libproxy: Update to 0.4.11

Delete patches that have been applied upstream or are no longer necessary.
Update LIC_FILES_CHKSUM to match new COPYING (whitespace changes only).

Signed-off-by: Phil Blundell <pb@pbcl.net>
Signed-off-by: Saul Wold <sgw@linux.intel.com>

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 29 deletions

diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libproxy/libproxy/libproxy-0.4.7-CVE-2012-4504.patch b/meta/recipes-support/libproxy/libproxy/libproxy-0.4.7-CVE-2012-4504.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 7f2d93a937..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libproxy/libproxy/libproxy-0.4.7-CVE-2012-4504.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-
-libproxy - CVE-2012-4504:
-
-Reference:https://code.google.com/p/libproxy/source/detail?r=853
-
-Stack-based buffer overflow in the url::get_pac function in url.cpp
-in libproxy 0.4.x before 0.4.9 allows remote servers to have an
-unspecified impact via a large proxy.pac file.
-
-http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2012-4504
-
-Signed-off-by: yanjun.zhu <yanjun.zhu@windriver.com> 
-
-diff -urpN a/libproxy/url.cpp b/libproxy/url.cpp
---- a/libproxy/url.cpp	2012-11-26 10:08:47.000000000 +0800
-+++ b/libproxy/url.cpp	2012-11-26 10:05:54.000000000 +0800
-@@ -472,9 +472,10 @@ char* url::get_pac() {
- 				// Add this chunk to our content length,
- 				// ensuring that we aren't over our max size
- 				content_length += chunk_length;
--				if (content_length >= PAC_MAX_SIZE) break;
- 			}
- 
-+			if (content_length >= PAC_MAX_SIZE) break;
-+
- 			while (recvd != content_length) {
- 				int r = recv(sock, buffer + recvd, content_length - recvd, 0);
- 				if (r < 0) break;