diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-3165.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-3165.patch | 61 |
1 files changed, 61 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-3165.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-3165.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a7d061eb99 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-3165.patch @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +From a15f7d9913d050fb72a79bbbefa5c2329d92e71d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com> +Date: Tue, 8 Nov 2022 17:10:00 +0530 +Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2022-3165 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/d307040b18] +CVE: CVE-2022-3165 +Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com> + +ui/vnc-clipboard: fix integer underflow in vnc_client_cut_text_ext + +Extended ClientCutText messages start with a 4-byte header. If len < 4, +an integer underflow occurs in vnc_client_cut_text_ext. The result is +used to decompress data in a while loop in inflate_buffer, leading to +CPU consumption and denial of service. Prevent this by checking dlen in +protocol_client_msg. + +Fixes: CVE-2022-3165 + +("ui/vnc: clipboard support") +Reported-by: default avatarTangPeng <tangpeng@qianxin.com> +Signed-off-by: Mauro Matteo Cascella's avatarMauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@redhat.com> +Message-Id: <20220925204511.1103214-1-mcascell@redhat.com> +Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann's avatarGerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> +--- + ui/vnc.c | 11 ++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/ui/vnc.c b/ui/vnc.c +index af02522e8..a14b6861b 100644 +--- a/ui/vnc.c ++++ b/ui/vnc.c +@@ -2442,8 +2442,8 @@ static int protocol_client_msg(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t len) + if (len == 1) { + return 8; + } ++ uint32_t dlen = abs(read_s32(data, 4)); + if (len == 8) { +- uint32_t dlen = abs(read_s32(data, 4)); + if (dlen > (1 << 20)) { + error_report("vnc: client_cut_text msg payload has %u bytes" + " which exceeds our limit of 1MB.", dlen); +@@ -2456,8 +2456,13 @@ static int protocol_client_msg(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t len) + } + + if (read_s32(data, 4) < 0) { +- vnc_client_cut_text_ext(vs, abs(read_s32(data, 4)), +- read_u32(data, 8), data + 12); ++ if (dlen < 4) { ++ error_report("vnc: malformed payload (header less than 4 bytes)" ++ " in extended clipboard pseudo-encoding."); ++ vnc_client_error(vs); ++ break; ++ } ++ vnc_client_cut_text_ext(vs, dlen, read_u32(data, 8), data + 12); + break; + } + vnc_client_cut_text(vs, read_u32(data, 4), data + 8); +-- +2.25.1 + |