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author | Jonas Gorski <jonas.gorski@bisdn.de> | 2023-05-10 12:32:03 +0200 |
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committer | Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com> | 2023-05-24 10:47:53 -0400 |
commit | 16718c0a0eb1593154451b6f1edc8ac66d5d21a9 (patch) | |
tree | f2f8aedd9b537389323961888bebea4823bcefba | |
parent | 49c8c1e74ecf81d8089d374b55f9a584f54cc4bc (diff) | |
download | meta-openembedded-contrib-16718c0a0eb1593154451b6f1edc8ac66d5d21a9.tar.gz |
frr: Security fix CVE-2022-40318
Add a security fix from the stable/8.2 branch:
CVE-2022-40318:
An issue was discovered in bgpd in FRRouting (FRR) through 8.4. By
crafting a BGP OPEN message with an option of type 0xff (Extended Length
from RFC 9072), attackers may cause a denial of service (assertion
failure and daemon restart, or out-of-bounds read). This is possible
because of inconsistent boundary checks that do not account for reading
3 bytes (instead of 2) in this 0xff case. NOTE: this behavior occurs in
bgp_open_option_parse in the bgp_open.c file, a different location (with
a different attack vector) relative to CVE-2022-40302.
Reference:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-40318
https://cyberriskleaders.com/new-vulnerabilities-disclosed-in-frrouting-software/
Patch from:
https://github.com/FRRouting/frr/commit/72088b05d469a6b6a8b9a2b250885246ea0c2acb
Signed-off-by: Jonas Gorski <jonas.gorski@bisdn.de>
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
-rw-r--r-- | meta-networking/recipes-protocols/frr/frr/CVE-2022-40318.patch | 81 |
1 files changed, 81 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-protocols/frr/frr/CVE-2022-40318.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-protocols/frr/frr/CVE-2022-40318.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9d6dcfb920 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-networking/recipes-protocols/frr/frr/CVE-2022-40318.patch @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +From 72088b05d469a6b6a8b9a2b250885246ea0c2acb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Donald Sharp <sharpd@nvidia.com> +Date: Fri, 30 Sep 2022 08:57:43 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] bgpd: Ensure FRR has enough data to read 2 bytes in + bgp_open_option_parse + +In bgp_open_option_parse the code is checking that the +stream has at least 2 bytes to read ( the opt_type and +the opt_length). However if BGP_OPEN_EXT_OPT_PARAMS_CAPABLE(peer) +is configured then FRR is reading 3 bytes. Which is not good +since the packet could be badly formateed. Ensure that +FRR has the appropriate data length to read the data. + +Signed-off-by: Donald Sharp <sharpd@nvidia.com> +(cherry picked from commit 1117baca3c592877a4d8a13ed6a1d9bd83977487) + +CVE: CVE-2022-40318 + +Upstream-Status: Backport +[https://github.com/FRRouting/frr/commit/72088b05d469a6b6a8b9a2b250885246ea0c2acb] + +Signed-off-by: Jonas Gorski <jonas.gorski@bisdn.de> +--- + bgpd/bgp_open.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- + 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/bgpd/bgp_open.c b/bgpd/bgp_open.c +index fe4c24a8c979..de550d2ac607 100644 +--- a/bgpd/bgp_open.c ++++ b/bgpd/bgp_open.c +@@ -1209,19 +1209,40 @@ int bgp_open_option_parse(struct peer *peer, uint16_t length, + uint8_t opt_type; + uint16_t opt_length; + +- /* Must have at least an OPEN option header */ +- if (STREAM_READABLE(s) < 2) { ++ /* ++ * Check that we can read the opt_type and fetch it ++ */ ++ if (STREAM_READABLE(s) < 1) { + zlog_info("%s Option length error", peer->host); + bgp_notify_send(peer, BGP_NOTIFY_OPEN_ERR, + BGP_NOTIFY_OPEN_MALFORMED_ATTR); + return -1; + } +- +- /* Fetch option type and length. */ + opt_type = stream_getc(s); +- opt_length = BGP_OPEN_EXT_OPT_PARAMS_CAPABLE(peer) +- ? stream_getw(s) +- : stream_getc(s); ++ ++ /* ++ * Check the length of the stream to ensure that ++ * FRR can properly read the opt_length. Then read it ++ */ ++ if (BGP_OPEN_EXT_OPT_PARAMS_CAPABLE(peer)) { ++ if (STREAM_READABLE(s) < 2) { ++ zlog_info("%s Option length error", peer->host); ++ bgp_notify_send(peer, BGP_NOTIFY_OPEN_ERR, ++ BGP_NOTIFY_OPEN_MALFORMED_ATTR); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ opt_length = stream_getw(s); ++ } else { ++ if (STREAM_READABLE(s) < 1) { ++ zlog_info("%s Option length error", peer->host); ++ bgp_notify_send(peer, BGP_NOTIFY_OPEN_ERR, ++ BGP_NOTIFY_OPEN_MALFORMED_ATTR); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ opt_length = stream_getc(s); ++ } + + /* Option length check. */ + if (STREAM_READABLE(s) < opt_length) { +-- +2.40.1 + |