1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
|
From 1b4e0d0f9d445ba3e4d0c7db7ce0b30300572fe8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Martin Matuska <martin@matuska.de>
Date: Fri, 18 Aug 2023 00:28:39 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] pax writer: fix multiple security vulnerabilities
Security vulnerabilities:
1. Heap overflow in url_encode() in archive_write_set_format_pax.c
2. NULL dereference in archive_write_pax_header_xattrs()
3. Another NULL dereference in archive_write_pax_header_xattrs()
4. NULL dereference in archive_write_pax_header_xattr()
The vulnerabilities can be triggered when writing pax archives
with extended attributes (SCHILY or LIBARCHIVE) by feeding attribute
names longer than INT_MAX or attribute names that fail to be encoded
properly.
Reported-by: Bahaa Naamneh of Crosspoint Labs
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/1b4e0d0f9d445ba3e4d0c7db7ce0b30300572fe8]
Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
---
libarchive/archive_write_set_format_pax.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/libarchive/archive_write_set_format_pax.c b/libarchive/archive_write_set_format_pax.c
index c9c15916..1eb9a9a4 100644
--- a/libarchive/archive_write_set_format_pax.c
+++ b/libarchive/archive_write_set_format_pax.c
@@ -367,10 +367,12 @@ archive_write_pax_header_xattr(struct pax *pax, const char *encoded_name,
struct archive_string s;
char *encoded_value;
+ if (encoded_name == NULL)
+ return;
+
if (pax->flags & WRITE_LIBARCHIVE_XATTR) {
encoded_value = base64_encode((const char *)value, value_len);
-
- if (encoded_name != NULL && encoded_value != NULL) {
+ if (encoded_value != NULL) {
archive_string_init(&s);
archive_strcpy(&s, "LIBARCHIVE.xattr.");
archive_strcat(&s, encoded_name);
@@ -403,17 +405,22 @@ archive_write_pax_header_xattrs(struct archive_write *a,
archive_entry_xattr_next(entry, &name, &value, &size);
url_encoded_name = url_encode(name);
- if (url_encoded_name != NULL) {
+ if (url_encoded_name == NULL)
+ goto malloc_error;
+ else {
/* Convert narrow-character to UTF-8. */
r = archive_strcpy_l(&(pax->l_url_encoded_name),
url_encoded_name, pax->sconv_utf8);
free(url_encoded_name); /* Done with this. */
if (r == 0)
encoded_name = pax->l_url_encoded_name.s;
- else if (errno == ENOMEM) {
- archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
- "Can't allocate memory for Linkname");
- return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
+ else if (r == -1)
+ goto malloc_error;
+ else {
+ archive_set_error(&a->archive,
+ ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
+ "Error encoding pax extended attribute");
+ return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
}
@@ -422,6 +429,9 @@ archive_write_pax_header_xattrs(struct archive_write *a,
}
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
+malloc_error:
+ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM, "Can't allocate memory");
+ return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
static int
@@ -1904,14 +1914,19 @@ url_encode(const char *in)
{
const char *s;
char *d;
- int out_len = 0;
+ size_t out_len = 0;
char *out;
for (s = in; *s != '\0'; s++) {
- if (*s < 33 || *s > 126 || *s == '%' || *s == '=')
+ if (*s < 33 || *s > 126 || *s == '%' || *s == '=') {
+ if (SIZE_MAX - out_len < 4)
+ return (NULL);
out_len += 3;
- else
+ } else {
+ if (SIZE_MAX - out_len < 2)
+ return (NULL);
out_len++;
+ }
}
out = (char *)malloc(out_len + 1);
--
2.30.2
|
