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-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch939
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.5.bb1
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-core/initrdscripts/files/init-install-efi.sh6
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-core/initrdscripts/files/init-install.sh5
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/files/0001-ecc-Store-EdDSA-session-key-in-secure-memory.patch39
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/files/CVE-2017-7526.patch455
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/libgcrypt.inc2
7 files changed, 1447 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..32fad29
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,939 @@
+The WPA2 four-way handshake protocol is vulnerable to replay attacks which can
+result in unauthenticated clients gaining access to the network.
+
+Backport a number of patches from upstream to fix this.
+
+CVE: CVE-2017-13077
+CVE: CVE-2017-13078
+CVE: CVE-2017-13079
+CVE: CVE-2017-13080
+CVE: CVE-2017-13081
+CVE: CVE-2017-13082
+CVE: CVE-2017-13086
+CVE: CVE-2017-13087
+CVE: CVE-2017-13088
+
+Thanks to Wind River for the backport from upstream master to wpa_supplicant
+2.5.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
+
+From 9a4a0f78bb2ad516d4a295fb5d042f8a61bd3f47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2017 10:13:17 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 1/7] hostapd: Avoid key reinstallation in FT handshake
+
+Do not reinstall TK to the driver during Reassociation Response frame
+processing if the first attempt of setting the TK succeeded. This avoids
+issues related to clearing the TX/RX PN that could result in reusing
+same PN values for transmitted frames (e.g., due to CCM nonce reuse and
+also hitting replay protection on the receiver) and accepting replayed
+frames on RX side.
+
+This issue was introduced by the commit
+0e84c25434e6a1f283c7b4e62e483729085b78d2 ('FT: Fix PTK configuration in
+authenticator') which allowed wpa_ft_install_ptk() to be called multiple
+times with the same PTK. While the second configuration attempt is
+needed with some drivers, it must be done only if the first attempt
+failed.
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 9 +++++++++
+ src/ap/wpa_auth.h | 3 ++-
+ src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h | 1 +
+ 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+index 2760a3f..b38a64d 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+@@ -1740,6 +1740,9 @@ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event)
+ #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
+ break;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
++ case WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED:
++ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
++ return 0;
+ }
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
+@@ -3208,6 +3211,12 @@ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
+ return sm->wpa;
+ }
+
++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
++{
++ if (!sm || !wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
++ return 0;
++ return sm->tk_already_set;
++}
+
+ int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
+ struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry)
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
+index fd04f16..3e53461 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
+@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
+ u8 *data, size_t data_len);
+ enum wpa_event {
+ WPA_AUTH, WPA_ASSOC, WPA_DISASSOC, WPA_DEAUTH, WPA_REAUTH,
+- WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT
++ WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED
+ };
+ void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event);
+@@ -271,6 +271,7 @@ int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
+ struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry);
+ struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
+index eeaffbf..f8f5dbe 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
+@@ -780,6 +780,14 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
+ return;
+ }
+
++ if (sm->tk_already_set) {
++ /* Must avoid TK reconfiguration to prevent clearing of TX/RX
++ * PN in the driver */
++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++ "FT: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver");
++ return;
++ }
++
+ /* FIX: add STA entry to kernel/driver here? The set_key will fail
+ * most likely without this.. At the moment, STA entry is added only
+ * after association has been completed. This function will be called
+@@ -792,6 +800,7 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
+
+ /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
+ sm->pairwise_set = TRUE;
++ sm->tk_already_set = TRUE;
+ }
+
+
+@@ -898,6 +907,7 @@ static int wpa_ft_process_auth_req(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
+
+ sm->pairwise = pairwise;
+ sm->PTK_valid = TRUE;
++ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
+ wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm);
+
+ buflen = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) +
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
+index 57b098f..234d84c 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
+@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ struct wpa_state_machine {
+ struct wpa_ptk PTK;
+ Boolean PTK_valid;
+ Boolean pairwise_set;
++ Boolean tk_already_set;
+ int keycount;
+ Boolean Pair;
+ struct wpa_key_replay_counter {
+--
+1.9.1
+
+From d0d1adad8792ae948743031543db8839f83db829 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2017 13:18:59 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 2/7] Prevent reinstallation of an already in-use group key
+
+Track the current GTK and IGTK that is in use and when receiving a
+(possibly retransmitted) Group Message 1 or WNM-Sleep Mode Response, do
+not install the given key if it is already in use. This prevents an
+attacker from trying to trick the client into resetting or lowering the
+sequence counter associated to the group key.
