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-rw-r--r--meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2022-4345.patch52
-rw-r--r--meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-0666.patch122
-rw-r--r--meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-0667.patch66
-rw-r--r--meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-0668.patch33
-rw-r--r--meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-1992.patch61
-rw-r--r--meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-2855.patch108
-rw-r--r--meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-2856.patch69
-rw-r--r--meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-2858.patch95
-rw-r--r--meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-2879.patch37
-rw-r--r--meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-2906.patch38
-rw-r--r--meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-2952.patch98
-rw-r--r--meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-4511.patch81
-rw-r--r--meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-6175.patch246
-rw-r--r--meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2024-0208.patch42
-rw-r--r--meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2024-2955.patch52
-rw-r--r--meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/wireshark_3.4.12.bb15
16 files changed, 1215 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2022-4345.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2022-4345.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ccf04459e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2022-4345.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+From 39db474f80af87449ce0f034522dccc80ed4153f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Thacker <johnthacker@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2022 20:46:15 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] openflow_v6: Prevent infinite loops in too short ofp_stats
+
+The ofp_stats struct length field includes the fixed 4 bytes.
+If the length is smaller than that, report the length error
+and break out. In particular, a value of zero can cause
+infinite loops if this isn't done.
+
+
+(cherry picked from commit 13823bb1059cf70f401892ba1b1eaa2400cdf3db)
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/commit/39db474f80af87449ce0f034522dccc80ed4153f]
+CVE: CVE-2022-4345
+Signed-off-by: Vivek Kumbhar <vkumbhar@mvista.com>
+---
+ epan/dissectors/packet-openflow_v6.c | 8 +++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/epan/dissectors/packet-openflow_v6.c b/epan/dissectors/packet-openflow_v6.c
+index 16016af..3e24d76 100644
+--- a/epan/dissectors/packet-openflow_v6.c
++++ b/epan/dissectors/packet-openflow_v6.c
+@@ -1118,17 +1118,23 @@ dissect_openflow_v6_oxs(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo _U_, proto_tree *tree,
+ static int
+ dissect_openflow_stats_v6(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo _U_, proto_tree *tree, int offset, guint16 length _U_)
+ {
++ proto_item *ti;
+ guint32 stats_length;
+ int oxs_end;
+ guint32 padding;
+
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_openflow_v6_stats_reserved, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_NA);
+
+- proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(tree, hf_openflow_v6_stats_length, tvb, offset+2, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &stats_length);
++ ti = proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(tree, hf_openflow_v6_stats_length, tvb, offset+2, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &stats_length);
+
+ oxs_end = offset + stats_length;
+ offset+=4;
+
++ if (stats_length < 4) {
++ expert_add_info(pinfo, ti, &ei_openflow_v6_length_too_short);
++ return offset;
++ }
++
+ while (offset < oxs_end) {
+ offset = dissect_openflow_v6_oxs(tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, oxs_end - offset);
+ }
+--
+2.40.1
+
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-0666.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-0666.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7732916826
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-0666.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+From 265cbf15a418b629c3c8f02c0ba901913b1c8fd2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
+Date: Thu, 18 May 2023 13:52:48 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] RTPS: Fixup our g_strlcpy dest_sizes
+
+Use the proper dest_size in various g_strlcpy calls.
+
+Fixes #19085
+
+(cherry picked from commit 28fdce547c417b868c521f87fb58f71ca6b1e3f7)
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/commit/265cbf15a418b629c3c8f02c0ba901913b1c8fd2]
+CVE: CVE-2023-0666
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ epan/dissectors/packet-rtps.c | 22 +++++++++++-----------
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/epan/dissectors/packet-rtps.c b/epan/dissectors/packet-rtps.c
+index 5c2d1c1..ef592d7 100644
+--- a/epan/dissectors/packet-rtps.c
++++ b/epan/dissectors/packet-rtps.c
+@@ -3025,7 +3025,7 @@ static gint rtps_util_add_typecode(proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, gint offset,
+ ++tk_id;
+ }
+
+- g_strlcpy(type_name, rtps_util_typecode_id_to_string(tk_id), 40);
++ g_strlcpy(type_name, rtps_util_typecode_id_to_string(tk_id), sizeof(type_name));
+
+ /* Structure of the typecode data:
+ *
+@@ -3196,7 +3196,7 @@ static gint rtps_util_add_typecode(proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, gint offset,
+ member_name, -1, NULL, ndds_40_hack);
+ }
+ /* Finally prints the name of the struct (if provided) */
+- g_strlcpy(type_name, "}", 40);
++ g_strlcpy(type_name, "}", sizeof(type_name));
+ break;
+
+ } /* end of case UNION */
+@@ -3367,7 +3367,7 @@ static gint rtps_util_add_typecode(proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, gint offset,
+ }
+ }
+ /* Finally prints the name of the struct (if provided) */
+- g_strlcpy(type_name, "}", 40);
++ g_strlcpy(type_name, "}", sizeof(type_name));
+ break;
+ }
+
+@@ -3459,7 +3459,7 @@ static gint rtps_util_add_typecode(proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, gint offset,
+ offset += 4;
+ alias_name = tvb_get_string_enc(wmem_packet_scope(), tvb, offset, alias_name_length, ENC_ASCII);
+ offset += alias_name_length;
+- g_strlcpy(type_name, alias_name, 40);
++ g_strlcpy(type_name, alias_name, sizeof(type_name));
+ break;
+ }
+
+@@ -3494,7 +3494,7 @@ static gint rtps_util_add_typecode(proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, gint offset,
+ if (tk_id == RTI_CDR_TK_VALUE_PARAM) {
+ type_id_name = "valueparam";
+ }
+- g_snprintf(type_name, 40, "%s '%s'", type_id_name, value_name);
++ g_snprintf(type_name, sizeof(type_name), "%s '%s'", type_id_name, value_name);
+ break;
+ }
+ } /* switch(tk_id) */
+@@ -3673,7 +3673,7 @@ static gint rtps_util_add_type_library_type(proto_tree *tree,
+ long_number = tvb_get_guint32(tvb, offset_tmp, encoding);
+ name = tvb_get_string_enc(wmem_packet_scope(), tvb, offset_tmp+4, long_number, ENC_ASCII);
+ if (info)
+- g_strlcpy(info->member_name, name, long_number);
++ g_strlcpy(info->member_name, name, sizeof(info->member_name));
+
+ proto_item_append_text(tree, " %s", name);
+ offset += member_length;
+@@ -3848,13 +3848,13 @@ static gint rtps_util_add_type_member(proto_tree *tree,
+ proto_item_append_text(tree, " %s (ID: %d)", name, member_id);
+ if (member_object) {
+ member_object->member_id = member_id;
+- g_strlcpy(member_object->member_name, name, long_number < 256 ? long_number : 256);
++ g_strlcpy(member_object->member_name, name, sizeof(member_object->member_name));
+ member_object->type_id = member_type_id;
+ }
+ if (info && info->extensibility == EXTENSIBILITY_MUTABLE) {
+ mutable_member_mapping * mutable_mapping = NULL;
+ mutable_mapping = wmem_new(wmem_file_scope(), mutable_member_mapping);
