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From 91239f7040b1f026d4d15765e7e3f58e92e93761 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Sep 2016 12:56:02 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] krb5: avoid realloc(0)
If the requested size is zero, bail out with error instead of doing a
realloc() that would cause a double-free: realloc(0) acts as a free()
and then there's a second free in the cleanup path.
CVE-2016-8619
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20161102E.html
Reported-by: Cure53
Upstream-Status: Backport
https://curl.haxx.se/CVE-2016-8619.patch
CVE: CVE-2016-8619
Signed-off-by: Thiruvadi Rajaraman <trajaraman@mvista.com>
---
lib/security.c | 9 ++++++---
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/security.c b/lib/security.c
index a268d4a..4cef8f8 100644
--- a/lib/security.c
+++ b/lib/security.c
@@ -190,19 +190,22 @@ socket_write(struct connectdata *conn, curl_socket_t fd, const void *to,
static CURLcode read_data(struct connectdata *conn,
curl_socket_t fd,
struct krb5buffer *buf)
{
int len;
- void* tmp;
+ void *tmp = NULL;
CURLcode result;
result = socket_read(fd, &len, sizeof(len));
if(result)
return result;
- len = ntohl(len);
- tmp = realloc(buf->data, len);
+ if(len) {
+ /* only realloc if there was a length */
+ len = ntohl(len);
+ tmp = realloc(buf->data, len);
+ }
if(tmp == NULL)
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
buf->data = tmp;
result = socket_read(fd, buf->data, len);
--
2.9.3
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