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/common/wpa_common.h | 11 +++++
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 119 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 4 ++
+ 3 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h
+index c08f651..21e13da 100644
+--- a/src/common/wpa_common.h
++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h
+@@ -215,6 +215,17 @@ struct wpa_ptk {
+ size_t tk_len;
+ };
+
++struct wpa_gtk {
++ u8 gtk[WPA_GTK_MAX_LEN];
++ size_t gtk_len;
++};
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
++struct wpa_igtk {
++ u8 igtk[WPA_IGTK_MAX_LEN];
++ size_t igtk_len;
++};
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+
+ /* WPA IE version 1
+ * 00-50-f2:1 (OUI:OUI type)
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+index a9f255e..eab7151 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -697,6 +697,15 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk;
+ u8 gtk_buf[32];
+
++ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
++ if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) {
++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
++ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
++ gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Group Key", gd->gtk, gd->gtk_len);
+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ "WPA: Installing GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
+@@ -731,6 +740,9 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ }
+ os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf));
+
++ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
++
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+@@ -801,6 +813,47 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
++static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk)
++{
++ size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
++ u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
++
++ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
++ if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) {
++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
++ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)",
++ keyidx);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
++ "WPA: IGTK keyid %d pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
++ keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn));
++ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK", igtk->igtk, len);
++ if (keyidx > 4095) {
++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
++ "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx);
++ return -1;
++ }
++ if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
++ broadcast_ether_addr,
++ keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn),
++ igtk->igtk, len) < 0) {
++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
++ "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver");
++ return -1;
++ }
++
++ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
++
++ return 0;
++}
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
++
+
+ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *ie)
+@@ -812,30 +865,14 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ if (ie->igtk) {
+ size_t len;
+ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
+- u16 keyidx;
++
+ len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
+ if (ie->igtk_len != WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN + len)
+ return -1;
++
+ igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk;
+- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
+- wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK keyid %d "
+- "pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
+- keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn));
+- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK",
+- igtk->igtk, len);
+- if (keyidx > 4095) {
+- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
+- "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx);
+- return -1;
+- }
+- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
+- broadcast_ether_addr,
+- keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn),
+- igtk->igtk, len) < 0) {
+- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
+- "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver");
+- return -1;
+- }
++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
++ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+@@ -2251,7 +2288,7 @@ void wpa_sm_deinit(struct wpa_sm *sm)
+ */
+ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
+ {
+- int clear_ptk = 1;
++ int clear_keys = 1;
+
+ if (sm == NULL)
+ return;
+@@ -2277,11 +2314,11 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
+ /* Prepare for the next transition */
+ wpa_ft_prepare_auth_request(sm, NULL);
+
+- clear_ptk = 0;
++ clear_keys = 0;
+ }
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
+
+- if (clear_ptk) {
++ if (clear_keys) {
+ /*
+ * IEEE 802.11, 8.4.10: Delete PTK SA on (re)association if
+ * this is not part of a Fast BSS Transition.
+@@ -2291,6 +2328,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
+ os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
+ sm->tptk_set = 0;
+ os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
++ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
++ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ }
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS
+@@ -2807,6 +2848,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm)
+ os_memset(sm->pmk, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk));
+ os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
+ os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
++ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
++ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
+ os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey));
+ os_memset(sm->pmk_r0, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk_r0));
+@@ -2879,29 +2924,11 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
+ os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ } else if (subelem_id == WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK) {
+- struct wpa_igtk_kde igd;
+- u16 keyidx;
+-
+- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
+- keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
+- os_memcpy(igd.keyid, buf + 2, 2);
+- os_memcpy(igd.pn, buf + 4, 6);
+-
+- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igd.keyid);
+- os_memcpy(igd.igtk, buf + 10, keylen);
+-
+- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install IGTK (WNM SLEEP)",
+- igd.igtk, keylen);
+- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
+- broadcast_ether_addr,
+- keyidx, 0, igd.pn, sizeof(igd.pn),
+- igd.igtk, keylen) < 0) {
+- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the IGTK in "
+- "WNM mode");
+- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
+- return -1;
+- }
+- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
++
++ igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2);
++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
++ return -1;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ } else {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Unknown element id");
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+index 965a9c1..27b6123 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ struct wpa_sm {
+ u8 rx_replay_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
+ int rx_replay_counter_set;
+ u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
++ struct wpa_gtk gtk;
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
++ struct wpa_igtk igtk;
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+
+ struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */
+
+--
+1.9.1
+
+From 76c0d1a21f0ebf00119e50bc57776d393ee4a30d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2017 17:31:46 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 3/7] Extend protection of GTK/IGTK reinstallation of WNM-Sleep
+ Mode cases
+
+This extends the protection to track last configured GTK/IGTK value
+separately from EAPOL-Key frames and WNM-Sleep Mode frames to cover a
+corner case where these two different mechanisms may get used when the
+GTK/IGTK has changed and tracking a single value is not sufficient to
+detect a possible key reconfiguration.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 2 ++
+ 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+index eab7151..e7b5ca8 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -692,14 +692,17 @@ struct wpa_gtk_data {
+
+ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ const struct wpa_gtk_data *gd,
+- const u8 *key_rsc)
++ const u8 *key_rsc, int wnm_sleep)
+ {
+ const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk;
+ u8 gtk_buf[32];
+
+ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
+- if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
+- os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) {
++ if ((sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) ||
++ (sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk,
++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len) == 0)) {
+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
+ gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len);
+@@ -740,8 +743,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ }
+ os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf));
+
+- sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
+- os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
++ if (wnm_sleep) {
++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk,
++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len);
++ } else {
++ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
++ }
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+@@ -800,7 +809,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ (wpa_supplicant_check_group_cipher(sm, sm->group_cipher,
+ gtk_len, gtk_len,
+ &gd.key_rsc_len, &gd.alg) ||
+- wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key->key_rsc))) {
++ wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key->key_rsc, 0))) {
+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ "RSN: Failed to install GTK");
+ os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
+@@ -815,14 +824,18 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+- const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk)
++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk,
++ int wnm_sleep)
+ {
+ size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
+ u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
+
+ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
+- if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
+- os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) {
++ if ((sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) ||
++ (sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len == len &&
++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk,
++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len) == 0)) {
+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)",
+ keyidx);
+@@ -847,8 +860,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+- sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
+- os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
++ if (wnm_sleep) {
++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len = len;
++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk,
++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len);
++ } else {
++ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
++ }
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+@@ -871,7 +890,7 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ return -1;
+
+ igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk;
+- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 0) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+@@ -1520,7 +1539,7 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_2(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ if (ret)
+ goto failed;
+
+- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key->key_rsc) ||
++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key->key_rsc, 0) ||
+ wpa_supplicant_send_2_of_2(sm, key, ver, key_info))
+ goto failed;
+ os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
+@@ -2329,8 +2348,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
+ sm->tptk_set = 0;
+ os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
+ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
++ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep));
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
++ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep));
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ }
+
+@@ -2849,8 +2870,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm)
+ os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
+ os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
+ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
++ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep));
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
++ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep));
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
+ os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey));
+@@ -2915,7 +2938,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
+
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install GTK (WNM SLEEP)",
+ gd.gtk, gd.gtk_len);
+- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc)) {
++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 1)) {
+ os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the GTK in "
+ "WNM mode");
+@@ -2927,7 +2950,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
+ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
+
+ igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2);
+- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 1) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ } else {
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+index 27b6123..51753ee 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+@@ -31,8 +31,10 @@ struct wpa_sm {
+ int rx_replay_counter_set;
+ u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
+ struct wpa_gtk gtk;
++ struct wpa_gtk gtk_wnm_sleep;
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ struct wpa_igtk igtk;
++ struct wpa_igtk igtk_wnm_sleep;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+
+ struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */
+--
+1.9.1
+
+From dc0d33ee697d016f14d0b6f3330720de2dfa9ad8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2017 17:55:19 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 4/7] Prevent installation of an all-zero TK
+
+Properly track whether a PTK has already been installed to the driver
+and the TK part cleared from memory. This prevents an attacker from
+trying to trick the client into installing an all-zero TK.
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/common/wpa_common.h | 1 +
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 7 +++++++
+ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h
+index 21e13da..a04e759 100644
+--- a/src/common/wpa_common.h
++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h
+@@ -213,6 +213,7 @@ struct wpa_ptk {
+ size_t kck_len;
+ size_t kek_len;
+ size_t tk_len;
++ int installed; /* 1 if key has already been installed to driver */
+ };
+
+ struct wpa_gtk {
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+index e7b5ca8..cb69b67 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -605,6 +605,12 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ const u8 *key_rsc;
+ u8 null_rsc[8] = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
+
++ if (sm->ptk.installed) {
++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
++ "WPA: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver");
++ return 0;
++ }
++
+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ "WPA: Installing PTK to the driver");
+
+@@ -643,6 +649,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+
+ /* TK is not needed anymore in supplicant */
+ os_memset(sm->ptk.tk, 0, WPA_TK_MAX_LEN);
++ sm->ptk.installed = 1;
+
+ if (sm->wpa_ptk_rekey) {
+ eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_rekey_ptk, sm, NULL);
+--
+1.9.1
+
+From 9831007c38f18cd70a077fccc22c836100867138 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2017 19:45:13 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 5/7] Fix PTK rekeying to generate a new ANonce
+
+The Authenticator state machine path for PTK rekeying ended up bypassing
+the AUTHENTICATION2 state where a new ANonce is generated when going
+directly to the PTKSTART state since there is no need to try to
+determine the PMK again in such a case. This is far from ideal since the
+new PTK would depend on a new nonce only from the supplicant.
+
+Fix this by generating a new ANonce when moving to the PTKSTART state
+for the purpose of starting new 4-way handshake to rekey PTK.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+index b38a64d..c603b1b 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+@@ -1895,6 +1895,20 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2)
+ sm->TimeoutCtr = 0;
+ }
+
++static int wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
++{
++ if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
++ "WPA: Failed to get random data for ANonce");
++ sm->Disconnect = TRUE;
++ return -1;
++ }
++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign new ANonce", sm->ANonce,
++ WPA_NONCE_LEN);
++ sm->TimeoutCtr = 0;
++ return 0;
++}
++
+
+ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPMK)
+ {
+@@ -2417,9 +2431,12 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK)
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION);
+ else if (sm->ReAuthenticationRequest)
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2);
+- else if (sm->PTKRequest)
+- SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
+- else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
++ else if (sm->PTKRequest) {
++ if (wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(sm) < 0)
++ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED);
++ else
++ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
++ } else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
+ case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE:
+ break;
+ case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT:
+--
+1.9.1
+
+From 7ec70b3c5a5e32f7687999ef21c608524dcf35b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2017 20:09:26 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 6/7] TDLS: Reject TPK-TK reconfiguration
+
+Do not try to reconfigure the same TPK-TK to the driver after it has
+been successfully configured. This is an explicit check to avoid issues
+related to resetting the TX/RX packet number. There was already a check
+for this for TPK M2 (retries of that message are ignored completely), so
+that behavior does not get modified.
+
+For TPK M3, the TPK-TK could have been reconfigured, but that was
+followed by immediate teardown of the link due to an issue in updating
+the STA entry. Furthermore, for TDLS with any real security (i.e.,
+ignoring open/WEP), the TPK message exchange is protected on the AP path
+and simple replay attacks are not feasible.
