1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
|
From 06e88ca78d056ea4de885e3a1496805179dc47bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com>
Date: Mon, 15 Oct 2018 16:33:04 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] ne2000: fix possible out of bound access in ne2000_receive
In ne2000_receive(), we try to assign size_ to size which converts
from size_t to integer. This will cause troubles when size_ is greater
INT_MAX, this will lead a negative value in size and it can then pass
the check of size < MIN_BUF_SIZE which may lead out of bound access of
for both buf and buf1.
Fixing by converting the type of size to size_t.
CC: address@hidden
Reported-by: Daniel Shapira <address@hidden>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <address@hidden>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <address@hidden>
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2018-09/msg03273.html]
CVE: CVE-2018-17958
Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com>
---
hw/net/ne2000.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/hw/net/ne2000.c b/hw/net/ne2000.c
index 07d79e3..869518e 100644
--- a/hw/net/ne2000.c
+++ b/hw/net/ne2000.c
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ static int ne2000_buffer_full(NE2000State *s)
ssize_t ne2000_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size_)
{
NE2000State *s = qemu_get_nic_opaque(nc);
- int size = size_;
+ size_t size = size_;
uint8_t *p;
unsigned int total_len, next, avail, len, index, mcast_idx;
uint8_t buf1[60];
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ ssize_t ne2000_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size_)
{ 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff };
#if defined(DEBUG_NE2000)
- printf("NE2000: received len=%d\n", size);
+ printf("NE2000: received len=%zu\n", size);
#endif
if (s->cmd & E8390_STOP || ne2000_buffer_full(s))
--
2.7.4
|
