diff options
| author |   Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com> | 2014-06-09 16:53:45 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer |   Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org> | 2014-06-10 17:05:53 +0100 |
| commit | 6506f8993c84b966642ef857bb15cf96eada32e8 (patch) | |
| tree | 75bc3360b616ada9641fbe533b07dd08e522eecc | |
| parent | 21fa437a37dad14145b6c8c8c16c95f1b074e09c (diff) | |
| download | openembedded-core-contrib-6506f8993c84b966642ef857bb15cf96eada32e8.tar.gz | |
openssl: fix CVE-2014-0221
http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140605.txt
DTLS recursion flaw (CVE-2014-0221)
By sending an invalid DTLS handshake to an OpenSSL DTLS client the code
can be made to recurse eventually crashing in a DoS attack.
Only applications using OpenSSL as a DTLS client are affected.
(Patch borrowed from Fedora.)
Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
| -rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch | 38 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb | 1 |
2 files changed, 39 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bf730a8124 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +commit d30e582446b027868cdabd0994681643682045a4 +Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> +Date: Fri May 16 13:00:45 2014 +0100 + + Fix CVE-2014-0221 + + Unnecessary recursion when receiving a DTLS hello request can be used to + crash a DTLS client. Fixed by handling DTLS hello request without recursion. + + Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue. + +Patch borrowed from Fedora +Upstream-Status: Backport +Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com> + +diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c +index 07f67f8..4c2fd03 100644 +--- a/ssl/d1_both.c ++++ b/ssl/d1_both.c +@@ -793,6 +793,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok) + int i,al; + struct hm_header_st msg_hdr; + ++ redo: + /* see if we have the required fragment already */ + if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s,max,ok)) || *ok) + { +@@ -851,8 +852,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok) + s->msg_callback_arg); + + s->init_num = 0; +- return dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn, +- max, ok); ++ goto redo; + } + else /* Incorrectly formated Hello request */ + { + diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb index 38cdb3f740..dc77330df8 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://configure-targets.patch \ file://CVE-2014-0160.patch \ file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch \ file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0198.patch \ + file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "66bf6f10f060d561929de96f9dfe5b8c" |