+
+As an additional corner case, make sure the local nonce gets updated if
+the peer uses a very unlikely "random nonce" of all zeros.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/rsn_supp/tdls.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
+index 722c20a..0878c62 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
+@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ struct wpa_tdls_peer {
+ u8 tk[16]; /* TPK-TK; assuming only CCMP will be used */
+ } tpk;
+ int tpk_set;
++ int tk_set; /* TPK-TK configured to the driver */
+ int tpk_success;
+ int tpk_in_progress;
+
+@@ -192,6 +193,20 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
+ u8 rsc[6];
+ enum wpa_alg alg;
+
++ if (peer->tk_set) {
++ /*
++ * This same TPK-TK has already been configured to the driver
++ * and this new configuration attempt (likely due to an
++ * unexpected retransmitted frame) would result in clearing
++ * the TX/RX sequence number which can break security, so must
++ * not allow that to happen.
++ */
++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TDLS: TPK-TK for the peer " MACSTR
++ " has already been configured to the driver - do not reconfigure",
++ MAC2STR(peer->addr));
++ return -1;
++ }
++
+ os_memset(rsc, 0, 6);
+
+ switch (peer->cipher) {
+@@ -209,12 +224,15 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
+ return -1;
+ }
+
++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Configure pairwise key for peer " MACSTR,
++ MAC2STR(peer->addr));
+ if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, alg, peer->addr, -1, 1,
+ rsc, sizeof(rsc), peer->tpk.tk, key_len) < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "TDLS: Failed to set TPK to the "
+ "driver");
+ return -1;
+ }
++ peer->tk_set = 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+@@ -690,7 +708,7 @@ static void wpa_tdls_peer_clear(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
+ peer->cipher = 0;
+ peer->qos_info = 0;
+ peer->wmm_capable = 0;
+- peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
++ peer->tk_set = peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
+ peer->chan_switch_enabled = 0;
+ os_memset(&peer->tpk, 0, sizeof(peer->tpk));
+ os_memset(peer->inonce, 0, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
+@@ -1153,6 +1171,7 @@ skip_rsnie:
+ wpa_tdls_peer_free(sm, peer);
+ return -1;
+ }
++ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Initiator Nonce for TPK handshake",
+ peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
+ os_memcpy(ftie->Snonce, peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
+@@ -1744,6 +1763,17 @@ static int wpa_tdls_addset_peer(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer,
+ peer->supp_oper_classes_len);
+ }
+
++static int tdls_nonce_set(const u8 *nonce)
++{
++ int i;
++
++ for (i = 0; i < WPA_NONCE_LEN; i++) {
++ if (nonce[i])
++ return 1;
++ }
++
++ return 0;
++}
+
+ static int wpa_tdls_process_tpk_m1(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr,
+ const u8 *buf, size_t len)
+@@ -1998,7 +2028,8 @@ skip_rsn:
+ peer->rsnie_i_len = kde.rsn_ie_len;
+ peer->cipher = cipher;
+
+- if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0) {
++ if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0 ||
++ !tdls_nonce_set(peer->inonce)) {
+ /*
+ * There is no point in updating the RNonce for every obtained
+ * TPK M1 frame (e.g., retransmission due to timeout) with the
+@@ -2014,6 +2045,7 @@ skip_rsn:
+ "TDLS: Failed to get random data for responder nonce");
+ goto error;
+ }
++ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
+ }
+
+ #if 0
+--
+1.9.1
+
+From 642f5eadf775b41bf3ddd8ffe77c33e785bda48f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2017 20:36:56 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 7/7] FT: Do not allow multiple Reassociation Response frames
+
+The driver is expected to not report a second association event without
+the station having explicitly request a new association. As such, this
+case should not be reachable. However, since reconfiguring the same
+pairwise or group keys to the driver could result in nonce reuse issues,
+be extra careful here and do an additional state check to avoid this
+even if the local driver ends up somehow accepting an unexpected
+Reassociation Response frame.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 3 +++
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c | 8 ++++++++
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 1 +
+ 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+index cb69b67..05e5168 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -2391,6 +2391,9 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_disassoc(struct wpa_sm *sm)
+ #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS
+ wpa_tdls_disassoc(sm);
+ #endif /* CONFIG_TDLS */
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0;
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
+
+ /* Keys are not needed in the WPA state machine anymore */
+ wpa_sm_drop_sa(sm);
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
+index 205793e..d45bb45 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
+@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ static u8 * wpa_ft_gen_req_ies(struct wpa_sm *sm, size_t *len,
+ u16 capab;
+
+ sm->ft_completed = 0;
++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0;
+
+ buf_len = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) +
+ 2 + sm->r0kh_id_len + ric_ies_len + 100;
+@@ -681,6 +682,11 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies,
+ return -1;
+ }
+
++ if (sm->ft_reassoc_completed) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Reassociation has already been completed for this FT protocol instance - ignore unexpected retransmission");
