diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0002-fix-CVE-2018-0734.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0002-fix-CVE-2018-0734.patch | 108 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 108 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0002-fix-CVE-2018-0734.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0002-fix-CVE-2018-0734.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 2a3e03fe2a..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0002-fix-CVE-2018-0734.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,108 +0,0 @@ -Backport patch to fix CVE-2018-0734. Remove a section which only remove a -space. It can't be applied because the context is different. - -CVE: CVE-2018-0734 -Upstream-Status: Backport - -Signed-off-by: Kai Kang <kai.kang@windriver.com> - -From 8abfe72e8c1de1b95f50aa0d9134803b4d00070f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Pauli <paul.dale@oracle.com> -Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2018 07:42:46 +1000 -Subject: [PATCH] Timing vulnerability in DSA signature generation - (CVE-2018-0734). - -Avoid a timing attack that leaks information via a side channel that -triggers when a BN is resized. Increasing the size of the BNs -prior to doing anything with them suppresses the attack. - -Thanks due to Samuel Weiser for finding and locating this. - -Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> -(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7486) - -(cherry picked from commit a9cfb8c2aa7254a4aa6a1716909e3f8cb78049b6) ---- - crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c | 28 +++++++++++++++------------- - 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c -index ca20811200..2dd2d7489a 100644 ---- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c -+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c -@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ - - #include <stdio.h> - #include "internal/cryptlib.h" -+#include "internal/bn_int.h" - #include <openssl/bn.h> - #include <openssl/sha.h> - #include "dsa_locl.h" -@@ -180,9 +181,9 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, - { - BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; - BIGNUM *k, *kinv = NULL, *r = *rp; -- BIGNUM *l, *m; -+ BIGNUM *l; - int ret = 0; -- int q_bits; -+ int q_bits, q_words; - - if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) { - DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); -@@ -191,8 +192,7 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, - - k = BN_new(); - l = BN_new(); -- m = BN_new(); -- if (k == NULL || l == NULL || m == NULL) -+ if (k == NULL || l == NULL) - goto err; - - if (ctx_in == NULL) { -@@ -203,9 +203,9 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, - - /* Preallocate space */ - q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q); -- if (!BN_set_bit(k, q_bits) -- || !BN_set_bit(l, q_bits) -- || !BN_set_bit(m, q_bits)) -+ q_words = bn_get_top(dsa->q); -+ if (!bn_wexpand(k, q_words + 2) -+ || !bn_wexpand(l, q_words + 2)) - goto err; - - /* Get random k */ -@@ -240,14 +240,17 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, - * small timing information leakage. We then choose the sum that is - * one bit longer than the modulus. - * -- * TODO: revisit the BN_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic -- * conditional copy. -+ * There are some concerns about the efficacy of doing this. More -+ * specificly refer to the discussion starting with: -+ * https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7486#discussion_r228323705 -+ * The fix is to rework BN so these gymnastics aren't required. - */ - if (!BN_add(l, k, dsa->q) -- || !BN_add(m, l, dsa->q) -- || !BN_copy(k, BN_num_bits(l) > q_bits ? l : m)) -+ || !BN_add(k, l, dsa->q)) - goto err; - -+ BN_consttime_swap(BN_is_bit_set(l, q_bits), k, l, q_words + 2); -+ - if ((dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp != NULL) { - if (!dsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(dsa, r, dsa->g, k, dsa->p, ctx, - dsa->method_mont_p)) -@@ -275,7 +278,6 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, - BN_CTX_free(ctx); - BN_clear_free(k); - BN_clear_free(l); -- BN_clear_free(m); - return ret; - } - --- -2.17.0 - |