+- g_strlcpy(mutable_mapping->member_name, name, long_number < 256 ? long_number : 256);
++ g_strlcpy(mutable_mapping->member_name, name, sizeof(mutable_mapping->member_name));
+ mutable_mapping->struct_type_id = info->type_id;
+ mutable_mapping->member_type_id = member_type_id;
+ mutable_mapping->member_id = member_id;
+@@ -3909,7 +3909,7 @@ static gint rtps_util_add_type_union_member(proto_tree *tree,
+ union_member_mapping * mapping = NULL;
+
+ mapping = wmem_new(wmem_file_scope(), union_member_mapping);
+- g_strlcpy(mapping->member_name, object.member_name, 256);
++ g_strlcpy(mapping->member_name, object.member_name, sizeof(mapping->member_name));
+ mapping->member_type_id = object.type_id;
+ mapping->discriminator = HASHMAP_DISCRIMINATOR_CONSTANT;
+ mapping->union_type_id = union_type_id + mapping->discriminator;
+@@ -3922,7 +3922,7 @@ static gint rtps_util_add_type_union_member(proto_tree *tree,
+ union_member_mapping * mapping = NULL;
+
+ mapping = wmem_new(wmem_file_scope(), union_member_mapping);
+- g_strlcpy(mapping->member_name, object.member_name, 256);
++ g_strlcpy(mapping->member_name, object.member_name, sizeof(mapping->member_name));
+ mapping->member_type_id = object.type_id;
+ mapping->discriminator = -1;
+ mapping->union_type_id = union_type_id + mapping->discriminator;
+@@ -3942,7 +3942,7 @@ static gint rtps_util_add_type_union_member(proto_tree *tree,
+ ti = proto_tree_add_item(labels, hf_rtps_type_object_union_label, tvb, offset_tmp, 4, encoding);
+ offset_tmp += 4;
+
+- g_strlcpy(mapping->member_name, object.member_name, 256);
++ g_strlcpy(mapping->member_name, object.member_name, sizeof(mapping->member_name));
+ mapping->member_type_id = object.type_id;
+ mapping->discriminator = discriminator_case;
+ mapping->union_type_id = union_type_id + discriminator_case;
+--
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-0667.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-0667.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cd07395aac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-0667.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+From 85fbca8adb09ea8e1af635db3d92727fbfa1e28a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Thacker <johnthacker@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 18 May 2023 18:06:36 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] MS-MMS: Use format_text_string()
+
+The length of a string transcoded from UTF-16 to UTF-8 can be
+shorter (or longer) than the original length in bytes in the packet.
+Use the new string length, not the original length.
+
+Use format_text_string, which is a convenience function that
+calls strlen.
+
+Fix #19086
+
+(cherry picked from commit 1c45a899f83fa88e60ab69936bea3c4754e7808b)
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/commit/85fbca8adb09ea8e1af635db3d92727fbfa1e28a]
+CVE: CVE-2023-0667
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ epan/dissectors/packet-ms-mms.c | 8 ++++----
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/epan/dissectors/packet-ms-mms.c b/epan/dissectors/packet-ms-mms.c
+index f4dbcd0..092a64b 100644
+--- a/epan/dissectors/packet-ms-mms.c
++++ b/epan/dissectors/packet-ms-mms.c
+@@ -740,7 +740,7 @@ static void dissect_client_transport_info(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, pro
+ transport_info, "Transport: (%s)", transport_info);
+
+ col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, " (%s)",
+- format_text(wmem_packet_scope(), (guchar*)transport_info, length_remaining - 20));
++ format_text_string(pinfo->pool, (const guchar*)transport_info));
+
+
+ /* Try to extract details from this string */
+@@ -837,7 +837,7 @@ static void dissect_server_info(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *t
+ ENC_UTF_16|ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN, wmem_packet_scope(), &server_version);
+
+ col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, " (version='%s')",
+- format_text(wmem_packet_scope(), (const guchar*)server_version, strlen(server_version)));
++ format_text_string(pinfo->pool, (const guchar*)server_version));
+ }
+ offset += (server_version_length*2);
+
+@@ -891,7 +891,7 @@ static void dissect_client_player_info(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_
+ ENC_UTF_16|ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN, wmem_packet_scope(), &player_info);
+
+ col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, " (%s)",
+- format_text(wmem_packet_scope(), (const guchar*)player_info, strlen(player_info)));
++ format_text_string(pinfo->pool, (const guchar*)player_info));
+ }
+
+ /* Dissect info about where client wants to start playing from */
+@@ -966,7 +966,7 @@ static void dissect_request_server_file(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto
+ ENC_UTF_16|ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN, wmem_packet_scope(), &server_file);
+
+ col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, " (%s)",
+- format_text(wmem_packet_scope(), (const guchar*)server_file, strlen(server_file)));
++ format_text_string(pinfo->pool, (const guchar*)server_file));
+ }
+
+ /* Dissect media details from server */
+--
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-0668.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-0668.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0009939330
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-0668.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From c4f37d77b29ec6a9754795d0efb6f68d633728d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Thacker <johnthacker@gmail.com>
+Date: Sat, 20 May 2023 23:08:08 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] synphasor: Use val_to_str_const
+
+Don't use a value from packet data to directly index a value_string,
+particularly when the value string doesn't cover all possible values.
+
+Fix #19087
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/commit/c4f37d77b29ec6a9754795d0efb6f68d633728d9]
+CVE: CVE-2023-0668
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ epan/dissectors/packet-synphasor.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/epan/dissectors/packet-synphasor.c b/epan/dissectors/packet-synphasor.c
+index 12b388b..fbde875 100644
+--- a/epan/dissectors/packet-synphasor.c
++++ b/epan/dissectors/packet-synphasor.c
+@@ -1212,7 +1212,7 @@ static gint dissect_PHSCALE(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, gint offset, gint c
+
+ data_flag_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree_format(single_phasor_scaling_and_flags_tree, tvb, offset, 4,
+ ett_conf_phflags, NULL, "Phasor Data flags: %s",
+- conf_phasor_type[tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset + 2)].strptr);
++ val_to_str_const(tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset + 2), conf_phasor_type, "Unknown"));
+
+ /* first and second bytes - phasor modification flags*/
+ phasor_flag1_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree_format(data_flag_tree, tvb, offset, 2, ett_conf_phmod_flags,
+--
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-1992.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-1992.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6bddf975d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-1992.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+From 3c8be14c827f1587da3c2b3bb0d9c04faff57413 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Thacker <johnthacker@gmail.com>
+Date: Sun, 19 Mar 2023 15:16:39 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] RPCoRDMA: Frame end cleanup for global write offsets
+
+Add a frame end routine for a global which is assigned to packet
+scoped memory. It really should be made proto data, but is used
+in a function in the header (that doesn't take the packet info
+struct as an argument) and this fix needs to be made in stable
+branches.