++ return 0;
++ }
++
+ if (wpa_ft_parse_ies(ies, ies_len, &parse) < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Failed to parse IEs");
+ return -1;
+@@ -781,6 +787,8 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies,
+ return -1;
+ }
+
++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 1;
++
+ if (wpa_ft_process_gtk_subelem(sm, parse.gtk, parse.gtk_len) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+index 51753ee..85cc862 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ struct wpa_sm {
+ size_t r0kh_id_len;
+ u8 r1kh_id[FT_R1KH_ID_LEN];
+ int ft_completed;
++ int ft_reassoc_completed;
+ int over_the_ds_in_progress;
+ u8 target_ap[ETH_ALEN]; /* over-the-DS target AP */
+ int set_ptk_after_assoc;
+--
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.5.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.5.bb
index a4160e1..f4b3b6a 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.5.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.5.bb
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://w1.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz \
file://0001-Reject-psk-parameter-set-with-invalid-passphrase-cha.patch \
file://0002-Reject-SET_CRED-commands-with-newline-characters-in-.patch \
file://0003-Reject-SET-commands-with-newline-characters-in-the-s.patch \
+ file://key-replay-cve-multiple.patch \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "96ff75c3a514f1f324560a2376f13110"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "cce55bae483b364eae55c35ba567c279be442ed8bab5b80a3c7fb0d057b9b316"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/initrdscripts/files/init-install-efi.sh b/meta/recipes-core/initrdscripts/files/init-install-efi.sh
index d58826a..d4c5fb3 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-core/initrdscripts/files/init-install-efi.sh
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/initrdscripts/files/init-install-efi.sh
@@ -138,6 +138,12 @@ if [ ! "${device#/dev/mmcblk}" = "${device}" ]; then
part_prefix="p"
rootwait="rootwait"
fi
+
+# USB devices also require rootwait
+if [ -n `readlink /dev/disk/by-id/usb* | grep $TARGET_DEVICE_NAME` ]; then
+ rootwait="rootwait"
+fi
+
bootfs=${device}${part_prefix}1
rootfs=${device}${part_prefix}2
swap=${device}${part_prefix}3
diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/initrdscripts/files/init-install.sh b/meta/recipes-core/initrdscripts/files/init-install.sh
index c5623ee..fddaf6a 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-core/initrdscripts/files/init-install.sh
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/initrdscripts/files/init-install.sh
@@ -146,6 +146,11 @@ if [ ! "${device#/dev/mmcblk}" = "${device}" ]; then
rootwait="rootwait"
fi
+# USB devices also require rootwait
+if [ -n `readlink /dev/disk/by-id/usb* | grep $TARGET_DEVICE_NAME` ]; then
+ rootwait="rootwait"
+fi
+
if [ $grub_version -eq 0 ] ; then
bios_boot=''
bootfs=${device}${part_prefix}1
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/files/0001-ecc-Store-EdDSA-session-key-in-secure-memory.patch b/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/files/0001-ecc-Store-EdDSA-session-key-in-secure-memory.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f6c4ca7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/files/0001-ecc-Store-EdDSA-session-key-in-secure-memory.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+CVE: CVE-2017-9526
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
+
+From b3cab278eb9c2ceda79f980bc26460d97f260041 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jo Van Bulck <jo.vanbulck@cs.kuleuven.be>
+Date: Thu, 19 Jan 2017 17:00:15 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] ecc: Store EdDSA session key in secure memory.
+
+* cipher/ecc-eddsa.c (_gcry_ecc_eddsa_sign): use mpi_snew to allocate
+session key.
+--
+
+An attacker who learns the EdDSA session key from side-channel
+observation during the signing process, can easily revover the long-
+term secret key. Storing the session key in secure memory ensures that
+constant time point operations are used in the MPI library.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jo Van Bulck <jo.vanbulck@cs.kuleuven.be>
+---
+ cipher/ecc-eddsa.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/cipher/ecc-eddsa.c b/cipher/ecc-eddsa.c
+index f91f8489..813e030d 100644
+--- a/cipher/ecc-eddsa.c
++++ b/cipher/ecc-eddsa.c
+@@ -603,7 +603,7 @@ _gcry_ecc_eddsa_sign (gcry_mpi_t input, ECC_secret_key *skey,
+ a = mpi_snew (0);
+ x = mpi_new (0);
+ y = mpi_new (0);
+- r = mpi_new (0);
++ r = mpi_snew (0);
+ ctx = _gcry_mpi_ec_p_internal_new (skey->E.model, skey->E.dialect, 0,
+ skey->E.p, skey->E.a, skey->E.b);
+ b = (ctx->nbits+7)/8;
+--
+2.11.0
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/files/CVE-2017-7526.patch b/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/files/CVE-2017-7526.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c9541d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/files/CVE-2017-7526.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,455 @@
+Flush+reload side-channel attack on RSA secret keys dubbed "Sliding right
+into disaster".
+
+CVE: CVE-2017-7526
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
+
+From 8ae178108eb3c64b40dcb4d1c1943205a86db724 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
+Date: Tue, 4 Apr 2017 17:38:05 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH 1/5] mpi: Simplify mpi_powm.
+
+* mpi/mpi-pow.c (_gcry_mpi_powm): Simplify the loop.
+
+--
+
+This fix is not a solution for the problem reported (yet). The
+problem is that the current algorithm of _gcry_mpi_powm depends on
+exponent and some information leaks is possible.
