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author | Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com> | 2014-06-09 16:51:16 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org> | 2014-06-10 17:10:34 +0100 |
commit | 5bcb997663a6bd7a4d7395dcdb5e027d7f2bab81 (patch) | |
tree | 967cbd30a6261e32099749e80fee5dd52f4b22ab | |
parent | 1bd77c28fdb51d1a0dad55c8d1af2991046c801d (diff) | |
download | openembedded-core-contrib-5bcb997663a6bd7a4d7395dcdb5e027d7f2bab81.tar.gz |
openssl: fix CVE-2014-0195
From the OpenSSL Security Advisory [05 Jun 2014]
http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140605.txt
DTLS invalid fragment vulnerability (CVE-2014-0195)
A buffer overrun attack can be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments
to an OpenSSL DTLS client or server. This is potentially exploitable to
run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client or server.
Only applications using OpenSSL as a DTLS client or server affected.
(Patch borrowed from Fedora.)
Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Saul Wold <sgw@linux.intel.com>
-rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch | 40 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1g.bb | 1 |
2 files changed, 41 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0c43919427 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +commit 208d54db20d58c9a5e45e856a0650caadd7d9612 +Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> +Date: Tue May 13 18:48:31 2014 +0100 + + Fix for CVE-2014-0195 + + A buffer overrun attack can be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments + to an OpenSSL DTLS client or server. This is potentially exploitable to + run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client or server. + + Fixed by adding consistency check for DTLS fragments. + + Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue. + +Patch borrowed from Fedora +Upstream-Status: Backport +Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com> + +diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c +index 2e8cf68..07f67f8 100644 +--- a/ssl/d1_both.c ++++ b/ssl/d1_both.c +@@ -627,7 +627,16 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok) + frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0; + } + else ++ { + frag = (hm_fragment*) item->data; ++ if (frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len) ++ { ++ item = NULL; ++ frag = NULL; ++ goto err; ++ } ++ } ++ + + /* If message is already reassembled, this must be a + * retransmit and can be dropped. + diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1g.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1g.bb index 579cf0376e..d4fc91d851 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1g.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1g.bb @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://configure-targets.patch \ file://find.pl \ file://openssl-fix-des.pod-error.patch \ file://openssl-CVE-2014-0198-fix.patch \ + file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch \ file://openssl-CVE-2010-5298.patch \ " |