From ce856e5e07589d49d5ff84b515c48735cc78cd01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Davide Gardenal Date: Fri, 25 Mar 2022 17:46:30 +0100 Subject: ghostscript: backport patch fix for CVE-2021-3781 Upstream advisory: https://ghostscript.com/blog/CVE-2021-3781.html Other than the CVE fix other two commits are backported to fit the patch. Signed-off-by: Davide Gardenal Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman --- .../ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2021-3781_1.patch | 121 +++++++++++ .../ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2021-3781_2.patch | 37 ++++ .../ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2021-3781_3.patch | 238 +++++++++++++++++++++ .../ghostscript/ghostscript_9.52.bb | 3 + 4 files changed, 399 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2021-3781_1.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2021-3781_2.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2021-3781_3.patch diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2021-3781_1.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2021-3781_1.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..033ba77f9a --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2021-3781_1.patch @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +From 3920a727fb19e19f597e518610ce2416d08cb75f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Chris Liddell +Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2020 17:19:09 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix pdfwrite "%d" mode with file permissions + +Firstly, in gx_device_delete_output_file the iodev pointer was being passed +to the delete_method incorrectly (passing a pointer to that pointer). Thus +when we attempted to use that to confirm permission to delete the file, it +crashed. Credit to Ken for finding that. + +Secondly, due to the way pdfwrite works, when running with an output file per +page, it creates the current output file immediately it has completed writing +the previous one. Thus, it has to delete that partial file on exit. + +Previously, the output file was not added to the "control" permission list, +so an attempt to delete it would result in an error. So add the output file +to the "control" as well as "write" list. + +CVE: CVE-2021-3781 + +Upstream-Status: Backport: +https://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;f=base/gslibctx.c;h=3920a727fb19e19f597e518610ce2416d08cb75f + +Signed-off-by: Davide Gardenal +--- + base/gsdevice.c | 2 +- + base/gslibctx.c | 20 ++++++++++++++------ + 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/base/gsdevice.c b/base/gsdevice.c +index 913119495..ac78af93f 100644 +--- a/base/gsdevice.c ++++ b/base/gsdevice.c +@@ -1185,7 +1185,7 @@ int gx_device_delete_output_file(const gx_device * dev, const char *fname) + parsed.len = strlen(parsed.fname); + } + if (parsed.iodev) +- code = parsed.iodev->procs.delete_file((gx_io_device *)(&parsed.iodev), (const char *)parsed.fname); ++ code = parsed.iodev->procs.delete_file((gx_io_device *)(parsed.iodev), (const char *)parsed.fname); + else + code = gs_note_error(gs_error_invalidfileaccess); + +diff --git a/base/gslibctx.c b/base/gslibctx.c +index d726c58b5..ff8fc895e 100644 +--- a/base/gslibctx.c ++++ b/base/gslibctx.c +@@ -647,7 +647,7 @@ gs_add_outputfile_control_path(gs_memory_t *mem, const char *fname) + char *fp, f[gp_file_name_sizeof]; + const int pipe = 124; /* ASCII code for '|' */ + const int len = strlen(fname); +- int i; ++ int i, code; + + /* Be sure the string copy will fit */ + if (len >= gp_file_name_sizeof) +@@ -658,8 +658,6 @@ gs_add_outputfile_control_path(gs_memory_t *mem, const char *fname) + rewrite_percent_specifiers(f); + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { + if (f[i] == pipe) { +- int code; +- + fp = &f[i + 1]; + /* Because we potentially have to check file permissions at two levels + for the output file (gx_device_open_output_file and the low level +@@ -671,10 +669,16 @@ gs_add_outputfile_control_path(gs_memory_t *mem, const char *fname) + if (code < 0) + return code; + break; ++ code = gs_add_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_control, f); ++ if (code < 0) ++ return code; + } + if (!IS_WHITESPACE(f[i])) + break; + } ++ code = gs_add_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_control, fp); ++ if (code < 0) ++ return code; + return gs_add_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_writing, fp); + } + +@@ -684,7 +688,7 @@ gs_remove_outputfile_control_path(gs_memory_t *mem, const char *fname) + char *fp, f[gp_file_name_sizeof]; + const int pipe = 124; /* ASCII code for '|' */ + const int len = strlen(fname); +- int i; ++ int i, code; + + /* Be sure the string copy will fit */ + if (len >= gp_file_name_sizeof) +@@ -694,8 +698,6 @@ gs_remove_outputfile_control_path(gs_memory_t *mem, const char *fname) + /* Try to rewrite any %d (or similar) in the string */ + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { + if (f[i] == pipe) { +- int code; +- + fp = &f[i + 1]; + /* Because we potentially have to check file permissions at two levels + for the output file (gx_device_open_output_file and the low level +@@ -704,6 +706,9 @@ gs_remove_outputfile_control_path(gs_memory_t *mem, const char *fname) + the pipe_fopen(), the leading '|' has been stripped. + */ + code = gs_remove_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_writing, f); ++ if (code < 0) ++ return code; ++ code = gs_remove_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_control, f); + if (code < 0) + return code; + break; +@@ -711,6 +716,9 @@ gs_remove_outputfile_control_path(gs_memory_t *mem, const char *fname) + if (!IS_WHITESPACE(f[i])) + break; + } ++ code = gs_remove_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_control, fp); ++ if (code < 0) ++ return code; + return gs_remove_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_writing, fp); + } + +-- +2.25.1 diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2021-3781_2.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2021-3781_2.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..beade79eef --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2021-3781_2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +From 9daf042fd7bb19e93388d89d9686a2fa4496f382 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Chris Liddell +Date: Mon, 24 Aug 2020 09:24:31 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Coverity 361429: move "break" to correct place. + +We had to add the outputfile to the "control" file permission list (as well +as write), but for the "pipe" case, I accidentally added the call after the +break out of loop that checks for a pipe. + +CVE: CVE-2021-3781 + +Upstream-Status: Backport: +https://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;f=base/gslibctx.c;h=9daf042fd7bb19e93388d89d9686a2fa4496f382 + +Signed-off-by: Davide Gardenal +--- + base/gslibctx.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/base/gslibctx.c b/base/gslibctx.c +index ff8fc895e..63dfbe2e0 100644 +--- a/base/gslibctx.c ++++ b/base/gslibctx.c +@@ -668,10 +668,10 @@ gs_add_outputfile_control_path(gs_memory_t *mem, const char *fname) + code = gs_add_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_writing, f); + if (code < 0) + return code; +- break; + code = gs_add_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_control, f); + if (code < 0) + return code; ++ break; + } + if (!IS_WHITESPACE(f[i])) + break; +-- +2.25.1 diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2021-3781_3.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2021-3781_3.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e3f9e81c45 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2021-3781_3.patch @@ -0,0 +1,238 @@ +From a9bd3dec9fde03327a4a2c69dad1036bf9632e20 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Chris Liddell +Date: Tue, 7 Sep 2021 20:36:12 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Bug 704342: Include device specifier strings in access + validation + +for the "%pipe%", %handle%" and %printer% io devices. + +We previously validated only the part after the "%pipe%" Postscript device +specifier, but this proved insufficient. + +This rebuilds the original file name string, and validates it complete. The +slight complication for "%pipe%" is it can be reached implicitly using +"|" so we have to check both prefixes. + +Addresses