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authorChangqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com>2021-11-17 16:05:34 +0800
committerArmin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>2021-11-18 07:36:34 -0800
commitb87521033c7c6a7c546392bd399dad641169554e (patch)
tree033aed9e361d22d0e6663360c33bfcefa7e7a5d6
parent93befa6cf5599979ebe14ded6e1829963faa367c (diff)
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postgresql: fix CVE-2021-23214,CVE-2021-23222
Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
-rw-r--r--meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2021-23214.patch116
-rw-r--r--meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2021-23222.patch131
-rw-r--r--meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/postgresql_13.4.bb2
3 files changed, 249 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2021-23214.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2021-23214.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..58bf810626
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2021-23214.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+From 24c2b9e42edb6d2f4ef2cead3b0aa1d6196adfce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
+Date: Mon, 8 Nov 2021 11:01:43 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption
+ handshake.
+
+The server collects up to a bufferload of data whenever it reads data
+from the client socket. When SSL or GSS encryption is requested
+during startup, any additional data received with the initial
+request message remained in the buffer, and would be treated as
+already-decrypted data once the encryption handshake completed.
+Thus, a man-in-the-middle with the ability to inject data into the
+TCP connection could stuff some cleartext data into the start of
+a supposedly encryption-protected database session.
+
+This could be abused to send faked SQL commands to the server,
+although that would only work if the server did not demand any
+authentication data. (However, a server relying on SSL certificate
+authentication might well not do so.)
+
+To fix, throw a protocol-violation error if the internal buffer
+is not empty after the encryption handshake.
+
+Our thanks to Jacob Champion for reporting this problem.
+
+Security: CVE-2021-23214
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport[https://github.com/postgres/postgres/commit/28e24125541545483093819efae9bca603441951]
+CVE: CVE-2021-23214
+
+Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com>
+
+---
+ src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c | 11 +++++++++++
+ src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ src/include/libpq/libpq.h | 1 +
+ 3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c b/src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c
+index ee2cd86..4dd1c02 100644
+--- a/src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c
++++ b/src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c
+@@ -1183,6 +1183,17 @@ pq_getstring(StringInfo s)
+ }
+ }
+
++/* -------------------------------
++ * pq_buffer_has_data - is any buffered data available to read?
++ *
++ * This will *not* attempt to read more data.
++ * --------------------------------
++ */
++bool
++pq_buffer_has_data(void)
++{
++ return (PqRecvPointer < PqRecvLength);
++}
+
+ /* --------------------------------
+ * pq_startmsgread - begin reading a message from the client.
+diff --git a/src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c b/src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c
+index 5775fc0..1fcc3f8 100644
+--- a/src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c
++++ b/src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c
+@@ -2049,6 +2049,17 @@ retry1:
+ return STATUS_ERROR;
+ #endif
+
++ /*
++ * At this point we should have no data already buffered. If we do,
++ * it was received before we performed the SSL handshake, so it wasn't
++ * encrypted and indeed may have been injected by a man-in-the-middle.
++ * We report this case to the client.
++ */
++ if (pq_buffer_has_data())
++ ereport(FATAL,
++ (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
++ errmsg("received unencrypted data after SSL request"),
++ errdetail("This could be either a client-software bug or evidence of an attempted man-in-the-middle attack.")));
+ /*
+ * regular startup packet, cancel, etc packet should follow, but not
+ * another SSL negotiation request, and a GSS request should only
+@@ -2080,7 +2091,17 @@ retry1:
+ if (GSSok == 'G' && secure_open_gssapi(port) == -1)
+ return STATUS_ERROR;
+ #endif
+-
++ /*
++ * At this point we should have no data already buffered. If we do,
++ * it was received before we performed the GSS handshake, so it wasn't
++ * encrypted and indeed may have been injected by a man-in-the-middle.
++ * We report this case to the client.
++ */
++ if (pq_buffer_has_data())
++ ereport(FATAL,
++ (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
++ errmsg("received unencrypted data after GSSAPI encryption request"),
++ errdetail("This could be either a client-software bug or evidence of an attempted man-in-the-middle attack.")));
+ /*
+ * regular startup packet, cancel, etc packet should follow, but not
+ * another GSS negotiation request, and an SSL request should only
+diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
+index b115247..9969692 100644
+--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
++++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
+@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ extern int pq_getbyte(void);
+ extern int pq_peekbyte(void);
+ extern int pq_getbyte_if_available(unsigned char *c);
+ extern int pq_putbytes(const char *s, size_t len);
++extern bool pq_buffer_has_data(void);
+
+ /*
+ * prototypes for functions in be-secure.c
+--
+2.17.1
+
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2021-23222.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2021-23222.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..42b78539b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2021-23222.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+From 79125ead2a6a234086844bb42f06d49603fe6ca0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
+Date: Mon, 8 Nov 2021 11:14:56 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption
+ handshake.
+
+libpq collects up to a bufferload of data whenever it reads data from
+the socket. When SSL or GSS encryption is requested during startup,
+any additional data received with the server's yes-or-no reply
+remained in the buffer, and would be treated as already-decrypted data
+once the encryption handshake completed. Thus, a man-in-the-middle
+with the ability to inject data into the TCP connection could stuff
+some cleartext data into the start of a supposedly encryption-protected
+database session.
