summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/meta/recipes-connectivity
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorAdrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>2019-06-05 21:41:16 +0300
committerRichard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>2019-06-07 09:10:33 +0100
commit147d66495622332fdbf3cb1d0c3f0948402e1d1b (patch)
tree1978642d7632c8284b0c9c6330ee9d40d41a6a37 /meta/recipes-connectivity
parent7af322a995a9385f7f452c2988188de98db300c2 (diff)
downloadopenembedded-core-147d66495622332fdbf3cb1d0c3f0948402e1d1b.tar.gz
openembedded-core-147d66495622332fdbf3cb1d0c3f0948402e1d1b.tar.bz2
openembedded-core-147d66495622332fdbf3cb1d0c3f0948402e1d1b.zip
openssl: Upgrade 1.1.1b -> 1.1.1c
Backported patch removed. Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'meta/recipes-connectivity')
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2019-1543.patch69
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/afalg.patch6
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1c.bb (renamed from meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1b.bb)5
3 files changed, 5 insertions, 75 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2019-1543.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2019-1543.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 900ef97fce..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2019-1543.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
-Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/f426625b6ae9a7831010750490a5f0ad689c5ba3]
-Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
-
-From f426625b6ae9a7831010750490a5f0ad689c5ba3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2019 14:39:15 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Prevent over long nonces in ChaCha20-Poly1305
-
-ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input for
-every encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value (IV)
-should be 96 bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length and
-front pads the nonce with 0 bytes if it is less than 12 bytes. However it
-also incorrectly allows a nonce to be set of up to 16 bytes. In this case
-only the last 12 bytes are significant and any additional leading bytes are
-ignored.
-
-It is a requirement of using this cipher that nonce values are unique.
-Messages encrypted using a reused nonce value are susceptible to serious
-confidentiality and integrity attacks. If an application changes the
-default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes and then makes a change to
-the leading bytes of the nonce expecting the new value to be a new unique
-nonce then such an application could inadvertently encrypt messages with a
-reused nonce.
-
-Additionally the ignored bytes in a long nonce are not covered by the
-integrity guarantee of this cipher. Any application that relies on the
-integrity of these ignored leading bytes of a long nonce may be further
-affected.
-
-Any OpenSSL internal use of this cipher, including in SSL/TLS, is safe
-because no such use sets such a long nonce value. However user
-applications that use this cipher directly and set a non-default nonce
-length to be longer than 12 bytes may be vulnerable.
-
-CVE: CVE-2019-1543
-
-Fixes #8345
-
-Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
-Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8406)
-
-(cherry picked from commit 2a3d0ee9d59156c48973592331404471aca886d6)
----
- crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c | 4 +++-
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c b/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c
-index c1917bb86a6..d3e2c622a1b 100644
---- a/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c
-+++ b/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c
-@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ typedef struct {
-
- #define data(ctx) ((EVP_CHACHA_KEY *)(ctx)->cipher_data)
-
-+#define CHACHA20_POLY1305_MAX_IVLEN 12
-+
- static int chacha_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
- const unsigned char user_key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE],
- const unsigned char iv[CHACHA_CTR_SIZE], int enc)
-@@ -533,7 +535,7 @@ static int chacha20_poly1305_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg,
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN:
-- if (arg <= 0 || arg > CHACHA_CTR_SIZE)
-+ if (arg <= 0 || arg > CHACHA20_POLY1305_MAX_IVLEN)
- return 0;
- actx->nonce_len = arg;
- return 1;
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/afalg.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/afalg.patch
index 7c4b084f3d..b7c0e9697f 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/afalg.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/afalg.patch
@@ -18,14 +18,14 @@ index 3baa8ce..9ef52ed 100755
- ($mi2) = $mi2 =~ /(\d+)/;
- my $ver = $ma*10000 + $mi1*100 + $mi2;
- if ($ver < $minver) {
-- $disabled{afalgeng} = "too-old-kernel";
+- disable('too-old-kernel', 'afalgeng');
- } else {
- push @{$config{engdirs}}, "afalg";
- }
- } else {
-- $disabled{afalgeng} = "cross-compiling";
+- disable('cross-compiling', 'afalgeng');
- }
+ push @{$config{engdirs}}, "afalg";
} else {
- $disabled{afalgeng} = "not-linux";
+ disable('not-linux', 'afalgeng');
}
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1b.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1c.bb
index 8bb3a309a2..669b1a1034 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1b.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1c.bb
@@ -16,15 +16,14 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-${PV}.tar.gz \
file://0001-skip-test_symbol_presence.patch \
file://0001-buildinfo-strip-sysroot-and-debug-prefix-map-from-co.patch \
file://afalg.patch \
- file://CVE-2019-1543.patch \
"
SRC_URI_append_class-nativesdk = " \
file://environment.d-openssl.sh \
"
-SRC_URI[md5sum] = "4532712e7bcc9414f5bce995e4e13930"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "5c557b023230413dfb0756f3137a13e6d726838ccd1430888ad15bfb2b43ea4b"
+SRC_URI[md5sum] = "15e21da6efe8aa0e0768ffd8cd37a5f6"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f6fb3079ad15076154eda9413fed42877d668e7069d9b87396d0804fdb3f4c90"
inherit lib_package multilib_header ptest