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authorJonas Gorski <jonas.gorski@bisdn.de>2023-05-10 12:32:03 +0200
committerArmin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>2023-05-24 10:47:53 -0400
commit16718c0a0eb1593154451b6f1edc8ac66d5d21a9 (patch)
treef2f8aedd9b537389323961888bebea4823bcefba
parent49c8c1e74ecf81d8089d374b55f9a584f54cc4bc (diff)
downloadmeta-openembedded-contrib-16718c0a0eb1593154451b6f1edc8ac66d5d21a9.tar.gz
frr: Security fix CVE-2022-40318
Add a security fix from the stable/8.2 branch: CVE-2022-40318: An issue was discovered in bgpd in FRRouting (FRR) through 8.4. By crafting a BGP OPEN message with an option of type 0xff (Extended Length from RFC 9072), attackers may cause a denial of service (assertion failure and daemon restart, or out-of-bounds read). This is possible because of inconsistent boundary checks that do not account for reading 3 bytes (instead of 2) in this 0xff case. NOTE: this behavior occurs in bgp_open_option_parse in the bgp_open.c file, a different location (with a different attack vector) relative to CVE-2022-40302. Reference: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-40318 https://cyberriskleaders.com/new-vulnerabilities-disclosed-in-frrouting-software/ Patch from: https://github.com/FRRouting/frr/commit/72088b05d469a6b6a8b9a2b250885246ea0c2acb Signed-off-by: Jonas Gorski <jonas.gorski@bisdn.de> Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
-rw-r--r--meta-networking/recipes-protocols/frr/frr/CVE-2022-40318.patch81
1 files changed, 81 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-protocols/frr/frr/CVE-2022-40318.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-protocols/frr/frr/CVE-2022-40318.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9d6dcfb920
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-networking/recipes-protocols/frr/frr/CVE-2022-40318.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+From 72088b05d469a6b6a8b9a2b250885246ea0c2acb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Donald Sharp <sharpd@nvidia.com>
+Date: Fri, 30 Sep 2022 08:57:43 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] bgpd: Ensure FRR has enough data to read 2 bytes in
+ bgp_open_option_parse
+
+In bgp_open_option_parse the code is checking that the
+stream has at least 2 bytes to read ( the opt_type and
+the opt_length). However if BGP_OPEN_EXT_OPT_PARAMS_CAPABLE(peer)
+is configured then FRR is reading 3 bytes. Which is not good
+since the packet could be badly formateed. Ensure that
+FRR has the appropriate data length to read the data.
+
+Signed-off-by: Donald Sharp <sharpd@nvidia.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 1117baca3c592877a4d8a13ed6a1d9bd83977487)
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-40318
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[https://github.com/FRRouting/frr/commit/72088b05d469a6b6a8b9a2b250885246ea0c2acb]
+
+Signed-off-by: Jonas Gorski <jonas.gorski@bisdn.de>
+---
+ bgpd/bgp_open.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/bgpd/bgp_open.c b/bgpd/bgp_open.c
+index fe4c24a8c979..de550d2ac607 100644
+--- a/bgpd/bgp_open.c
++++ b/bgpd/bgp_open.c
+@@ -1209,19 +1209,40 @@ int bgp_open_option_parse(struct peer *peer, uint16_t length,
+ uint8_t opt_type;
+ uint16_t opt_length;
+
+- /* Must have at least an OPEN option header */
+- if (STREAM_READABLE(s) < 2) {
++ /*
++ * Check that we can read the opt_type and fetch it
++ */
++ if (STREAM_READABLE(s) < 1) {
+ zlog_info("%s Option length error", peer->host);
+ bgp_notify_send(peer, BGP_NOTIFY_OPEN_ERR,
+ BGP_NOTIFY_OPEN_MALFORMED_ATTR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+-
+- /* Fetch option type and length. */
+ opt_type = stream_getc(s);
+- opt_length = BGP_OPEN_EXT_OPT_PARAMS_CAPABLE(peer)
+- ? stream_getw(s)
+- : stream_getc(s);
++
++ /*
++ * Check the length of the stream to ensure that
++ * FRR can properly read the opt_length. Then read it
++ */
++ if (BGP_OPEN_EXT_OPT_PARAMS_CAPABLE(peer)) {
++ if (STREAM_READABLE(s) < 2) {
++ zlog_info("%s Option length error", peer->host);
++ bgp_notify_send(peer, BGP_NOTIFY_OPEN_ERR,
++ BGP_NOTIFY_OPEN_MALFORMED_ATTR);
++ return -1;
++ }
++
++ opt_length = stream_getw(s);
++ } else {
++ if (STREAM_READABLE(s) < 1) {
++ zlog_info("%s Option length error", peer->host);
++ bgp_notify_send(peer, BGP_NOTIFY_OPEN_ERR,
++ BGP_NOTIFY_OPEN_MALFORMED_ATTR);
++ return -1;
++ }
++
++ opt_length = stream_getc(s);
++ }
+
+ /* Option length check. */
+ if (STREAM_READABLE(s) < opt_length) {
+--
+2.40.1
+