+
+Fix #18852
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/colin.mcinnes/wireshark/-/commit/3c8be14c827f1587da3c2b3bb0d9c04faff5741]
+CVE: CVE-2023-1992
+Signed-off-by: Vivek Kumbhar <vkumbhar@mvista.com>
+---
+ epan/dissectors/packet-rpcrdma.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/epan/dissectors/packet-rpcrdma.c b/epan/dissectors/packet-rpcrdma.c
+index 76085c7..9d57bae 100644
+--- a/epan/dissectors/packet-rpcrdma.c
++++ b/epan/dissectors/packet-rpcrdma.c
+@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
+ #include <epan/addr_resolv.h>
+
+ #include "packet-rpcrdma.h"
++#include "packet-frame.h"
+ #include "packet-infiniband.h"
+ #include "packet-iwarp-ddp-rdmap.h"
+
+@@ -270,6 +271,18 @@ void rpcrdma_insert_offset(gint offset)
+ wmem_array_append_one(gp_rdma_write_offsets, offset);
+ }
+
++/*
++ * Reset the array of write offsets at the end of the frame. These
++ * are packet scoped, so they don't need to be freed, but we want
++ * to ensure that the global doesn't point to no longer allocated
++ * memory in a later packet.
++ */
++static void
++reset_write_offsets(void)
++{
++ gp_rdma_write_offsets = NULL;
++}
++
+ /* Get conversation state, it is created if it does not exist */
+ static rdma_conv_info_t *get_rdma_conv_info(packet_info *pinfo)
+ {
+@@ -1392,6 +1405,7 @@ dissect_rpcrdma(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, void* data
+ if (write_size > 0 && !pinfo->fd->visited) {
+ /* Initialize array of write chunk offsets */
+ gp_rdma_write_offsets = wmem_array_new(wmem_packet_scope(), sizeof(gint));
++ register_frame_end_routine(pinfo, reset_write_offsets);
+ TRY {
+ /*
+ * Call the upper layer dissector to get a list of offsets
+--
+2.40.1
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-2855.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-2855.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b4718f4607
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-2855.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+From 0181fafb2134a177328443a60b5e29c4ee1041cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Guy Harris <gharris@sonic.net>
+Date: Tue, 16 May 2023 12:05:07 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] candump: check for a too-long frame length.
+
+If the frame length is longer than the maximum, report an error in the
+file.
+
+Fixes #19062, preventing the overflow on a buffer on the stack (assuming
+your compiler doesn't call a bounds-checknig version of memcpy() if the
+size of the target space is known).
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/commit/0181fafb2134a177328443a60b5e29c4ee1041cb]
+CVE: CVE-2023-2855
+
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ wiretap/candump.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
+ 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/wiretap/candump.c b/wiretap/candump.c
+index 0def7bc..3f7c2b2 100644
+--- a/wiretap/candump.c
++++ b/wiretap/candump.c
+@@ -26,8 +26,9 @@ static gboolean candump_seek_read(wtap *wth, gint64 seek_off,
+ wtap_rec *rec, Buffer *buf,
+ int *err, gchar **err_info);
+
+-static void
+-candump_write_packet(wtap_rec *rec, Buffer *buf, const msg_t *msg)
++static gboolean
++candump_write_packet(wtap_rec *rec, Buffer *buf, const msg_t *msg, int *err,
++ gchar **err_info)
+ {
+ static const char *can_proto_name = "can-hostendian";
+ static const char *canfd_proto_name = "canfd";
+@@ -59,6 +60,18 @@ candump_write_packet(wtap_rec *rec, Buffer *buf, const msg_t *msg)
+ {
+ canfd_frame_t canfd_frame = {0};
+
++ /*
++ * There's a maximum of CANFD_MAX_DLEN bytes in a CAN-FD frame.
++ */
++ if (msg->data.length > CANFD_MAX_DLEN) {
++ *err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE;
++ if (err_info != NULL) {
++ *err_info = g_strdup_printf("candump: File has %u-byte CAN FD packet, bigger than maximum of %u",
++ msg->data.length, CANFD_MAX_DLEN);
++ }
++ return FALSE;
++ }
++
+ canfd_frame.can_id = msg->id;
+ canfd_frame.flags = msg->flags;
+ canfd_frame.len = msg->data.length;
+@@ -70,6 +83,18 @@ candump_write_packet(wtap_rec *rec, Buffer *buf, const msg_t *msg)
+ {
+ can_frame_t can_frame = {0};
+
++ /*
++ * There's a maximum of CAN_MAX_DLEN bytes in a CAN frame.
++ */
++ if (msg->data.length > CAN_MAX_DLEN) {
++ *err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE;
++ if (err_info != NULL) {
++ *err_info = g_strdup_printf("candump: File has %u-byte CAN packet, bigger than maximum of %u",
++ msg->data.length, CAN_MAX_DLEN);
++ }
++ return FALSE;
++ }
++
+ can_frame.can_id = msg->id;
+ can_frame.can_dlc = msg->data.length;
+ memcpy(can_frame.data, msg->data.data, msg->data.length);
+@@ -84,6 +109,8 @@ candump_write_packet(wtap_rec *rec, Buffer *buf, const msg_t *msg)
+
+ rec->rec_header.packet_header.caplen = packet_length;
+ rec->rec_header.packet_header.len = packet_length;
++
++ return TRUE;
+ }
+
+ static gboolean
+@@ -190,9 +217,7 @@ candump_read(wtap *wth, wtap_rec *rec, Buffer *buf, int *err, gchar **err_info,
+ ws_debug_printf("%s: Stopped at offset %" PRIi64 "\n", G_STRFUNC, file_tell(wth->fh));
+ #endif
+
+- candump_write_packet(rec, buf, &msg);
+-
+- return TRUE;
++ return candump_write_packet(rec, buf, &msg, err, err_info);
+ }
+
+ static gboolean
+@@ -216,9 +241,7 @@ candump_seek_read(wtap *wth , gint64 seek_off, wtap_rec *rec,
+ if (!candump_parse(wth->random_fh, &msg, NULL, err, err_info))
+ return FALSE;
+
+- candump_write_packet(rec, buf, &msg);
+-
+- return TRUE;
++ return candump_write_packet(rec, buf, &msg, err, err_info);
+ }
+
+ /*
+--
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-2856.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-2856.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..863421f986
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-2856.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+From db5135826de3a5fdb3618225c2ff02f4207012ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Guy Harris <gharris@sonic.net>
+Date: Thu, 18 May 2023 15:03:23 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] vms: fix the search for the packet length field.
+
+The packet length field is of the form
+
+ Total Length = DDD = ^xXXX
+
+where "DDD" is the length in decimal and "XXX" is the length in
+hexadecimal.
+
+Search for "length ". not just "Length", as we skip past "Length ", not
+just "Length", so if we assume we found "Length " but only found
+"Length", we'd skip past the end of the string.
