From b7b6d39565f8fad61f2347a3fe31c9ee77a4da15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Changqing Li Date: Tue, 22 Oct 2019 10:47:11 +0800 Subject: sudo: fix CVE-2019-14287 In Sudo before 1.8.28, an attacker with access to a Runas ALL sudoer account can bypass certain policy blacklists and session PAM modules, and can cause incorrect logging, by invoking sudo with a crafted user ID. For example, this allows bypass of !root configuration, and USER= logging, for a "sudo -u \#$((0xffffffff))" command. Signed-off-by: Changqing Li Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie (cherry picked from commit 4e11cd561f2bdaa6807cf02ee7c9870881826308) Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster --- .../sudo/sudo/CVE-2019-14287-1.patch | 178 +++++++++++++++++++++ .../sudo/sudo/CVE-2019-14287-2.patch | 112 +++++++++++++ meta/recipes-extended/sudo/sudo_1.8.27.bb | 2 + 3 files changed, 292 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/sudo/sudo/CVE-2019-14287-1.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/sudo/sudo/CVE-2019-14287-2.patch diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/sudo/sudo/CVE-2019-14287-1.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/sudo/sudo/CVE-2019-14287-1.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2a11e3f7ec --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-extended/sudo/sudo/CVE-2019-14287-1.patch @@ -0,0 +1,178 @@ +From f752ae5cee163253730ff7cdf293e34a91aa5520 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Todd C. Miller" +Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2019 10:04:13 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH] Treat an ID of -1 as invalid since that means "no change". + Fixes CVE-2019-14287. Found by Joe Vennix from Apple Information Security. + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/sudo-project/sudo/commit/f752ae5cee163253730ff7cdf293e34a91aa5520] +CVE: CVE-2019-14287 + +Signed-off-by: Changqing Li + +--- + lib/util/strtoid.c | 100 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------- + 1 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/util/strtoid.c b/lib/util/strtoid.c +index 2dfce75..6b3916b 100644 +--- a/lib/util/strtoid.c ++++ b/lib/util/strtoid.c +@@ -49,6 +49,27 @@ + #include "sudo_util.h" + + /* ++ * Make sure that the ID ends with a valid separator char. ++ */ ++static bool ++valid_separator(const char *p, const char *ep, const char *sep) ++{ ++ bool valid = false; ++ debug_decl(valid_separator, SUDO_DEBUG_UTIL) ++ ++ if (ep != p) { ++ /* check for valid separator (including '\0') */ ++ if (sep == NULL) ++ sep = ""; ++ do { ++ if (*ep == *sep) ++ valid = true; ++ } while (*sep++ != '\0'); ++ } ++ debug_return_bool(valid); ++} ++ ++/* + * Parse a uid/gid in string form. + * If sep is non-NULL, it contains valid separator characters (e.g. comma, space) + * If endp is non-NULL it is set to the next char after the ID. +@@ -62,36 +83,33 @@ sudo_strtoid_v1(const char *p, const char *sep, char **endp, const char **errstr + char *ep; + id_t ret = 0; + long long llval; +- bool valid = false; + debug_decl(sudo_strtoid, SUDO_DEBUG_UTIL) + + /* skip leading space so we can pick up the sign, if any */ + while (isspace((unsigned char)*p)) + p++; +- if (sep == NULL) +- sep = ""; ++ ++ /* While id_t may be 64-bit signed, uid_t and gid_t are 32-bit unsigned. */ + errno = 0; + llval = strtoll(p, &ep, 10); +- if (ep != p) { +- /* check for valid separator (including '\0') */ +- do { +- if (*ep == *sep) +- valid = true; +- } while (*sep++ != '\0'); ++ if ((errno == ERANGE && llval == LLONG_MAX) || llval > (id_t)UINT_MAX) { ++ errno = ERANGE; ++ if (errstr != NULL) ++ *errstr = N_("value too large"); ++ goto done; + } +- if (!valid) { ++ if ((errno == ERANGE && llval == LLONG_MIN) || llval < INT_MIN) { ++ errno = ERANGE; + if (errstr != NULL) +- *errstr = N_("invalid value"); +- errno = EINVAL; ++ *errstr = N_("value too small"); + goto done; + } +- if (errno == ERANGE) { +- if (errstr != NULL) { +- if (llval == LLONG_MAX) +- *errstr = N_("value too large"); +- else +- *errstr = N_("value too small"); +- } ++ ++ /* Disallow id -1, which means "no change". */ ++ if (!valid_separator(p, ep, sep) || llval == -1 || llval == (id_t)UINT_MAX) { ++ if (errstr != NULL) ++ *errstr = N_("invalid value"); ++ errno = EINVAL; + goto done; + } + ret = (id_t)llval; +@@ -108,30 +126,15 @@ sudo_strtoid_v1(const char *p, const char *sep, char **endp, const char **errstr + { + char *ep; + id_t ret = 0; +- bool valid = false; + debug_decl(sudo_strtoid, SUDO_DEBUG_UTIL) + + /* skip leading space so we can pick up the sign, if any */ + while (isspace((unsigned char)*p)) + p++; +- if (sep == NULL) +- sep = ""; ++ + errno = 0; + if (*p == '-') { + long lval = strtol(p, &ep, 10); +- if (ep != p) { +- /* check for valid separator (including '\0') */ +- do { +- if (*ep == *sep) +- valid = true; +- } while (*sep++ != '\0'); +- } +- if (!valid) { +- if (errstr != NULL) +- *errstr = N_("invalid value"); +- errno = EINVAL; +- goto done; +- } + if ((errno == ERANGE && lval == LONG_MAX) || lval > INT_MAX) { + errno = ERANGE; + if (errstr != NULL) +@@ -144,28 +147,31 @@ sudo_strtoid_v1(const char *p, const char *sep, char **endp, const char **errstr + *errstr = N_("value too small"); + goto done; + } +- ret = (id_t)lval; +- } else { +- unsigned long ulval = strtoul(p, &ep, 10); +- if (ep != p) { +- /* check for valid separator (including '\0') */ +- do { +- if (*ep == *sep) +- valid = true; +- } while (*sep++ != '\0'); +- } +- if (!valid) { ++ ++ /* Disallow id -1, which means "no change". */ ++ if (!valid_separator(p, ep, sep) || lval == -1) { + if (errstr != NULL) + *errstr = N_("invalid value"); + errno = EINVAL; + goto done; + } ++ ret = (id_t)lval; ++ } else { ++ unsigned long ulval = strtoul(p, &ep, 10); + if ((errno == ERANGE && ulval == ULONG_MAX) || ulval > UINT_MAX) { + errno = ERANGE; + if (errstr != NULL) + *errstr = N_("value too large"); + goto done; + } ++ ++ /* Disallow id -1, which means "no change". */ ++ if (!valid_separator(p, ep, sep) || ulval == UINT_MAX) { ++ if (errstr != NULL) ++ *errstr = N_("invalid value"); ++ errno = EINVAL; ++ goto done; ++ } + ret = (id_t)ulval; + } + if (errstr != NULL) +-- +2.7.4 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/sudo/sudo/CVE-2019-14287-2.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/sudo/sudo/CVE-2019-14287-2.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..453a8b09a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-extended/sudo/sudo/CVE-2019-14287-2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +From 396bc57feff3e360007634f62448b64e0626390c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Todd C. Miller" +Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2019 10:04:13 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH] Add sudo_strtoid() tests for -1 and range errors. Also adjust + testsudoers/test5 which relied upon gid -1 parsing. + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/sudo-project/sudo/commit/396bc57] +CVE: CVE-2019-14287 + +Signed-off-by: Changqing Li + +--- + lib/util/regress/atofoo/atofoo_test.