+
+Reported-by: Andreas Zankl <andreas.zankl@aisec.fraunhofer.de>
+Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
+
+(backport from master commit:
+719468e53133d3bdf12156c5bfdea2bf15f9f6f1)
+
+Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
+---
+ mpi/mpi-pow.c | 105 +++++++++++++++++-----------------------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 75 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/mpi/mpi-pow.c b/mpi/mpi-pow.c
+index 70bf9e84..c00cfed3 100644
+--- a/mpi/mpi-pow.c
++++ b/mpi/mpi-pow.c
+@@ -613,12 +613,8 @@ _gcry_mpi_powm (gcry_mpi_t res,
+ if (e == 0)
+ {
+ j += c;
+- i--;
+- if ( i < 0 )
+- {
+- c = 0;
+- break;
+- }
++ if ( --i < 0 )
++ break;
+
+ e = ep[i];
+ c = BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB;
+@@ -633,38 +629,33 @@ _gcry_mpi_powm (gcry_mpi_t res,
+ c -= c0;
+ j += c0;
+
++ e0 = (e >> (BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB - W));
+ if (c >= W)
+- {
+- e0 = (e >> (BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB - W));
+- e = (e << W);
+- c -= W;
+- }
++ c0 = 0;
+ else
+ {
+- i--;
+- if ( i < 0 )
++ if ( --i < 0 )
+ {
+- e = (e >> (BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB - c));
+- break;
++ e0 = (e >> (BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB - c));
++ j += c - W;
++ goto last_step;
++ }
++ else
++ {
++ c0 = c;
++ e = ep[i];
++ c = BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB;
++ e0 |= (e >> (BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB - (W - c0)));
+ }
+-
+- c0 = c;
+- e0 = (e >> (BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB - W))
+- | (ep[i] >> (BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB - W + c0));
+- e = (ep[i] << (W - c0));
+- c = BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB - W + c0;
+ }
+
++ e = e << (W - c0);
++ c -= (W - c0);
++
++ last_step:
+ count_trailing_zeros (c0, e0);
+ e0 = (e0 >> c0) >> 1;
+
+- for (j += W - c0; j; j--)
+- {
+- mul_mod (xp, &xsize, rp, rsize, rp, rsize, mp, msize, &karactx);
+- tp = rp; rp = xp; xp = tp;
+- rsize = xsize;
+- }
+-
+ /*
+ * base_u <= precomp[e0]
+ * base_u_size <= precomp_size[e0]
+@@ -681,25 +672,23 @@ _gcry_mpi_powm (gcry_mpi_t res,
+ u.d = precomp[k];
+
+ mpi_set_cond (&w, &u, k == e0);
+- base_u_size |= (precomp_size[k] & ((mpi_size_t)0 - (k == e0)) );
++ base_u_size |= ( precomp_size[k] & ((mpi_size_t)0 - (k == e0)) );
+ }
+
+- mul_mod (xp, &xsize, rp, rsize, base_u, base_u_size,
+- mp, msize, &karactx);
+- tp = rp; rp = xp; xp = tp;
+- rsize = xsize;
++ for (j += W - c0; j >= 0; j--)
++ {
++ mul_mod (xp, &xsize, rp, rsize,
++ j == 0 ? base_u : rp, j == 0 ? base_u_size : rsize,
++ mp, msize, &karactx);
++ tp = rp; rp = xp; xp = tp;
++ rsize = xsize;
++ }
+
+ j = c0;
++ if ( i < 0 )
++ break;
+ }
+
+- if (c != 0)
+- {
+- j += c;
+- count_trailing_zeros (c, e);
+- e = (e >> c);
+- j -= c;
+- }
+-
+ while (j--)
+ {
+ mul_mod (xp, &xsize, rp, rsize, rp, rsize, mp, msize, &karactx);
+@@ -707,40 +696,6 @@ _gcry_mpi_powm (gcry_mpi_t res,
+ rsize = xsize;
+ }
+
+- if (e != 0)
+- {
+- /*
+- * base_u <= precomp[(e>>1)]
+- * base_u_size <= precomp_size[(e>>1)]
+- */
+- base_u_size = 0;
+- for (k = 0; k < (1<< (W - 1)); k++)
+- {
+- struct gcry_mpi w, u;
+- w.alloced = w.nlimbs = precomp_size[k];
+- u.alloced = u.nlimbs = precomp_size[k];
+- w.sign = u.sign = 0;
+- w.flags = u.flags = 0;
+- w.d = base_u;
+- u.d = precomp[k];
+-
+- mpi_set_cond (&w, &u, k == (e>>1));
+- base_u_size |= (precomp_size[k] & ((mpi_size_t)0 - (k == (e>>1))) );
+- }
+-
+- mul_mod (xp, &xsize, rp, rsize, base_u, base_u_size,
+- mp, msize, &karactx);
+- tp = rp; rp = xp; xp = tp;
+- rsize = xsize;
+-
+- for (; c; c--)
+- {
+- mul_mod (xp, &xsize, rp, rsize, rp, rsize, mp, msize, &karactx);
+- tp = rp; rp = xp; xp = tp;
+- rsize = xsize;
+- }
+- }
+-
+ /* We shifted MOD, the modulo reduction argument, left
+ MOD_SHIFT_CNT steps. Adjust the result by reducing it with the
+ original MOD.
+--
+2.11.0
+
+
+From ab6d34849f33d16e1da2b09e3d938bcb0f48f682 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
+Date: Sat, 24 Jun 2017 20:46:20 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH 2/5] Same computation for square and multiply.
+
+* mpi/mpi-pow.c (_gcry_mpi_powm): Compare msize for max_u_size. Move
+the assignment to base_u into the loop. Copy content refered by RP to
+BASE_U except the last of the loop.