+
+While we're at it, fail if we don't find a length field, rather than
+just blithely acting as if the packet length were zero.
+
+Fixes #19083.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/commit/db5135826de3a5fdb3618225c2ff02f4207012ca]
+CVE: CVE-2023-2856
+
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ wiretap/vms.c | 9 ++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/wiretap/vms.c b/wiretap/vms.c
+index 0aa83ea..5f5fdbb 100644
+--- a/wiretap/vms.c
++++ b/wiretap/vms.c
+@@ -318,6 +318,7 @@ parse_vms_packet(FILE_T fh, wtap_rec *rec, Buffer *buf, int *err, gchar **err_in
+ {
+ char line[VMS_LINE_LENGTH + 1];
+ int num_items_scanned;
++ gboolean have_pkt_len = FALSE;
+ guint32 pkt_len = 0;
+ int pktnum;
+ int csec = 101;
+@@ -374,7 +375,7 @@ parse_vms_packet(FILE_T fh, wtap_rec *rec, Buffer *buf, int *err, gchar **err_in
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+- if ( (! pkt_len) && (p = strstr(line, "Length"))) {
++ if ( (! have_pkt_len) && (p = strstr(line, "Length "))) {
+ p += sizeof("Length ");
+ while (*p && ! g_ascii_isdigit(*p))
+ p++;
+@@ -390,9 +391,15 @@ parse_vms_packet(FILE_T fh, wtap_rec *rec, Buffer *buf, int *err, gchar **err_in
+ *err_info = g_strdup_printf("vms: Length field '%s' not valid", p);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
++ have_pkt_len = TRUE;
+ break;
+ }
+ } while (! isdumpline(line));
++ if (! have_pkt_len) {
++ *err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE;
++ *err_info = g_strdup_printf("vms: Length field not found");
++ return FALSE;
++ }
+ if (pkt_len > WTAP_MAX_PACKET_SIZE_STANDARD) {
+ /*
+ * Probably a corrupt capture file; return an error,
+--
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-2858.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-2858.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7174e9155c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-2858.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+From cb190d6839ddcd4596b0205844f45553f1e77105 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Guy Harris <gharris@sonic.net>
+Date: Fri, 19 May 2023 16:29:45 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] netscaler: add more checks to make sure the record is within
+ the page.
+
+Whie we're at it, restructure some other checks to test-before-casting -
+it's OK to test afterwards, but testing before makes it follow the
+pattern used elsewhere.
+
+Fixes #19081.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/commit/cb190d6839ddcd4596b0205844f45553f1e77105]
+CVE: CVE-2023-2858
+
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ wiretap/netscaler.c | 15 ++++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/wiretap/netscaler.c b/wiretap/netscaler.c
+index 01a7f6d..4fa020b 100644
+--- a/wiretap/netscaler.c
++++ b/wiretap/netscaler.c
+@@ -1091,13 +1091,13 @@ static gboolean nstrace_set_start_time(wtap *wth, int *err, gchar **err_info)
+
+ #define PACKET_DESCRIBE(rec,buf,FULLPART,fullpart,ver,type,HEADERVER) \
+ do {\
+- nspr_pktrace##fullpart##_v##ver##_t *type = (nspr_pktrace##fullpart##_v##ver##_t *) &nstrace_buf[nstrace_buf_offset];\
+ /* Make sure the record header is entirely contained in the page */\
+- if ((nstrace_buflen - nstrace_buf_offset) < sizeof *type) {\
++ if ((nstrace_buflen - nstrace_buf_offset) < sizeof(nspr_pktrace##fullpart##_v##ver##_t)) {\
+ *err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE;\
+ *err_info = g_strdup("nstrace: record header crosses page boundary");\
+ return FALSE;\
+ }\
++ nspr_pktrace##fullpart##_v##ver##_t *type = (nspr_pktrace##fullpart##_v##ver##_t *) &nstrace_buf[nstrace_buf_offset];\
+ /* Check sanity of record size */\
+ if (pletoh16(&type->nsprRecordSize) < sizeof *type) {\
+ *err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE;\
+@@ -1162,6 +1162,8 @@ static gboolean nstrace_read_v10(wtap *wth, wtap_rec *rec, Buffer *buf,
+
+ case NSPR_ABSTIME_V10:
+ {
++ if (!nstrace_ensure_buflen(nstrace, nstrace_buf_offset, sizeof(nspr_pktracefull_v10_t), err, err_info))
++ return FALSE;
+ nspr_pktracefull_v10_t *fp = (nspr_pktracefull_v10_t *) &nstrace_buf[nstrace_buf_offset];
+ if (pletoh16(&fp->nsprRecordSize) == 0) {
+ *err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE;
+@@ -1175,6 +1177,8 @@ static gboolean nstrace_read_v10(wtap *wth, wtap_rec *rec, Buffer *buf,
+
+ case NSPR_RELTIME_V10:
+ {
++ if (!nstrace_ensure_buflen(nstrace, nstrace_buf_offset, sizeof(nspr_pktracefull_v10_t), err, err_info))
++ return FALSE;
+ nspr_pktracefull_v10_t *fp = (nspr_pktracefull_v10_t *) &nstrace_buf[nstrace_buf_offset];
+ if (pletoh16(&fp->nsprRecordSize) == 0) {
+ *err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE;
+@@ -1192,6 +1196,8 @@ static gboolean nstrace_read_v10(wtap *wth, wtap_rec *rec, Buffer *buf,
+
+ default:
+ {
++ if (!nstrace_ensure_buflen(nstrace, nstrace_buf_offset, sizeof(nspr_pktracefull_v10_t), err, err_info))
++ return FALSE;
+ nspr_pktracefull_v10_t *fp = (nspr_pktracefull_v10_t *) &nstrace_buf[nstrace_buf_offset];
+ if (pletoh16(&fp->nsprRecordSize) == 0) {
+ *err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE;
+@@ -1475,14 +1481,14 @@ static gboolean nstrace_read_v20(wtap *wth, wtap_rec *rec, Buffer *buf,
+
+ #define PACKET_DESCRIBE(rec,buf,FULLPART,ver,enumprefix,type,structname,HEADERVER)\
+ do {\
+- nspr_##structname##_t *fp = (nspr_##structname##_t *) &nstrace_buf[nstrace_buf_offset];\
+ /* Make sure the record header is entirely contained in the page */\
+- if ((nstrace->nstrace_buflen - nstrace_buf_offset) < sizeof *fp) {\
++ if ((nstrace->nstrace_buflen - nstrace_buf_offset) < sizeof(nspr_##structname##_t)) {\
+ *err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE;\
+ *err_info = g_strdup("nstrace: record header crosses page boundary");\
+ g_free(nstrace_tmpbuff);\
+ return FALSE;\
+ }\
++ nspr_##structname##_t *fp = (nspr_##structname##_t *) &nstrace_buf[nstrace_buf_offset];\
+ (rec)->rec_type = REC_TYPE_PACKET;\
+ TIMEDEFV##ver((rec),fp,type);\
+ FULLPART##SIZEDEFV##ver((rec),fp,ver);\
+@@ -1589,7 +1595,6 @@ static gboolean nstrace_read_v30(wtap *wth, wtap_rec *rec, Buffer *buf,
+ g_free(nstrace_tmpbuff);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+-
+ hdp = (nspr_hd_v20_t *) &nstrace_buf[nstrace_buf_offset];
+ if (nspr_getv20recordsize(hdp) == 0) {
+ *err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE;
+--
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-2879.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-2879.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0a8247923e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-2879.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From 118815ca7c9f82c1f83f8f64d9e0e54673f31677 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Thacker <johnthacker@gmail.com>
+Date: Sat, 13 May 2023 21:45:16 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] GDSDB: Make sure our offset advances.