CVE-2021-3781 + +CVE: CVE-2021-3781 + +Upstream-Status: Backport: +https://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commitdiff;h=a9bd3dec9fde + +Signed-off-by: Davide Gardenal +--- + base/gdevpipe.c | 22 +++++++++++++++- + base/gp_mshdl.c | 11 +++++++- + base/gp_msprn.c | 10 ++++++- + base/gp_os2pr.c | 13 +++++++++- + base/gslibctx.c | 69 ++++++++++--------------------------------------- + 5 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/base/gdevpipe.c b/base/gdevpipe.c +index 96d71f5d8..5bdc485be 100644 +--- a/base/gdevpipe.c ++++ b/base/gdevpipe.c +@@ -72,8 +72,28 @@ pipe_fopen(gx_io_device * iodev, const char *fname, const char *access, + #else + gs_lib_ctx_t *ctx = mem->gs_lib_ctx; + gs_fs_list_t *fs = ctx->core->fs; ++ /* The pipe device can be reached in two ways, explicltly with %pipe% ++ or implicitly with "|", so we have to check for both ++ */ ++ char f[gp_file_name_sizeof]; ++ const char *pipestr = "|"; ++ const size_t pipestrlen = strlen(pipestr); ++ const size_t preflen = strlen(iodev->dname); ++ const size_t nlen = strlen(fname); ++ int code1; ++ ++ if (preflen + nlen >= gp_file_name_sizeof) ++ return_error(gs_error_invalidaccess); ++ ++ memcpy(f, iodev->dname, preflen); ++ memcpy(f + preflen, fname, nlen + 1); ++ ++ code1 = gp_validate_path(mem, f, access); ++ ++ memcpy(f, pipestr, pipestrlen); ++ memcpy(f + pipestrlen, fname, nlen + 1); + +- if (gp_validate_path(mem, fname, access) != 0) ++ if (code1 != 0 && gp_validate_path(mem, f, access) != 0 ) + return gs_error_invalidfileaccess; + + /* +diff --git a/base/gp_mshdl.c b/base/gp_mshdl.c +index 2b964ed74..8d87ceadc 100644 +--- a/base/gp_mshdl.c ++++ b/base/gp_mshdl.c +@@ -95,8 +95,17 @@ mswin_handle_fopen(gx_io_device * iodev, const char *fname, const char *access, + long hfile; /* Correct for Win32, may be wrong for Win64 */ + gs_lib_ctx_t *ctx = mem->gs_lib_ctx; + gs_fs_list_t *fs = ctx->core->fs; ++ char f[gp_file_name_sizeof]; ++ const size_t preflen = strlen(iodev->dname); ++ const size_t nlen = strlen(fname); + +- if (gp_validate_path(mem, fname, access) != 0) ++ if (preflen + nlen >= gp_file_name_sizeof) ++ return_error(gs_error_invalidaccess); ++ ++ memcpy(f, iodev->dname, preflen); ++ memcpy(f + preflen, fname, nlen + 1); ++ ++ if (gp_validate_path(mem, f, access) != 0) + return gs_error_invalidfileaccess; + + /* First we try the open_handle method. */ +diff --git a/base/gp_msprn.c b/base/gp_msprn.c +index ed4827968..746a974f7 100644 +--- a/base/gp_msprn.c ++++ b/base/gp_msprn.c +@@ -168,8 +168,16 @@ mswin_printer_fopen(gx_io_device * iodev, const char *fname, const char *access, + unsigned long *ptid = &((tid_t *)(iodev->state))->tid; + gs_lib_ctx_t *ctx = mem->gs_lib_ctx; + gs_fs_list_t *fs = ctx->core->fs; ++ const size_t preflen = strlen(iodev->dname); ++ const size_t nlen = strlen(fname); + +- if (gp_validate_path(mem, fname, access) != 0) ++ if (preflen + nlen >= gp_file_name_sizeof) ++ return_error(gs_error_invalidaccess); ++ ++ memcpy(pname, iodev->dname, preflen); ++ memcpy(pname + preflen, fname, nlen + 1); ++ ++ if (gp_validate_path(mem, pname, access) != 0) + return gs_error_invalidfileaccess; + + /* First we try the open_printer method. */ +diff --git a/base/gp_os2pr.c b/base/gp_os2pr.c +index f852c71fc..ba54cde66 100644 +--- a/base/gp_os2pr.c ++++ b/base/gp_os2pr.c +@@ -107,9 +107,20 @@ os2_printer_fopen(gx_io_device * iodev, const char *fname, const char *access, + FILE ** pfile, char *rfname, uint rnamelen) + { + os2_printer_t *pr = (os2_printer_t *)iodev->state; +- char driver_name[256]; ++ char driver_name[gp_file_name_sizeof]; + gs_lib_ctx_t *ctx = mem->gs_lib_ctx; + gs_fs_list_t *fs = ctx->core->fs; ++ const size_t preflen = strlen(iodev->dname); ++ const int size_t = strlen(fname); ++ ++ if (preflen + nlen >= gp_file_name_sizeof) ++ return_error(gs_error_invalidaccess); ++ ++ memcpy(driver_name, iodev->dname, preflen); ++ memcpy(driver_name + preflen, fname, nlen + 1); ++ ++ if (gp_validate_path(mem, driver_name, access) != 0) ++ return gs_error_invalidfileaccess; + + /* First we try the open_printer method. */ + /* Note that the loop condition here ensures we don't +diff --git a/base/gslibctx.c b/base/gslibctx.c +index 6dfed6cd5..318039fad 