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author | Fan Xin <fan.xin@jp.fujitsu.com> | 2015-11-19 19:46:47 +0900 |
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committer | Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org> | 2015-12-01 21:30:58 +0000 |
commit | 80af821d1240a1fc2b32379b75801571db562657 (patch) | |
tree | dc19d2eeebca3c0cde11e0953c947326da035656 /meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch | |
parent | 12c3f7b5501c0035f72c115fa2eac7aaad927057 (diff) | |
download | openembedded-core-contrib-80af821d1240a1fc2b32379b75801571db562657.tar.gz |
wpa-supplicant: upgrade to 2.5
wpa-supplicant: upgrade to 2.5
1. upgrade to 2.5
2. remove eight patches since they have been applied in 2.5
3. update SRC_URI, HOMEPAGE and BUGTRACKER to use w1.fi instead
Signed-off-by: Fan Xin <fan.xin@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch | 53 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 53 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 2568ea1124..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,53 +0,0 @@ -Upstream-Status: Backport - -Signed-off-by: Fan Xin <fan.xin@jp.fujitsu.com> - -From 5acd23f4581da58683f3cf5e36cb71bbe4070bd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> -Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2015 17:08:33 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH] WPS: Fix HTTP chunked transfer encoding parser - -strtoul() return value may end up overflowing the int h->chunk_size and -resulting in a negative value to be stored as the chunk_size. This could -result in the following memcpy operation using a very large length -argument which would result in a buffer overflow and segmentation fault. - -This could have been used to cause a denial service by any device that -has been authorized for network access (either wireless or wired). This -would affect both the WPS UPnP functionality in a WPS AP (hostapd with -upnp_iface parameter set in the configuration) and WPS ER -(wpa_supplicant with WPS_ER_START control interface command used). - -Validate the parsed chunk length value to avoid this. In addition to -rejecting negative values, we can also reject chunk size that would be -larger than the maximum configured body length. - -Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and -reporting this issue. - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> ---- - src/wps/httpread.c | 7 +++++++ - 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/src/wps/httpread.c b/src/wps/httpread.c -index 2f08f37..d2855e3 100644 ---- a/src/wps/httpread.c -+++ b/src/wps/httpread.c -@@ -533,6 +533,13 @@ static void httpread_read_handler(int sd, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx) - if (!isxdigit(*cbp)) - goto bad; - h->chunk_size = strtoul(cbp, NULL, 16); -+ if (h->chunk_size < 0 || -+ h->chunk_size > h->max_bytes) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, -+ "httpread: Invalid chunk size %d", -+ h->chunk_size); -+ goto bad; -+ } - /* throw away chunk header - * so we have only real data - */ --- -1.9.1 - |