From ea251020304b9c18f31c39de867a47311b1bb46c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ross Burton Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2019 16:30:02 +0000 Subject: libarchive: integrate security fixes Fix the following CVEs by backporting patches from upstream: - CVE-2019-1000019 - CVE-2019-1000020 - CVE-2018-1000877 - CVE-2018-1000878 - CVE-2018-1000879 - CVE-2018-1000880 Signed-off-by: Ross Burton Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie --- .../libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2018-1000877.patch | 38 +++++++++++ .../libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2018-1000878.patch | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++ .../libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2018-1000879.patch | 50 ++++++++++++++ .../libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2018-1000880.patch | 44 ++++++++++++ .../libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2019-1000019.patch | 59 ++++++++++++++++ .../libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2019-1000020.patch | 61 +++++++++++++++++ .../libarchive/libarchive_3.3.3.bb | 6 ++ 7 files changed, 337 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2018-1000877.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2018-1000878.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2018-1000879.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2018-1000880.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2019-1000019.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2019-1000020.patch diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2018-1000877.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2018-1000877.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ce638370bd --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2018-1000877.patch @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +CVE: CVE-2018-1000877 +Upstream-Status: Backport +Signed-off-by: Ross Burton + +From 021efa522ad729ff0f5806c4ce53e4a6cc1daa31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Axtens +Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2018 17:56:29 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH] Avoid a double-free when a window size of 0 is specified + +new_size can be 0 with a malicious or corrupted RAR archive. + +realloc(area, 0) is equivalent to free(area), so the region would +be free()d here and the free()d again in the cleanup function. + +Found with a setup running AFL, afl-rb, and qsym. +--- + libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c | 5 +++++ + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c +index 23452222..6f419c27 100644 +--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c ++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c +@@ -2300,6 +2300,11 @@ parse_codes(struct archive_read *a) + new_size = DICTIONARY_MAX_SIZE; + else + new_size = rar_fls((unsigned int)rar->unp_size) << 1; ++ if (new_size == 0) { ++ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT, ++ "Zero window size is invalid."); ++ return (ARCHIVE_FATAL); ++ } + new_window = realloc(rar->lzss.window, new_size); + if (new_window == NULL) { + archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM, +-- +2.20.0 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2018-1000878.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2018-1000878.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7468fd3c93 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2018-1000878.patch @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +CVE: CVE-2018-1000878 +Upstream-Status: Backport +Signed-off-by: Ross Burton + +From bfcfe6f04ed20db2504db8a254d1f40a1d84eb28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Axtens +Date: Tue, 4 Dec 2018 00:55:22 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH] rar: file split across multi-part archives must match + +Fuzzing uncovered some UAF and memory overrun bugs where a file in a +single file archive reported that it was split across multiple +volumes. This was caused by ppmd7 operations calling +rar_br_fillup. This would invoke rar_read_ahead, which would in some +situations invoke archive_read_format_rar_read_header. That would +check the new file name against the old file name, and if they didn't +match up it would free the ppmd7 buffer and allocate a new +one. However, because the ppmd7 decoder wasn't actually done with the +buffer, it would continue to used the freed buffer. Both reads and +writes to the freed region can be observed. + +This is quite tricky to solve: once the buffer has been freed it is +too late, as the ppmd7 decoder functions almost universally assume +success - there's no way for ppmd_read to signal error, nor are there +good ways for functions like Range_Normalise to propagate them. So we +can't detect after the fact that we're in an invalid state - e.g. by +checking rar->cursor, we have to prevent ourselves from ever ending up +there. So, when we are in the dangerous part or rar_read_ahead that +assumes a valid split, we set a flag force read_header to either go +down the path for split files or bail. This means that the ppmd7 +decoder keeps a valid buffer and just runs out of data. + +Found with a combination of AFL, afl-rb and qsym. +--- + libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c | 9 +++++++++ + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c +index 6f419c27..a8cc5c94 100644 +--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c ++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c +@@ -258,6 +258,7 @@ struct rar + struct data_block_offsets *dbo; + unsigned int