbackData;
+            ss->canFalseStartCallback = os->canFalseStartCallback;
+            ss->canFalseStartCallbackData = os->canFalseStartCallbackData;
 	    ss->pkcs11PinArg          = os->pkcs11PinArg;
     
 	    /* Create security data */
@@ -2341,10 +2343,14 @@ ssl_Poll(PRFileDesc *fd, PRInt16 how_flags, PRInt16 *p_out_flags)
 	    } else if (new_flags & PR_POLL_WRITE) {
 		    /* The caller is trying to write, but the handshake is 
 		    ** blocked waiting for data to read, and the first 
-		    ** handshake has been sent.  so do NOT to poll on write.
+                    ** handshake has been sent.  So do NOT to poll on write
+                    ** unless we did false start.
 		    */
-		    new_flags ^=  PR_POLL_WRITE;   /* don't select on write. */
-		    new_flags |=  PR_POLL_READ;	   /* do    select on read. */
+                    if (!(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 &&
+                        ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart)) {
+                        new_flags ^= PR_POLL_WRITE; /* don't select on write. */
+                    }
+                    new_flags |= PR_POLL_READ;      /* do    select on read. */
 	    }
 	}
     } else if ((new_flags & PR_POLL_READ) && (SSL_DataPending(fd) > 0)) {
-- 
1.7.9.5