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author | Andrej Valek <andrej.valek@siemens.com> | 2018-09-04 17:48:06 +0200 |
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committer | Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org> | 2018-09-05 18:00:25 +0100 |
commit | f0386ed8ee9d6a43d0eb32ebcc89e94bbe458638 (patch) | |
tree | ad490b7c6f3318255d73df212b1bb0254b541973 /meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant | |
parent | cb3d32f1653fc9afdd8a5e7e32441813a69fdb18 (diff) | |
download | openembedded-core-contrib-f0386ed8ee9d6a43d0eb32ebcc89e94bbe458638.tar.gz |
wpa-supplicant: fix CVE-2018-14526
Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data in supplicant
processing. When using WPA2, these are frames that have the Encrypted
flag set, but not the MIC flag.
(From OE-Core rev: a5a07887e73ebf0aa6b3b1fa247e44743b39322e)
Signed-off-by: Andrej Valek <andrej.valek@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant')
-rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/wpa_supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch | 44 |
1 files changed, 44 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/wpa_supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/wpa_supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e800a410ea --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/wpa_supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +wpa_supplicant-2.6: Fix CVE-2018-14526 + +[No upstream tracking] -- https://w1.fi/security/2018-1/unauthenticated-eapol-key-decryption.txt + +wpa: Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data + +Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data in supplicant +processing. When using WPA2, these are frames that have the Encrypted +flag set, but not the MIC flag. + +When using WPA2, EAPOL-Key frames that had the Encrypted flag set but +not the MIC flag, had their data field decrypted without first verifying +the MIC. In case the data field was encrypted using RC4 (i.e., when +negotiating TKIP as the pairwise cipher), this meant that +unauthenticated but decrypted data would then be processed. An adversary +could abuse this as a decryption oracle to recover sensitive information +in the data field of EAPOL-Key messages (e.g., the group key). + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c?id=3e34cfdff6b192fe337c6fb3f487f73e96582961] +CVE: CVE-2018-14526 +Signed-off-by: Andrej Valek <andrej.valek@siemens.com> + +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +index 3c47879..6bdf923 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +@@ -2016,6 +2016,17 @@ int wpa_sm_rx_eapol(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr, + + if ((sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN || sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_OSEN) && + (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA)) { ++ /* ++ * Only decrypt the Key Data field if the frame's authenticity ++ * was verified. When using AES-SIV (FILS), the MIC flag is not ++ * set, so this check should only be performed if mic_len != 0 ++ * which is the case in this code branch. ++ */ ++ if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)) { ++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, ++ "WPA: Ignore EAPOL-Key with encrypted but unauthenticated data"); ++ goto out; ++ } + if (wpa_supplicant_decrypt_key_data(sm, key, ver, key_data, + &key_data_len)) + goto out; |