cursor; + unsigned int nodes; ++ char filename_must_match; + + /* LZSS members */ + struct huffman_code maincode; +@@ -1560,6 +1561,12 @@ read_header(struct archive_read *a, struct archive_entry *entry, + } + return ret; + } ++ else if (rar->filename_must_match) ++ { ++ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT, ++ "Mismatch of file parts split across multi-volume archive"); ++ return (ARCHIVE_FATAL); ++ } + + rar->filename_save = (char*)realloc(rar->filename_save, + filename_size + 1); +@@ -2933,12 +2940,14 @@ rar_read_ahead(struct archive_read *a, size_t min, ssize_t *avail) + else if (*avail == 0 && rar->main_flags & MHD_VOLUME && + rar->file_flags & FHD_SPLIT_AFTER) + { ++ rar->filename_must_match = 1; + ret = archive_read_format_rar_read_header(a, a->entry); + if (ret == (ARCHIVE_EOF)) + { + rar->has_endarc_header = 1; + ret = archive_read_format_rar_read_header(a, a->entry); + } ++ rar->filename_must_match = 0; + if (ret != (ARCHIVE_OK)) + return NULL; + return rar_read_ahead(a, min, avail); +-- +2.20.0 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2018-1000879.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2018-1000879.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9f25932a1a --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2018-1000879.patch @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +CVE: CVE-2018-1000879 +Upstream-Status: Backport +Signed-off-by: Ross Burton + +From 15bf44fd2c1ad0e3fd87048b3fcc90c4dcff1175 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Axtens +Date: Tue, 4 Dec 2018 14:29:42 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH] Skip 0-length ACL fields + +Currently, it is possible to create an archive that crashes bsdtar +with a malformed ACL: + +Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. +archive_acl_from_text_l (acl=, text=0x7e2e92 "", want_type=, sc=) at libarchive/archive_acl.c:1726 +1726 switch (*s) { +(gdb) p n +$1 = 1 +(gdb) p field[n] +$2 = {start = 0x0, end = 0x0} + +Stop this by checking that the length is not zero before beginning +the switch statement. + +I am pretty sure this is the bug mentioned in the qsym paper [1], +and I was able to replicate it with a qsym + AFL + afl-rb setup. + +[1] https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/yun +--- + libarchive/archive_acl.c | 5 +++++ + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/libarchive/archive_acl.c b/libarchive/archive_acl.c +index 512beee1..7beeee86 100644 +--- a/libarchive/archive_acl.c ++++ b/libarchive/archive_acl.c +@@ -1723,6 +1723,11 @@ archive_acl_from_text_l(struct archive_acl *acl, const char *text, + st = field[n].start + 1; + len = field[n].end - field[n].start; + ++ if (len == 0) { ++ ret = ARCHIVE_WARN; ++ continue; ++ } ++ + switch (*s) { + case 'u': + if (len == 1 || (len == 4 +-- +2.20.0 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2018-1000880.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2018-1000880.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bc264a1242 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2018-1000880.patch @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +CVE: CVE-2018-1000880 +Upstream-Status: Backport +Signed-off-by: Ross Burton + +From 9c84b7426660c09c18cc349f6d70b5f8168b5680 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Axtens +Date: Tue, 4 Dec 2018 16:33:42 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH] warc: consume data once read + +The warc decoder only used read ahead, it wouldn't actually consume +data that had previously been printed. This means that if you specify +an invalid content length, it will just reprint the same data over +and over and over again until it hits the desired length. + +This means that a WARC resource with e.g. +Content-Length: 666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666665 +but only a few hundred bytes of data, causes a quasi-infinite loop. + +Consume data in subsequent calls to _warc_read. + +Found with an AFL + afl-rb + qsym setup. +--- + libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c | 5 +++++ + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c +index e8753853..e8fc8428 100644 +--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c ++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c +@@ -386,6 +386,11 @@ _warc_read(struct archive_read *a, const void **buf, size_t *bsz, int64_t *off) + return (ARCHIVE_EOF); + } + ++ if (w->unconsumed) { ++ __archive_read_consume(a, w->unconsumed); ++ w->unconsumed = 0U; ++ } ++ + rab = __archive_read_ahead(a, 1U, &nrd); + if (nrd < 0) { + *bsz = 0U; +-- +2.20.0 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2019-1000019.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2019-1000019.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f6f1add5e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2019-1000019.patch @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +CVE: CVE-2018-1000019 +Upstream-Status: Backport +Signed-off-by: Ross Burton + +From 65a23f5dbee4497064e9bb467f81138a62b0dae1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Axtens +Date: Tue, 1 Jan 2019 16:01:40 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH 2/2] 7zip: fix crash when parsing certain archives + +Fuzzing with CRCs disabled revealed that a call to get_uncompressed_data() +would sometimes fail to return at least 'minimum' bytes. This can cause +the crc32() invocation in header_bytes to read off into invalid memory. + +A specially crafted archive can use this to cause a crash. + +An ASAN trace is below, but ASAN is not required - an uninstrumented +binary will also