+
+--
+
+Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
+(backport from master commit:
+78130828e9a140a9de4dafadbc844dbb64cb709a)
+
+Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
+---
+ mpi/mpi-pow.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
+ 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/mpi/mpi-pow.c b/mpi/mpi-pow.c
+index c00cfed3..0d74f28c 100644
+--- a/mpi/mpi-pow.c
++++ b/mpi/mpi-pow.c
+@@ -577,6 +577,8 @@ _gcry_mpi_powm (gcry_mpi_t res,
+ MPN_COPY (precomp[i], rp, rsize);
+ }
+
++ if (msize > max_u_size)
++ max_u_size = msize;
+ base_u = mpi_alloc_limb_space (max_u_size, esec);
+ MPN_ZERO (base_u, max_u_size);
+
+@@ -623,6 +625,10 @@ _gcry_mpi_powm (gcry_mpi_t res,
+ {
+ int c0;
+ mpi_limb_t e0;
++ struct gcry_mpi w, u;
++ w.sign = u.sign = 0;
++ w.flags = u.flags = 0;
++ w.d = base_u;
+
+ count_leading_zeros (c0, e);
+ e = (e << c0);
+@@ -656,29 +662,31 @@ _gcry_mpi_powm (gcry_mpi_t res,
+ count_trailing_zeros (c0, e0);
+ e0 = (e0 >> c0) >> 1;
+
+- /*
+- * base_u <= precomp[e0]
+- * base_u_size <= precomp_size[e0]
+- */
+- base_u_size = 0;
+- for (k = 0; k < (1<< (W - 1)); k++)
+- {
+- struct gcry_mpi w, u;
+- w.alloced = w.nlimbs = precomp_size[k];
+- u.alloced = u.nlimbs = precomp_size[k];
+- w.sign = u.sign = 0;
+- w.flags = u.flags = 0;
+- w.d = base_u;
+- u.d = precomp[k];
+-
+- mpi_set_cond (&w, &u, k == e0);
+- base_u_size |= ( precomp_size[k] & ((mpi_size_t)0 - (k == e0)) );
+- }
+-
+ for (j += W - c0; j >= 0; j--)
+ {
+- mul_mod (xp, &xsize, rp, rsize,
+- j == 0 ? base_u : rp, j == 0 ? base_u_size : rsize,
++
++ /*
++ * base_u <= precomp[e0]
++ * base_u_size <= precomp_size[e0]
++ */
++ base_u_size = 0;
++ for (k = 0; k < (1<< (W - 1)); k++)
++ {
++ w.alloced = w.nlimbs = precomp_size[k];
++ u.alloced = u.nlimbs = precomp_size[k];
++ u.d = precomp[k];
++
++ mpi_set_cond (&w, &u, k == e0);
++ base_u_size |= ( precomp_size[k] & (0UL - (k == e0)) );
++ }
++
++ w.alloced = w.nlimbs = rsize;
++ u.alloced = u.nlimbs = rsize;
++ u.d = rp;
++ mpi_set_cond (&w, &u, j != 0);
++ base_u_size ^= ((base_u_size ^ rsize) & (0UL - (j != 0)));
++
++ mul_mod (xp, &xsize, rp, rsize, base_u, base_u_size,
+ mp, msize, &karactx);
+ tp = rp; rp = xp; xp = tp;
+ rsize = xsize;
+--
+2.11.0
+
+
+From b5370d527612d2c453a366729f07892974b28ba8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
+Date: Thu, 29 Jun 2017 11:48:44 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH 3/5] rsa: Add exponent blinding.
+
+* cipher/rsa.c (secret): Blind secret D with randomized nonce R for
+mpi_powm computation.
+
+--
+
+Co-authored-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
+Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
+
+The paper describing attack: https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/627
+
+Sliding right into disaster: Left-to-right sliding windows leak
+by Daniel J. Bernstein and Joachim Breitner and Daniel Genkin and
+Leon Groot Bruinderink and Nadia Heninger and Tanja Lange and
+Christine van Vredendaal and Yuval Yarom
+
+ It is well known that constant-time implementations of modular
+ exponentiation cannot use sliding windows. However, software
+ libraries such as Libgcrypt, used by GnuPG, continue to use sliding
+ windows. It is widely believed that, even if the complete pattern of
+ squarings and multiplications is observed through a side-channel
+ attack, the number of exponent bits leaked is not sufficient to
+ carry out a full key-recovery attack against RSA. Specifically,
+ 4-bit sliding windows leak only 40% of the bits, and 5-bit sliding
+ windows leak only 33% of the bits.
+
+ In this paper we demonstrate a complete break of RSA-1024 as
+ implemented in Libgcrypt. Our attack makes essential use of the fact
+ that Libgcrypt uses the left-to-right method for computing the
+ sliding-window expansion. We show for the first time that the
+ direction of the encoding matters: the pattern of squarings and
+ multiplications in left-to-right sliding windows leaks significantly
+ more information about exponent bits than for right-to-left. We show
+ how to incorporate this additional information into the
+ Heninger-Shacham algorithm for partial key reconstruction, and use
+ it to obtain very efficient full key recovery for RSA-1024. We also
+ provide strong evidence that the same attack works for RSA-2048 with
+ only moderately more computation.
+
+Exponent blinding is a kind of workaround to add noise. Signal (leak)
+is still there for non-constant-time implementation.