100644 +--- a/base/gslibctx.c ++++ b/base/gslibctx.c +@@ -655,82 +655,39 @@ rewrite_percent_specifiers(char *s) + int + gs_add_outputfile_control_path(gs_memory_t *mem, const char *fname) + { +- char *fp, f[gp_file_name_sizeof]; +- const int pipe = 124; /* ASCII code for '|' */ +- const int len = strlen(fname); +- int i, code; ++ char f[gp_file_name_sizeof]; ++ int code; + + /* Be sure the string copy will fit */ +- if (len >= gp_file_name_sizeof) ++ if (strlen(fname) >= gp_file_name_sizeof) + return gs_error_rangecheck; + strcpy(f, fname); +- fp = f; + /* Try to rewrite any %d (or similar) in the string */ + rewrite_percent_specifiers(f); +- for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { +- if (f[i] == pipe) { +- fp = &f[i + 1]; +- /* Because we potentially have to check file permissions at two levels +- for the output file (gx_device_open_output_file and the low level +- fopen API, if we're using a pipe, we have to add both the full string, +- (including the '|', and just the command to which we pipe - since at +- the pipe_fopen(), the leading '|' has been stripped. +- */ +- code = gs_add_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_writing, f); +- if (code < 0) +- return code; +- code = gs_add_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_control, f); +- if (code < 0) +- return code; +- break; +- } +- if (!IS_WHITESPACE(f[i])) +- break; +- } +- code = gs_add_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_control, fp); ++ ++ code = gs_add_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_control, f); + if (code < 0) + return code; +- return gs_add_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_writing, fp); ++ return gs_add_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_writing, f); + } + + int + gs_remove_outputfile_control_path(gs_memory_t *mem, const char *fname) + { +- char *fp, f[gp_file_name_sizeof]; +- const int pipe = 124; /* ASCII code for '|' */ +- const int len = strlen(fname); +- int i, code; ++ char f[gp_file_name_sizeof]; ++ int code; + + /* Be sure the string copy will fit */ +- if (len >= gp_file_name_sizeof) ++ if (strlen(fname) >= gp_file_name_sizeof) + return gs_error_rangecheck; + strcpy(f, fname); +- fp = f; + /* Try to rewrite any %d (or similar) in the string */ +- for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { +- if (f[i] == pipe) { +- fp = &f[i + 1]; +- /* Because we potentially have to check file permissions at two levels +- for the output file (gx_device_open_output_file and the low level +- fopen API, if we're using a pipe, we have to add both the full string, +- (including the '|', and just the command to which we pipe - since at +- the pipe_fopen(), the leading '|' has been stripped. +- */ +- code = gs_remove_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_writing, f); +- if (code < 0) +- return code; +- code = gs_remove_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_control, f); +- if (code < 0) +- return code; +- break; +- } +- if (!IS_WHITESPACE(f[i])) +- break; +- } +- code = gs_remove_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_control, fp); ++ rewrite_percent_specifiers(f); ++ ++ code = gs_remove_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_control, f); + if (code < 0) + return code; +- return gs_remove_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_writing, fp); ++ return gs_remove_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_writing, f); + } + + int +-- +2.25.1 diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript_9.52.bb b/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript_9.52.bb index 310c4f6d24..a829d4b4ae 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript_9.52.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript_9.52.bb @@ -36,6 +36,9 @@ SRC_URI_BASE = "https://github.com/ArtifexSoftware/ghostpdl-downloads/releases/d file://CVE-2020-15900.patch \ file://check-stack-limits-after-function-evalution.patch \ file://CVE-2021-45949.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-3781_1.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-3781_2.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-3781_3.patch \ " SRC_URI = "${SRC_URI_BASE} \ -- cgit 1.2.3-korg