diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2019-6111.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2019-6111.patch | 187 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 187 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2019-6111.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2019-6111.patch deleted file mode 100644 index e498da3819..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2019-6111.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,187 +0,0 @@ -From 15cc3497367d2e9729353b3df75518548e845c82 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org> -Date: Sat, 26 Jan 2019 22:41:28 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH] upstream: check in scp client that filenames sent during - -remote->local directory copies satisfy the wildcard specified by the user. - -This checking provides some protection against a malicious server -sending unexpected filenames, but it comes at a risk of rejecting wanted -files due to differences between client and server wildcard expansion rules. - -For this reason, this also adds a new -T flag to disable the check. - -reported by Harry Sintonen -fix approach suggested by markus@; -has been in snaps for ~1wk courtesy deraadt@ - -OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 00f44b50d2be8e321973f3c6d014260f8f7a8eda - -CVE: CVE-2019-6111 -Upstream-Status: Backport -Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@intel.com> ---- - scp.1 | 12 +++++++++++- - scp.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- - 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/scp.1 b/scp.1 -index 0e5cc1b..397e770 100644 ---- a/scp.1 -+++ b/scp.1 -@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ - .Nd secure copy (remote file copy program) - .Sh SYNOPSIS - .Nm scp --.Op Fl 346BCpqrv -+.Op Fl 346BCpqrTv - .Op Fl c Ar cipher - .Op Fl F Ar ssh_config - .Op Fl i Ar identity_file -@@ -208,6 +208,16 @@ to use for the encrypted connection. - The program must understand - .Xr ssh 1 - options. -+.It Fl T -+Disable strict filename checking. -+By default when copying files from a remote host to a local directory -+.Nm -+checks that the received filenames match those requested on the command-line -+to prevent the remote end from sending unexpected or unwanted files. -+Because of differences in how various operating systems and shells interpret -+filename wildcards, these checks may cause wanted files to be rejected. -+This option disables these checks at the expense of fully trusting that -+the server will not send unexpected filenames. - .It Fl v - Verbose mode. - Causes -diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c -index 0587cec..b2d331e 100644 ---- a/scp.c -+++ b/scp.c -@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ - #include <dirent.h> - #include <errno.h> - #include <fcntl.h> -+#include <fnmatch.h> - #include <limits.h> - #include <locale.h> - #include <pwd.h> -@@ -375,14 +376,14 @@ void verifydir(char *); - struct passwd *pwd; - uid_t userid; - int errs, remin, remout; --int pflag, iamremote, iamrecursive, targetshouldbedirectory; -+int Tflag, pflag, iamremote, iamrecursive, targetshouldbedirectory; - - #define CMDNEEDS 64 - char cmd[CMDNEEDS]; /* must hold "rcp -r -p -d\0" */ - - int response(void); - void rsource(char *, struct stat *); --void sink(int, char *[]); -+void sink(int, char *[], const char *); - void source(int, char *[]); - void tolocal(int, char *[]); - void toremote(int, char *[]); -@@ -421,8 +422,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) - addargs(&args, "-oRemoteCommand=none"); - addargs(&args, "-oRequestTTY=no"); - -- fflag = tflag = 0; -- while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "dfl:prtvBCc:i:P:q12346S:o:F:")) != -1) -+ fflag = Tflag = tflag = 0; -+ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, -+ "dfl:prtTvBCc:i:P:q12346S:o:F:")) != -1) { - switch (ch) { - /* User-visible flags. */ - case '1': -@@ -501,9 +503,13 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) - setmode(0, O_BINARY); - #endif - break; -+ case 'T': -+ Tflag = 1; -+ break; - default: - usage(); - } -+ } - argc -= optind; - argv += optind; - -@@ -534,7 +540,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) - } - if (tflag) { - /* Receive data. */ -- sink(argc, argv); -+ sink(argc, argv, NULL); - exit(errs != 0); - } - if (argc < 2) -@@ -792,7 +798,7 @@ tolocal(int argc, char **argv) - continue; - } - free(bp); -- sink(1, argv + argc - 1); -+ sink(1, argv + argc - 1, src); - (void) close(remin); - remin = remout = -1; - } -@@ -968,7 +974,7 @@ rsource(char *name, struct stat *statp) - (sizeof(type) != 4 && sizeof(type) != 8)) - - void --sink(int argc, char **argv) -+sink(int argc, char **argv, const char *src) - { - static BUF buffer; - struct stat stb; -@@ -984,6 +990,7 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv) - unsigned long long ull; - int setimes, targisdir, wrerrno = 0; - char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[2048], visbuf[2048]; -+ char *src_copy = NULL, *restrict_pattern = NULL; - struct timeval tv[2]; - - #define atime tv[0] -@@ -1008,6 +1015,17 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv) - (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); - if (stat(targ, &stb) == 0 && S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode)) - targisdir = 1; -+ if (src != NULL && !iamrecursive && !Tflag) { -+ /* -+ * Prepare to try to restrict incoming filenames to match -+ * the requested destination file glob. -+ */ -+ if ((src_copy = strdup(src)) == NULL) -+ fatal("strdup failed"); -+ if ((restrict_pattern = strrchr(src_copy, '/')) != NULL) { -+ *restrict_pattern++ = '\0'; -+ } -+ } - for (first = 1;; first = 0) { - cp = buf; - if (atomicio(read, remin, cp, 1) != 1) -@@ -1112,6 +1130,9 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv) - run_err("error: unexpected filename: %s", cp); - exit(1); - } -+ if (restrict_pattern != NULL && -+ fnmatch(restrict_pattern, cp, 0) != 0) -+ SCREWUP("filename does not match request"); - if (targisdir) { - static char *namebuf; - static size_t cursize; -@@ -1149,7 +1170,7 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv) - goto bad; - } - vect[0] = xstrdup(np); -- sink(1, vect); -+ sink(1, vect, src); - if (setimes) { - setimes = 0; - if (utimes(vect[0], tv) < 0) --- -2.7.4 - |