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++------ + plugins/sudoers/regress/testsudoers/test5.out.ok | 2 +- + plugins/sudoers/regress/testsudoers/test5.sh | 2 +- + 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/util/regress/atofoo/atofoo_test.c b/lib/util/regress/atofoo/atofoo_test.c +index 031a7ed..fb41c1a 100644 +--- a/lib/util/regress/atofoo/atofoo_test.c ++++ b/lib/util/regress/atofoo/atofoo_test.c +@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ + #else + # include "compat/stdbool.h" + #endif ++#include + + #include "sudo_compat.h" + #include "sudo_util.h" +@@ -80,15 +81,20 @@ static struct strtoid_data { + id_t id; + const char *sep; + const char *ep; ++ int errnum; + } strtoid_data[] = { +- { "0,1", 0, ",", "," }, +- { "10", 10, NULL, NULL }, +- { "-2", -2, NULL, NULL }, ++ { "0,1", 0, ",", ",", 0 }, ++ { "10", 10, NULL, NULL, 0 }, ++ { "-1", 0, NULL, NULL, EINVAL }, ++ { "4294967295", 0, NULL, NULL, EINVAL }, ++ { "4294967296", 0, NULL, NULL, ERANGE }, ++ { "-2147483649", 0, NULL, NULL, ERANGE }, ++ { "-2", -2, NULL, NULL, 0 }, + #if SIZEOF_ID_T != SIZEOF_LONG_LONG +- { "-2", (id_t)4294967294U, NULL, NULL }, ++ { "-2", (id_t)4294967294U, NULL, NULL, 0 }, + #endif +- { "4294967294", (id_t)4294967294U, NULL, NULL }, +- { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL } ++ { "4294967294", (id_t)4294967294U, NULL, NULL, 0 }, ++ { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, 0 } + }; + + static int +@@ -104,11 +110,23 @@ test_strtoid(int *ntests) + (*ntests)++; + errstr = "some error"; + value = sudo_strtoid(d->idstr, d->sep, &ep, &errstr); +- if (errstr != NULL) { +- if (d->id != (id_t)-1) { +- sudo_warnx_nodebug("FAIL: %s: %s", d->idstr, errstr); ++ if (d->errnum != 0) { ++ if (errstr == NULL) { ++ sudo_warnx_nodebug("FAIL: %s: missing errstr for errno %d", ++ d->idstr, d->errnum); ++ errors++; ++ } else if (value != 0) { ++ sudo_warnx_nodebug("FAIL: %s should return 0 on error", ++ d->idstr); ++ errors++; ++ } else if (errno != d->errnum) { ++ sudo_warnx_nodebug("FAIL: %s: errno mismatch, %d != %d", ++ d->idstr, errno, d->errnum); + errors++; + } ++ } else if (errstr != NULL) { ++ sudo_warnx_nodebug("FAIL: %s: %s", d->idstr, errstr); ++ errors++; + } else if (value != d->id) { + sudo_warnx_nodebug("FAIL: %s != %u", d->idstr, (unsigned int)d->id); + errors++; +diff --git a/plugins/sudoers/regress/testsudoers/test5.out.ok b/plugins/sudoers/regress/testsudoers/test5.out.ok +index 5e319c9..cecf700 100644 +--- a/plugins/sudoers/regress/testsudoers/test5.out.ok ++++ b/plugins/sudoers/regress/testsudoers/test5.out.ok +@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Parse error in sudoers near line 1. + Entries for user root: + + Command unmatched +-testsudoers: test5.inc should be owned by gid 4294967295 ++testsudoers: test5.inc should be owned by gid 4294967294 + Parse error in sudoers near line 1. + + Entries for user root: +diff --git a/plugins/sudoers/regress/testsudoers/test5.sh b/plugins/sudoers/regress/testsudoers/test5.sh +index 9e690a6..94d585c 100755 +--- a/plugins/sudoers/regress/testsudoers/test5.sh ++++ b/plugins/sudoers/regress/testsudoers/test5.sh +@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ EOF + + # Test group writable + chmod 664 $TESTFILE +-./testsudoers -U $MYUID -G -1 root id <