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From 399944622df7bd81af62e67ea967c470534090e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Cesar Pereida <cesar.pereida@aalto.fi>
Date: Mon, 23 May 2016 12:45:25 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] Fix DSA, preserve BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
Operations in the DSA signing algorithm should run in constant time in
order to avoid side channel attacks. A flaw in the OpenSSL DSA
implementation means that a non-constant time codepath is followed for
certain operations. This has been demonstrated through a cache-timing
attack to be sufficient for an attacker to recover the private DSA key.
CVE-2016-2178
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Upstream-Status: Backport
CVE: CVE-2016-2178
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
---
crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c | 9 +++++----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Index: openssl-1.0.2h/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-1.0.2h.orig/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
+++ openssl-1.0.2h/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
@@ -248,9 +248,6 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_C
if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q))
goto err;
while (BN_is_zero(&k)) ;
- if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
- BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- }
if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
@@ -282,6 +279,11 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_C
} else {
K = &k;
}
+
+ if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
+ BN_set_flags(K, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ }
+
DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(goto err, dsa, r, dsa->g, K, dsa->p, ctx,
dsa->method_mont_p);
if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx))
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