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author | Changhyeok Bae <changhyeok.bae@gmail.com> | 2019-02-08 05:21:07 +0000 |
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committer | Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org> | 2019-02-08 14:11:45 +0000 |
commit | 2c3a905061b501b1c79e191a1f275fdb9768a2d6 (patch) | |
tree | 48366ae4386a54cbafef1cdfb1c6fa9a643e2ac2 /meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/wpa_supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch | |
parent | 85f82e94849f1c1b5e150c2e38c03eae19a2b370 (diff) | |
download | openembedded-core-contrib-2c3a905061b501b1c79e191a1f275fdb9768a2d6.tar.gz |
wpa-supplicant: update to 2.7
CVE patches is already applied in v2.7
Signed-off-by: Changhyeok Bae <changhyeok.bae@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/wpa_supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/wpa_supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch | 44 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 44 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/wpa_supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/wpa_supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch deleted file mode 100644 index e800a410ea..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/wpa_supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,44 +0,0 @@ -wpa_supplicant-2.6: Fix CVE-2018-14526 - -[No upstream tracking] -- https://w1.fi/security/2018-1/unauthenticated-eapol-key-decryption.txt - -wpa: Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data - -Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data in supplicant -processing. When using WPA2, these are frames that have the Encrypted -flag set, but not the MIC flag. - -When using WPA2, EAPOL-Key frames that had the Encrypted flag set but -not the MIC flag, had their data field decrypted without first verifying -the MIC. In case the data field was encrypted using RC4 (i.e., when -negotiating TKIP as the pairwise cipher), this meant that -unauthenticated but decrypted data would then be processed. An adversary -could abuse this as a decryption oracle to recover sensitive information -in the data field of EAPOL-Key messages (e.g., the group key). - -Upstream-Status: Backport [https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c?id=3e34cfdff6b192fe337c6fb3f487f73e96582961] -CVE: CVE-2018-14526 -Signed-off-by: Andrej Valek <andrej.valek@siemens.com> - -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c -index 3c47879..6bdf923 100644 ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c -@@ -2016,6 +2016,17 @@ int wpa_sm_rx_eapol(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr, - - if ((sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN || sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_OSEN) && - (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA)) { -+ /* -+ * Only decrypt the Key Data field if the frame's authenticity -+ * was verified. When using AES-SIV (FILS), the MIC flag is not -+ * set, so this check should only be performed if mic_len != 0 -+ * which is the case in this code branch. -+ */ -+ if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)) { -+ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, -+ "WPA: Ignore EAPOL-Key with encrypted but unauthenticated data"); -+ goto out; -+ } - if (wpa_supplicant_decrypt_key_data(sm, key, ver, key_data, - &key_data_len)) - goto out; |