+
+add_uint_string() returns the next offset to use, not the number
+of bytes consumed. So to consume all the bytes and make sure the
+offset advances, return the entire reported tvb length, not the
+number of bytes remaining.
+
+Fixup 8d3c2177793e900cfc7cfaac776a2807e4ea289f
+Fixes #19068
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/commit/118815ca7c9f82c1f83f8f64d9e0e54673f31677]
+CVE: CVE-2023-2879
+
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ epan/dissectors/packet-gdsdb.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/epan/dissectors/packet-gdsdb.c b/epan/dissectors/packet-gdsdb.c
+index 75bcfb9..950d68f 100644
+--- a/epan/dissectors/packet-gdsdb.c
++++ b/epan/dissectors/packet-gdsdb.c
+@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ static int add_uint_string(proto_tree *tree, int hf_string, tvbuff_t *tvb, int o
+ int ret_offset = offset + length;
+ if (length < 4 || ret_offset < offset) {
+ expert_add_info_format(NULL, ti, &ei_gdsdb_invalid_length, "Invalid length: %d", length);
+- return tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset);
++ return tvb_reported_length(tvb);
+ }
+ return ret_offset;
+ }
+--
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-2906.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-2906.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fe21097286
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-2906.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From 44dc70cc5aadca91cb8ba3710c59c3651b7b0d4d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jaap Keuter <jaap.keuter@xs4all.nl>
+Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2023 20:21:19 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] CP2179: Handle timetag info response without records
+
+Fixes #19229
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/commit/44dc70cc5aadca91cb8ba3710c59c3651b7b0d4d]
+CVE: CVE-2023-2906
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ epan/dissectors/packet-cp2179.c | 7 +++++--
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/epan/dissectors/packet-cp2179.c b/epan/dissectors/packet-cp2179.c
+index 30f53f8..70fe033 100644
+--- a/epan/dissectors/packet-cp2179.c
++++ b/epan/dissectors/packet-cp2179.c
+@@ -721,11 +721,14 @@ dissect_response_frame(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, packet_info *pinfo, int
+ proto_tree_add_item(cp2179_proto_tree, hf_cp2179_timetag_numsets, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+
+ num_records = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset) & 0x7F;
++ offset += 1;
++
++ if (num_records == 0 || numberofcharacters <= 1)
++ break;
++
+ recordsize = (numberofcharacters-1) / num_records;
+ num_values = (recordsize-6) / 2; /* Determine how many 16-bit analog values are present in each event record */
+
+- offset += 1;
+-
+ for (x = 0; x < num_records; x++)
+ {
+ cp2179_event_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree_format(cp2179_proto_tree, tvb, offset, recordsize, ett_cp2179_event, NULL, "Event Record # %d", x+1);
+--
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-2952.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-2952.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..41b02bb3fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-2952.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+From ce87eac0325581b600b3093fcd75080df14ccfda Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
+Date: Tue, 23 May 2023 13:52:03 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] XRA: Fix an infinite loop
+
+C compilers don't care what size a value was on the wire. Use
+naturally-sized ints, including in dissect_message_channel_mb where we
+would otherwise overflow and loop infinitely.
+
+Fixes #19100
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/commit/e18d0e369729b0fff5f76f41cbae67e97c2e52e5]
+CVE: CVE-2023-2952
+
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ epan/dissectors/packet-xra.c | 16 ++++++++--------
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/epan/dissectors/packet-xra.c b/epan/dissectors/packet-xra.c
+index 68a8e72..6c7ab74 100644
+--- a/epan/dissectors/packet-xra.c
++++ b/epan/dissectors/packet-xra.c
+@@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ dissect_xra_tlv_cw_info(tvbuff_t * tvb, proto_tree * tree, void* data _U_, guint
+ it = proto_tree_add_item (tree, hf_xra_tlv_cw_info, tvb, 0, tlv_length, ENC_NA);
+ xra_tlv_cw_info_tree = proto_item_add_subtree (it, ett_xra_tlv_cw_info);
+
+- guint32 tlv_index =0;
++ unsigned tlv_index = 0;
+ while (tlv_index < tlv_length) {
+ guint8 type = tvb_get_guint8 (tvb, tlv_index);
+ ++tlv_index;
+@@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ dissect_xra_tlv_ms_info(tvbuff_t * tvb, proto_tree * tree, void* data _U_, guint
+ it = proto_tree_add_item (tree, hf_xra_tlv_ms_info, tvb, 0, tlv_length, ENC_NA);
+ xra_tlv_ms_info_tree = proto_item_add_subtree (it, ett_xra_tlv_ms_info);
+
+- guint32 tlv_index =0;
++ unsigned tlv_index = 0;
+ while (tlv_index < tlv_length) {
+ guint8 type = tvb_get_guint8 (tvb, tlv_index);
+ ++tlv_index;
+@@ -567,7 +567,7 @@ dissect_xra_tlv_burst_info(tvbuff_t * tvb, proto_tree * tree, void* data _U_, gu
+ it = proto_tree_add_item (tree, hf_xra_tlv_burst_info, tvb, 0, tlv_length, ENC_NA);
+ xra_tlv_burst_info_tree = proto_item_add_subtree (it, ett_xra_tlv_burst_info);
+
+- guint32 tlv_index =0;
++ unsigned tlv_index = 0;
+ while (tlv_index < tlv_length) {
+ guint8 type = tvb_get_guint8 (tvb, tlv_index);
+ ++tlv_index;
+@@ -607,7 +607,7 @@ dissect_xra_tlv(tvbuff_t * tvb, packet_info * pinfo, proto_tree * tree, void* da
+ it = proto_tree_add_item (tree, hf_xra_tlv, tvb, 0, tlv_length, ENC_NA);
+ xra_tlv_tree = proto_item_add_subtree (it, ett_xra_tlv);
+
+- guint32 tlv_index =0;
++ unsigned tlv_index = 0;
+ tvbuff_t *xra_tlv_cw_info_tvb, *xra_tlv_ms_info_tvb, *xra_tlv_burst_info_tvb;
+
+ while (tlv_index < tlv_length) {
+@@ -751,7 +751,7 @@ dissect_message_channel_mb(tvbuff_t * tvb, packet_info * pinfo, proto_tree* tree
+ if(packet_start_pointer_field_present) {
+ proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint (tree, hf_plc_mb_mc_psp, tvb, 1, 2, FALSE, &packet_start_pointer);
+
+- guint16 docsis_start = 3 + packet_start_pointer;
++ unsigned docsis_start = 3 + packet_start_pointer;
+ while (docsis_start + 6 < remaining_length) {
+ /*DOCSIS header in packet*/
+ guint8 fc = tvb_get_guint8(tvb,docsis_start + 0);
+@@ -760,7 +760,7 @@ dissect_message_channel_mb(tvbuff_t * tvb, packet_info * pinfo, proto_tree* tree