+
+This could probably be abused to inject faked responses to the
+client's first few queries, although other details of libpq's behavior
+make that harder than it sounds. A different line of attack is to
+exfiltrate the client's password, or other sensitive data that might
+be sent early in the session. That has been shown to be possible with
+a server vulnerable to CVE-2021-23214.
+
+To fix, throw a protocol-violation error if the internal buffer
+is not empty after the encryption handshake.
+
+Our thanks to Jacob Champion for reporting this problem.
+
+Security: CVE-2021-23222
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport[https://github.com/postgres/postgres/commit/160c0258802d10b0600d7671b1bbea55d8e17d45]
+CVE: CVE-2021-23222
+
+Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com>
+---
+ doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 54 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml
+index e26619e1b5..b692648fca 100644
+--- a/doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml
++++ b/doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml
+@@ -1471,6 +1471,20 @@ SELCT 1/0;<!-- this typo is intentional -->
+ and proceed without requesting <acronym>SSL</acronym>.
+ </para>
+
++ <para>
++ When <acronym>SSL</acronym> encryption can be performed, the server
++ is expected to send only the single <literal>S</literal> byte and then
++ wait for the frontend to initiate an <acronym>SSL</acronym> handshake.
++ If additional bytes are available to read at this point, it likely
++ means that a man-in-the-middle is attempting to perform a
++ buffer-stuffing attack
++ (<ulink url="https://www.postgresql.org/support/security/CVE-2021-23222/">CVE-2021-23222</ulink>).
++ Frontends should be coded either to read exactly one byte from the
++ socket before turning the socket over to their SSL library, or to
++ treat it as a protocol violation if they find they have read additional
++ bytes.
++ </para>
++
+ <para>
+ An initial SSLRequest can also be used in a connection that is being
+ opened to send a CancelRequest message.
+@@ -1532,6 +1546,20 @@ SELCT 1/0;<!-- this typo is intentional -->
+ encryption.
+ </para>
+
++ <para>
++ When <acronym>GSSAPI</acronym> encryption can be performed, the server
++ is expected to send only the single <literal>G</literal> byte and then
++ wait for the frontend to initiate a <acronym>GSSAPI</acronym> handshake.
++ If additional bytes are available to read at this point, it likely
++ means that a man-in-the-middle is attempting to perform a
++ buffer-stuffing attack
++ (<ulink url="https://www.postgresql.org/support/security/CVE-2021-23222/">CVE-2021-23222</ulink>).
++ Frontends should be coded either to read exactly one byte from the
++ socket before turning the socket over to their GSSAPI library, or to
++ treat it as a protocol violation if they find they have read additional
++ bytes.
++ </para>
++
+ <para>
+ An initial GSSENCRequest can also be used in a connection that is being
+ opened to send a CancelRequest message.
+diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
+index f80f4e98d8..57aee95183 100644
+--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
++++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
+@@ -3076,6 +3076,19 @@ keep_going: /* We will come back to here until there is
+ pollres = pqsecure_open_client(conn);
+ if (pollres == PGRES_POLLING_OK)
+ {
++ /*
++ * At this point we should have no data already buffered.
++ * If we do, it was received before we performed the SSL
++ * handshake, so it wasn't encrypted and indeed may have
++ * been injected by a man-in-the-middle.
++ */
++ if (conn->inCursor != conn->inEnd)
++ {
++ appendPQExpBufferStr(&conn->errorMessage,
++ libpq_gettext("received unencrypted data after SSL response\n"));
++ goto error_return;
++ }
++
+ /* SSL handshake done, ready to send startup packet */
+ conn->status = CONNECTION_MADE;
+ return PGRES_POLLING_WRITING;
+@@ -3175,6 +3188,19 @@ keep_going: /* We will come back to here until there is
+ pollres = pqsecure_open_gss(conn);
+ if (pollres == PGRES_POLLING_OK)
+ {
++ /*
++ * At this point we should have no data already buffered.
++ * If we do, it was received before we performed the GSS
++ * handshake, so it wasn't encrypted and indeed may have
++ * been injected by a man-in-the-middle.
++ */
++ if (conn->inCursor != conn->inEnd)
++ {
++ appendPQExpBufferStr(&conn->errorMessage,
++ libpq_gettext("received unencrypted data after GSSAPI encryption response\n"));
++ goto error_return;
++ }
++
+ /* All set for startup packet */
+ conn->status = CONNECTION_MADE;
+ return PGRES_POLLING_WRITING;
+--
+2.17.1
+
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/postgresql_13.4.bb b/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/postgresql_13.4.bb
index f63d23dbef..2ed0fa49bb 100644
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/postgresql_13.4.bb
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/postgresql_13.4.bb
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ SRC_URI += "\
file://0001-Add-support-for-RISC-V.patch \
file://0001-Improve-reproducibility.patch \
file://0001-configure.in-bypass-autoconf-2.69-version-check.patch \
+ file://CVE-2021-23214.patch \
+ file://CVE-2021-23222.patch \
"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "ea93e10390245f1ce461a54eb5f99a48d8cabd3a08ce4d652ec2169a357bc0cd"