+
+(backported from master commit:
+8725c99ffa41778f382ca97233183bcd687bb0ce)
+
+Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
+---
+ cipher/rsa.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/cipher/rsa.c b/cipher/rsa.c
+index 0b98b6a8..d8658476 100644
+--- a/cipher/rsa.c
++++ b/cipher/rsa.c
+@@ -724,15 +724,33 @@ secret (gcry_mpi_t output, gcry_mpi_t input, RSA_secret_key *skey )
+ gcry_mpi_t m1 = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(skey->n)+1 );
+ gcry_mpi_t m2 = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(skey->n)+1 );
+ gcry_mpi_t h = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(skey->n)+1 );
+-
+- /* m1 = c ^ (d mod (p-1)) mod p */
++ gcry_mpi_t D_blind = mpi_alloc_secure ( mpi_get_nlimbs(skey->n) + 1 );
++ gcry_mpi_t r;
++ unsigned int r_nbits;
++
++ r_nbits = mpi_get_nbits (skey->p) / 4;
++ if (r_nbits < 96)
++ r_nbits = 96;
++ r = mpi_alloc_secure ((r_nbits + BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB-1)/BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB);
++
++ /* d_blind = (d mod (p-1)) + (p-1) * r */
++ /* m1 = c ^ d_blind mod p */
++ _gcry_mpi_randomize (r, r_nbits, GCRY_WEAK_RANDOM);
++ mpi_set_highbit (r, r_nbits - 1);
+ mpi_sub_ui( h, skey->p, 1 );
+- mpi_fdiv_r( h, skey->d, h );
+- mpi_powm( m1, input, h, skey->p );
+- /* m2 = c ^ (d mod (q-1)) mod q */
++ mpi_mul ( D_blind, h, r );
++ mpi_fdiv_r ( h, skey->d, h );
++ mpi_add ( D_blind, D_blind, h );
++ mpi_powm( m1, input, D_blind, skey->p );
++ /* d_blind = (d mod (q-1)) + (q-1) * r */
++ /* m2 = c ^ d_blind mod q */
++ _gcry_mpi_randomize (r, r_nbits, GCRY_WEAK_RANDOM);
++ mpi_set_highbit (r, r_nbits - 1);
+ mpi_sub_ui( h, skey->q, 1 );
+- mpi_fdiv_r( h, skey->d, h );
+- mpi_powm( m2, input, h, skey->q );
++ mpi_mul ( D_blind, h, r );
++ mpi_fdiv_r ( h, skey->d, h );
++ mpi_add ( D_blind, D_blind, h );
++ mpi_powm( m2, input, D_blind, skey->q );
+ /* h = u * ( m2 - m1 ) mod q */
+ mpi_sub( h, m2, m1 );
+ if ( mpi_has_sign ( h ) )
+--
+2.11.0
+
+
+From b7c572550b8759f2b0e45ee72df0494700b26da1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
+Date: Thu, 29 Jun 2017 12:36:27 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH 4/5] rsa: Fix exponent blinding.
+
+* cipher/rsa.c (secret): Free D_BLIND.
+
+--
+
+Fixes-commit: a9f612def801c8145d551d995475e5d51a4c988c
+Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
+Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
+---
+ cipher/rsa.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/cipher/rsa.c b/cipher/rsa.c
+index d8658476..9474fe89 100644
+--- a/cipher/rsa.c
++++ b/cipher/rsa.c
+@@ -760,6 +760,7 @@ secret (gcry_mpi_t output, gcry_mpi_t input, RSA_secret_key *skey )
+ mpi_mul ( h, h, skey->p );
+ mpi_add ( output, m1, h );
+
++ mpi_free ( D_blind );
+ mpi_free ( h );
+ mpi_free ( m1 );
+ mpi_free ( m2 );
+--
+2.11.0
+
+
+From e5a5f14bdd8d6265f85264575a1f3c3307306849 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
+Date: Thu, 29 Jun 2017 12:40:19 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH 5/5] rsa: More fix.
+
+* cipher/rsa.c (secret): Free R.
+
+--
+
+Fixes-commit: a9f612def801c8145d551d995475e5d51a4c988c
+Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
+Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
+---
+ cipher/rsa.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/cipher/rsa.c b/cipher/rsa.c
+index 9474fe89..b151b39f 100644
+--- a/cipher/rsa.c
++++ b/cipher/rsa.c
+@@ -760,6 +760,7 @@ secret (gcry_mpi_t output, gcry_mpi_t input, RSA_secret_key *skey )
+ mpi_mul ( h, h, skey->p );
+ mpi_add ( output, m1, h );
+
++ mpi_free ( r );
+ mpi_free ( D_blind );
+ mpi_free ( h );
+ mpi_free ( m1 );
+--
+2.11.0
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/libgcrypt.inc b/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/libgcrypt.inc
index 5478253..8e7a38f 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/libgcrypt.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/libgcrypt.inc
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ SRC_URI = "ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-${PV}.tar.gz \
file://add-pkgconfig-support.patch \
file://libgcrypt-fix-building-error-with-O2-in-sysroot-path.patch \
file://fix-ICE-failure-on-mips-with-option-O-and-g.patch \
+ file://0001-ecc-Store-EdDSA-session-key-in-secure-memory.patch \
+ file://CVE-2017-7526.patch \
"
BINCONFIG = "${bindir}/libgcrypt-config"