libpng: Security fix CVE-2015-8126

libpng: Buffer overflow vulnerabilities in png_get_PLTE/png_set_PLTE functions

Adjusted dir location to match the version.

(From OE-Core master rev: d0a8313a03711ff881ad89b6cfc545f66a0bc018)

Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Joshua Lock <joshua.g.lock@intel.com>

1 files changed, 79 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/libpng-1.6.16/CVE-2015-8126_3.patch b/meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/libpng-1.6.16/CVE-2015-8126_3.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0e0ad23200
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/libpng-1.6.16/CVE-2015-8126_3.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+From 1bef8e97995c33123665582e57d3ed40b57d5978 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Glenn Randers-Pehrson <glennrp at users.sourceforge.net>
+Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2015 11:34:37 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] [libpng16] Silently truncate over-length PLTE chunk while
+ reading.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+https://github.com/glennrp/libpng/commit/1bef8e97995c33123665582e57d3ed40b57d5978
+
+Normal Issues is date and version conflicts not applied.
+
+CVE: CVE-2015-8i26 patch #3
+
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+
+---
+ ANNOUNCE   |  3 ++-
+ CHANGES    |  3 ++-
+ pngrutil.c | 15 +++++++++++----
+ pngset.c   |  2 +-
+ 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+Index: libpng-1.6.17/pngrutil.c
+===================================================================
+--- libpng-1.6.17.orig/pngrutil.c
++++ libpng-1.6.17/pngrutil.c
+@@ -867,7 +867,7 @@ void /* PRIVATE */
+ png_handle_PLTE(png_structrp png_ptr, png_inforp info_ptr, png_uint_32 length)
+ {
+    png_color palette[PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH];
+-   int num, i;
++   int max_palette_length, num, i;
+ #ifdef PNG_POINTER_INDEXING_SUPPORTED
+    png_colorp pal_ptr;
+ #endif
+@@ -925,9 +925,19 @@ png_handle_PLTE(png_structrp png_ptr, pn
+       return;
+    }
+ 
++   max_palette_length = (png_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE) ?
++      (1 << png_ptr->bit_depth) : PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH;
++
+    /* The cast is safe because 'length' is less than 3*PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH */
+    num = (int)length / 3;
+ 
++   /* If the palette has 256 or fewer entries but is too large for the bit depth,
++    * we don't issue an error, to preserve the behavior of previous libpng versions.
++    * We silently truncate the unused extra palette entries here.
++    */
++   if (num > max_palette_length)
++     num = max_palette_length;
++
+ #ifdef PNG_POINTER_INDEXING_SUPPORTED
+    for (i = 0, pal_ptr = palette; i < num; i++, pal_ptr++)
+    {
+@@ -997,9 +1007,6 @@ png_handle_PLTE(png_structrp png_ptr, pn
+     * confusing.
+     *
+     * Fix this by not sharing the palette in this way.
+-    *
+-    * Starting with libpng-1.6.19, png_set_PLTE() also issues a png_error() when
+-    * it attempts to set a palette length that is too large for the bit depth.
+     */
+    png_set_PLTE(png_ptr, info_ptr, palette, num);
+ 
+Index: libpng-1.6.17/pngset.c
+===================================================================
+--- libpng-1.6.17.orig/pngset.c
++++ libpng-1.6.17/pngset.c
+@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ png_set_PLTE(png_structrp png_ptr, png_i
+    max_palette_length = (png_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE) ?
+       (1 << png_ptr->bit_depth) : PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH;
+ 
+-   if (num_palette < 0 || num_palette > max_palette_length)
++   if (num_palette < 0 || num_palette > (int) max_palette_length)
+    {
+       if (info_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
+          png_error(png_ptr, "Invalid palette length");