+ docsis_start += 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+- guint16 docsis_length = 256*tvb_get_guint8(tvb,docsis_start + 2) + tvb_get_guint8(tvb,docsis_start + 3);
++ unsigned docsis_length = 256*tvb_get_guint8(tvb,docsis_start + 2) + tvb_get_guint8(tvb,docsis_start + 3);
+ if (docsis_start + 6 + docsis_length <= remaining_length) {
+ /*DOCSIS packet included in packet*/
+ tvbuff_t *docsis_tvb;
+@@ -830,7 +830,7 @@ dissect_ncp_message_block(tvbuff_t * tvb, proto_tree * tree) {
+ static int
+ dissect_plc(tvbuff_t * tvb, packet_info * pinfo, proto_tree * tree, void* data _U_) {
+
+- guint16 offset = 0;
++ int offset = 0;
+ proto_tree *plc_tree;
+ proto_item *plc_item;
+ tvbuff_t *mb_tvb;
+@@ -890,7 +890,7 @@ dissect_plc(tvbuff_t * tvb, packet_info * pinfo, proto_tree * tree, void* data _
+
+ static int
+ dissect_ncp(tvbuff_t * tvb, proto_tree * tree, void* data _U_) {
+- guint16 offset = 0;
++ int offset = 0;
+ proto_tree *ncp_tree;
+ proto_item *ncp_item;
+ tvbuff_t *ncp_mb_tvb;
+--
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-4511.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-4511.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6a2f20163c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-4511.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+From ef9c79ae81b00a63aa8638076ec81dc9482972e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Thacker <johnthacker@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 10 Aug 2023 05:29:09 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] btsdp: Keep offset advancing
+
+hf_data_element_value is a FT_NONE, so we can add the item with
+the expected length and get_hfi_length() will adjust the length
+without throwing an exception. There's no need to add it with
+zero length and call proto_item_set_len. Also, don't increment
+the offset by 0 instead of the real length when there isn't
+enough data in the packet, as that can lead to failing to advance
+the offset.
+
+When dissecting a sequence type (sequence or alternative) and
+recursing into the sequence member, instead of using the main
+packet tvb directly, create a subset using the indicated length
+of the sequence. That will properly throw an exception if a
+contained item is larger than the containing sequence, instead of
+dissecting the same bytes as several different items (inside
+the sequence recursively, as well in the outer loop.)
+
+Fix #19258
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/commit/ef9c79ae81b00a63aa8638076ec81dc9482972e9]
+CVE: CVE-2023-4511
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ epan/dissectors/packet-btsdp.c | 15 ++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/epan/dissectors/packet-btsdp.c b/epan/dissectors/packet-btsdp.c
+index 397ece7..eb7f5fa 100644
+--- a/epan/dissectors/packet-btsdp.c
++++ b/epan/dissectors/packet-btsdp.c
+@@ -1925,13 +1925,11 @@ dissect_data_element(proto_tree *tree, proto_tree **next_tree,
+ offset += len - length;
+ }
+
+- pitem = proto_tree_add_item(ptree, hf_data_element_value, tvb, offset, 0, ENC_NA);
++ pitem = proto_tree_add_item(ptree, hf_data_element_value, tvb, offset, length, ENC_NA);
+ if (length > tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset)) {
+ expert_add_info(pinfo, pitem, &ei_data_element_value_large);
+- length = 0;
+- }
+- proto_item_set_len(pitem, length);
+- if (length == 0)
++ proto_item_append_text(pitem, ": MISSING");
++ } else if (length == 0)
+ proto_item_append_text(pitem, ": MISSING");
+
+ if (next_tree) *next_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(pitem, ett_btsdp_data_element_value);
+@@ -3523,6 +3521,8 @@ dissect_sdp_type(proto_tree *tree, packet_info *pinfo, tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ gint bytes_to_go = size;
+ gint first = 1;
+ wmem_strbuf_t *substr;
++ tvbuff_t *next_tvb = tvb_new_subset_length(tvb, offset, size);
++ gint next_offset = 0;
+
+ ti = proto_tree_add_item(next_tree, (type == 6) ? hf_data_element_value_sequence : hf_data_element_value_alternative,
+ tvb, offset, size, ENC_NA);
+@@ -3537,14 +3537,15 @@ dissect_sdp_type(proto_tree *tree, packet_info *pinfo, tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ first = 0;
+ }
+
+- size = dissect_sdp_type(st, pinfo, tvb, offset, attribute, service_uuid,
++ size = dissect_sdp_type(st, pinfo, next_tvb, next_offset,
++ attribute, service_uuid,
+ service_did_vendor_id, service_did_vendor_id_source,
+ service_hdp_data_exchange_specification, service_info, &substr);
+ if (size < 1) {
+ break;
+ }
+ wmem_strbuf_append_printf(info_buf, "%s ", wmem_strbuf_get_str(substr));
+- offset += size ;
++ next_offset += size;
+ bytes_to_go -= size;
+ }
+
+--
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-6175.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-6175.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a08610f8d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-6175.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
+From 2d59b26d3b554960c777003c431add89d018b0a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Guy Harris <gharris@sonic.net>
+Date: Tue, 17 Oct 2023 22:08:42 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] netscreen: do bounds checking for each byte of packet data.
+
+Make sure each byte we add to the packet data from the file fits in the
+buffer, rather than stuffing bytes into the buffer and checking
+afterwards.
+
+This prevents a buffer overflow.
+
+Fixes #19404, which was filed as part of Trend Micro's Zero Day
+Initiative as ZDI-CAN-22164.
+
+While we're at it, expand a comment and make error messages give some
+more detail.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/commit/3be1c99180a6fc48c34ae4bfc79bfd840b29ae3e]
+CVE: CVE-2023-6175
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ wiretap/netscreen.c | 125 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
+ 1 file changed, 94 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/wiretap/netscreen.c b/wiretap/netscreen.c
+index 9ad825f..ffcb689 100644
+--- a/wiretap/netscreen.c
++++ b/wiretap/netscreen.c
+@@ -59,7 +59,12 @@ static gboolean netscreen_seek_read(wtap *wth, gint64 seek_off,
+ static gboolean parse_netscreen_packet(FILE_T fh, wtap_rec *rec,
+ Buffer* buf, char *line, int *err, gchar **err_info);
+ static int parse_single_hex_dump_line(char* rec, guint8 *buf,
+- guint byte_offset);
++ guint byte_offset, guint pkt_len);
++
++/* Error returns from parse_single_hex_dump_line() */
++#define PARSE_LINE_INVALID_CHARACTER -1
++#define PARSE_LINE_NO_BYTES_SEEN -2
++#define PARSE_LINE_TOO_MANY_BYTES_SEEN -3
+
+ /* Returns TRUE if the line appears to be a line with protocol info.