crash. + +==7719==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x631000040000 (pc 0x7fbdb3b3ec1d bp 0x7ffe77a51310 sp 0x7ffe77a51150 T0) +==7719==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. + #0 0x7fbdb3b3ec1c in crc32_z (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libz.so.1+0x2c1c) + #1 0x84f5eb in header_bytes (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x84f5eb) + #2 0x856156 in read_Header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x856156) + #3 0x84e134 in slurp_central_directory (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x84e134) + #4 0x849690 in archive_read_format_7zip_read_header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x849690) + #5 0x5713b7 in _archive_read_next_header2 (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x5713b7) + #6 0x570e63 in _archive_read_next_header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x570e63) + #7 0x6f08bd in archive_read_next_header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x6f08bd) + #8 0x52373f in read_archive (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x52373f) + #9 0x5257be in tar_mode_x (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x5257be) + #10 0x51daeb in main (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x51daeb) + #11 0x7fbdb27cab96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 + #12 0x41dd09 in _start (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x41dd09) + +This was primarly done with afl and FairFuzz. Some early corpus entries +may have been generated by qsym. +--- + libarchive/archive_read_support_format_7zip.c | 8 +------- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_7zip.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_7zip.c +index bccbf8966..b6d1505d3 100644 +--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_7zip.c ++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_7zip.c +@@ -2964,13 +2964,7 @@ get_uncompressed_data(struct archive_read *a, const void **buff, size_t size, + if (zip->codec == _7Z_COPY && zip->codec2 == (unsigned long)-1) { + /* Copy mode. */ + +- /* +- * Note: '1' here is a performance optimization. +- * Recall that the decompression layer returns a count of +- * available bytes; asking for more than that forces the +- * decompressor to combine reads by copying data. +- */ +- *buff = __archive_read_ahead(a, 1, &bytes_avail); ++ *buff = __archive_read_ahead(a, minimum, &bytes_avail); + if (bytes_avail <= 0) { + archive_set_error(&a->archive, + ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT, diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2019-1000020.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2019-1000020.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3e63921346 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2019-1000020.patch @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +CVE: CVE-2018-1000020 +Upstream-Status: Backport +Signed-off-by: Ross Burton + +From 8312eaa576014cd9b965012af51bc1f967b12423 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Axtens +Date: Tue, 1 Jan 2019 17:10:49 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH 1/2] iso9660: Fail when expected Rockridge extensions is + missing + +A corrupted or malicious ISO9660 image can cause read_CE() to loop +forever. + +read_CE() calls parse_rockridge(), expecting a Rockridge extension +to be read. However, parse_rockridge() is structured as a while +loop starting with a sanity check, and if the sanity check fails +before the loop has run, the function returns ARCHIVE_OK without +advancing the position in the file. This causes read_CE() to retry +indefinitely. + +Make parse_rockridge() return ARCHIVE_WARN if it didn't read an +extension. As someone with no real knowledge of the format, this +seems more apt than ARCHIVE_FATAL, but both the call-sites escalate +it to a fatal error immediately anyway. + +Found with a combination of AFL, afl-rb (FairFuzz) and qsym. +--- + libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c | 11 ++++++++++- + 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c +index 28acfefbb..bad8f1dfe 100644 +--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c ++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c +@@ -2102,6 +2102,7 @@ parse_rockridge(struct archive_read *a, struct file_info *file, + const unsigned char *p, const unsigned char *end) + { + struct iso9660 *iso9660; ++ int entry_seen = 0; + + iso9660 = (struct iso9660 *)(a->format->data); + +@@ -2257,8 +2258,16 @@ parse_rockridge(struct archive_read *a, struct file_info *file, + } + + p += p[2]; ++ entry_seen = 1; ++ } ++ ++ if (entry_seen) ++ return (ARCHIVE_OK); ++ else { ++ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT, ++ "Tried to parse Rockridge extensions, but none found"); ++ return (ARCHIVE_WARN); + } +- return (ARCHIVE_OK); + } + + static int + diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.3.3.bb b/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.3.3.bb index 46a3d43762..af5ca65297 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.3.3.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.3.3.bb @@ -34,6 +34,12 @@ EXTRA_OECONF += "--enable-largefile" SRC_URI = "http://libarchive.org/downloads/libarchive-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://non-recursive-extract-and-list.patch \ file://bug1066.patch \ + file://CVE-2018-1000877.patch \ + file://CVE-2018-1000878.patch \ + file://CVE-2018-1000879.patch \ + file://CVE-2018-1000880.patch \ + file://CVE-2019-1000019.patch \ + file://CVE-2019-1000020.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "4038e366ca5b659dae3efcc744e72120" -- cgit 1.2.3-korg