+ Otherwise it returns FALSE. */
+@@ -241,13 +246,40 @@ netscreen_seek_read(wtap *wth, gint64 seek_off, wtap_rec *rec, Buffer *buf,
+ 2c 21 b6 d3 20 60 0c 8c 35 98 88 cf 20 91 0e a9 ,!...`..5.......
+ 1d 0b ..
+
++ * The first line of a packet is in the form
++
++<secs>.<dsecs>: <iface>({i,o}) len=<length>:<llinfo>>
+
++ * where:
++ *
++ * <secs> and <dsecs> are a time stamp in seconds and deciseconds,
++ * giving the time since the firewall was booted;
++ *
++ * <iface> is the name of the interface on which the packet was
++ * received or on which it was transmitted;
++ *
++ * {i,o} is i for a received packet and o for a transmitted packet;
++ *
++ * <length> is the length of the packet on the network;
++ *
++ * <llinfo>, at least for Ethernet, appears to be a source MAC
++ * address, folowed by "->", folowed by a destination MAC
++ * address, followed by a sequence of Ethertypes, each
++ * preceded by a "/" (multiple Ethertypes if there are VLAN
++ * tags and the like), possibly followed by ", tag <tag>".
++ *
++ * Following that may be some "info lines", each of which is indented
++ * by 14 spaces, giving a dissection of the payload after the
++ * link-layer header.
++ *
++ * Following that is a hex/ASCII dump of the contents of the
++ * packet, with 16 octets per line.
+ */
+ static gboolean
+ parse_netscreen_packet(FILE_T fh, wtap_rec *rec, Buffer* buf,
+ char *line, int *err, gchar **err_info)
+ {
+- int pkt_len;
++ guint pkt_len;
+ int sec;
+ int dsec;
+ char cap_int[NETSCREEN_MAX_INT_NAME_LENGTH];
+@@ -266,17 +298,12 @@ parse_netscreen_packet(FILE_T fh, wtap_rec *rec, Buffer* buf,
+ memset(cap_int, 0, sizeof(cap_int));
+ memset(cap_dst, 0, sizeof(cap_dst));
+
+- if (sscanf(line, "%9d.%9d: %15[a-z0-9/:.-](%1[io]) len=%9d:%12s->%12s/",
++ if (sscanf(line, "%9d.%9d: %15[a-z0-9/:.-](%1[io]) len=%9u:%12s->%12s/",
+ &sec, &dsec, cap_int, direction, &pkt_len, cap_src, cap_dst) < 5) {
+ *err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE;
+ *err_info = g_strdup("netscreen: Can't parse packet-header");
+ return -1;
+ }
+- if (pkt_len < 0) {
+- *err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE;
+- *err_info = g_strdup("netscreen: packet header has a negative packet length");
+- return FALSE;
+- }
+ if (pkt_len > WTAP_MAX_PACKET_SIZE_STANDARD) {
+ /*
+ * Probably a corrupt capture file; don't blow up trying
+@@ -323,44 +350,71 @@ parse_netscreen_packet(FILE_T fh, wtap_rec *rec, Buffer* buf,
+ break;
+ }
+
+- n = parse_single_hex_dump_line(p, pd, offset);
++ n = parse_single_hex_dump_line(p, pd, offset, pkt_len);
+
+- /* the smallest packet has a length of 6 bytes, if
+- * the first hex-data is less then check whether
+- * it is a info-line and act accordingly
++ /*
++ * The smallest packet has a length of 6 bytes.
++ * If the first line either gets an error when
++ * parsed as hex data, or has fewer than 6
++ * bytes of hex data, check whether it's an
++ * info line by see if it has at least
++ * NETSCREEN_SPACES_ON_INFO_LINE spaces at the
++ * beginning.
++ *
++ * If it does, count this line and, if we have,
++ * so far, skipped no more than NETSCREEN_MAX_INFOLINES
++ * lines, skip this line.
+ */
+ if (offset == 0 && n < 6) {
+ if (info_line(line)) {
++ /* Info line */
+ if (++i <= NETSCREEN_MAX_INFOLINES) {
++ /* Skip this line */
+ continue;
+ }
+ } else {
+- *err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE;
+- *err_info = g_strdup("netscreen: cannot parse hex-data");
+- return FALSE;
++ if (n >= 0) {
++ *err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE;
++ *err_info = g_strdup("netscreen: first line of packet data has only %d hex bytes, < 6");
++ return FALSE;
++ }
++ /* Otherwise, fall through to report error */
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* If there is no more data and the line was not empty,
+ * then there must be an error in the file
+ */
+- if (n == -1) {
+- *err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE;
+- *err_info = g_strdup("netscreen: cannot parse hex-data");
++ if (n < 0) {
++ switch (n) {
++
++ case PARSE_LINE_INVALID_CHARACTER:
++ *err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE;
++ *err_info = g_strdup("netscreen: invalid character in hex data");
++ break;
++
++ case PARSE_LINE_NO_BYTES_SEEN:
++ *err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE;
++ *err_info = g_strdup("netscreen: no hex bytes seen in hex data");
++ break;
++
++ case PARSE_LINE_TOO_MANY_BYTES_SEEN:
++ *err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE;
++ *err_info = g_strdup("netscreen: number of hex bytes seen in hex data is greater than the packet length");
++ break;
++
++ default:
++ *err = WTAP_ERR_INTERNAL;
++ *err_info = g_strdup_printf("netscreen: unknown error %d from parse_single_hex_dump_line()", n);
++ break;
++ }
++
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ /* Adjust the offset to the data that was just added to the buffer */
+ offset += n;
+
+- /* If there was more hex-data than was announced in the len=x
+- * header, then then there must be an error in the file
+- */
+- if (offset > pkt_len) {
+- *err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE;
+- *err_info = g_strdup("netscreen: too much hex-data");
+- return FALSE;
+- }
+ }
+
+ /*
+@@ -400,7 +454,7 @@ parse_netscreen_packet(FILE_T fh, wtap_rec *rec, Buffer* buf,
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes successfully read, -1 if bad. */
+ static int
+-parse_single_hex_dump_line(char* rec, guint8 *buf, guint byte_offset)
++parse_single_hex_dump_line(char* rec, guint8 *buf, guint byte_offset, guint pkt_len)
+ {
+ int num_items_scanned;
+ guint8 character;
+@@ -419,7 +473,7 @@ parse_single_hex_dump_line(char* rec, guint8 *buf, guint byte_offset)
+ /* Nothing more to parse */
+ break;
+ } else
+- return -1; /* not a hex digit, space before ASCII dump, or EOL */
++ return PARSE_LINE_INVALID_CHARACTER; /* not a hex digit, space before ASCII dump, or EOL */
+ byte <<= 4;
+ character = *rec++ & 0xFF;
+ if (character >= '0' && character <= '9')
+@@ -429,7 +483,16 @@ parse_single_hex_dump_line(char* rec, guint8 *buf, guint byte_offset)
+ else if (character >= 'a' && character <= 'f')
+ byte += character - 'a' + 0xa;
+ else
+- return -1; /* not a hex digit */
++ return PARSE_LINE_INVALID_CHARACTER; /* not a hex digit */
++
++ /* If there was more hex-data than was announced in the len=x
++ * header, then there must be an error in the file; quit
++ * now, as adding this byte will overflow the buffer.
++ */
++ if (byte_offset + num_items_scanned >= pkt_len) {
++ return PARSE_LINE_TOO_MANY_BYTES_SEEN;
++ }
++
+ buf[byte_offset + num_items_scanned] = byte;
+ character = *rec++ & 0xFF;
+ if (character == '\0' || character == '\r' || character == '\n') {
+@@ -437,11 +500,11 @@ parse_single_hex_dump_line(char* rec, guint8 *buf, guint byte_offset)
+ break;
+ } else if (character != ' ') {
+ /* not space before ASCII dump */
+- return -1;
++ return PARSE_LINE_INVALID_CHARACTER;
+ }
+ }
+ if (num_items_scanned == 0)
+- return -1;
++ return PARSE_LINE_NO_BYTES_SEEN;
+
+ return num_items_scanned;
+ }
+--
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2024-0208.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2024-0208.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4c9f8d29c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2024-0208.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+From a8586fde3a6512466afb2a660538ef3fe712076b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Thacker <johnthacker@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 23 Nov 2023 13:47:51 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] gvcp: Don't try to add a NULL string to a column
+
+This was caught as an invalid argument by g_strlcpy before 4.2,
+but it was never a good idea.
+
+Fix #19496
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/commit/a8586fde3a6512466afb2a660538ef3fe712076b]
+CVE: CVE-2024-0208
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ epan/dissectors/packet-gvcp.c | 7 ++-----
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/epan/dissectors/packet-gvcp.c b/epan/dissectors/packet-gvcp.c
+index 6a17cff..eb849c0 100644
+--- a/epan/dissectors/packet-gvcp.c
++++ b/epan/dissectors/packet-gvcp.c
+@@ -2222,15 +2222,12 @@ static void dissect_readreg_ack(proto_tree *gvcp_telegram_tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, p
+ if (addr_list_size > 0)
+ {
+ address_string = get_register_name_from_address(*((guint32*)wmem_array_index(gvcp_trans->addr_list, 0)), gvcp_info, &is_custom_register);
++ col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, address_string);
+ }
+
+ if (num_registers)
+ {
+- col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "%s Value=0x%08X", address_string, tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, offset));
+- }
+- else
+- {
+- col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, address_string);
++ col_append_sep_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, " ", "Value=0x%08X", tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, offset));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+--
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2024-2955.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2024-2955.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..347943d422
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2024-2955.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+From 6fd3af5e999c71df67c2cdcefb96d0dc4afa5341 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Thacker <johnthacker@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2024 20:40:42 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] t38: Allocate forced defragmented memory in correct scope
+
+Fragment data can't be allocated in pinfo->pool scope, as it
+outlives the frame. Set it to be freed when the associated tvb
+is freed, as done in the main reassemble.c code.
+
+Fix #19695
+
+CVE: CVE-2024-2955
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/commit/6fd3af5e999c71df67c2cdcefb96d0dc4afa5341]
+Signed-off-by: Ashish Sharma <asharma@mvista.com>
+
+ epan/dissectors/asn1/t38/packet-t38-template.c | 3 ++-
+ epan/dissectors/packet-t38.c | 3 ++-
+ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/epan/dissectors/asn1/t38/packet-t38-template.c b/epan/dissectors/asn1/t38/packet-t38-template.c
+index 7b856626865..526b313d054 100644
+--- a/epan/dissectors/asn1/t38/packet-t38-template.c
++++ b/epan/dissectors/asn1/t38/packet-t38-template.c
+@@ -325,8 +325,9 @@ force_reassemble_seq(reassembly_table *table, packet_info *pinfo, guint32 id)
+ last_fd=fd_i;
+ }
+
+- data = (guint8 *) wmem_alloc(pinfo->pool, size);
++ data = (guint8 *) g_malloc(size);
+ fd_head->tvb_data = tvb_new_real_data(data, size, size);
++ tvb_set_free_cb(fd_head->tvb_data, g_free);
+ fd_head->len = size; /* record size for caller */
+
+ /* add all data fragments */
+diff --git a/epan/dissectors/packet-t38.c b/epan/dissectors/packet-t38.c
+index ca95ae8b64e..5083c936c5a 100644
+--- a/epan/dissectors/packet-t38.c
++++ b/epan/dissectors/packet-t38.c
+@@ -355,8 +355,9 @@ force_reassemble_seq(reassembly_table *table, packet_info *pinfo, guint32 id)
+ last_fd=fd_i;
+ }
+
+- data = (guint8 *) wmem_alloc(pinfo->pool, size);
++ data = (guint8 *) g_malloc(size);
+ fd_head->tvb_data = tvb_new_real_data(data, size, size);
++ tvb_set_free_cb(fd_head->tvb_data, g_free);
+ fd_head->len = size; /* record size for caller */
+
+ /* add all data fragments */
+--
+GitLab
+
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/wireshark_3.4.12.bb b/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/wireshark_3.4.12.bb
index 1a4aedc139..0a523013ca 100644
--- a/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/wireshark_3.4.12.bb
+++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/wireshark_3.4.12.bb
@@ -16,6 +16,21 @@ SRC_URI += " \
file://0003-bison-Remove-line-directives.patch \
file://0004-lemon-Remove-line-directives.patch \
file://CVE-2022-3190.patch \
+ file://CVE-2023-2855.patch \
+ file://CVE-2023-2856.patch \
+ file://CVE-2023-2858.patch \
+ file://CVE-2023-2879.patch \
+ file://CVE-2023-2952.patch \
+ file://CVE-2023-0666.patch \
+ file://CVE-2023-0667.patch \
+ file://CVE-2023-0668.patch \
+ file://CVE-2023-2906.patch \
+ file://CVE-2023-1992.patch \
+ file://CVE-2022-4345.patch \
+ file://CVE-2024-0208.patch \
+ file://CVE-2023-4511.patch \
+ file://CVE-2023-6175.patch \
+ file://CVE-2024-2955.patch \
"
UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "https://1.as.dl.wireshark.org/src"