summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/meta/recipes-connectivity
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorSona Sarmadi <sona.sarmadi@enea.com>2016-04-13 08:32:15 +0200
committerRichard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>2016-04-14 10:58:27 +0100
commit080d1a313e4982dd05846b375ebf936c46934d80 (patch)
tree85f2ff1326f8cc0c3568b6deafb1748eb132f8e8 /meta/recipes-connectivity
parente951a8970b456de71f6596f061211a48adce3e3a (diff)
downloadopenembedded-core-080d1a313e4982dd05846b375ebf936c46934d80.tar.gz
openembedded-core-080d1a313e4982dd05846b375ebf936c46934d80.tar.bz2
openembedded-core-080d1a313e4982dd05846b375ebf936c46934d80.zip
bind: CVE-2016-1285 CVE-2016-1286
Fixes following vulnerabilities: CVE-2016-1285 bind: malformed packet sent to rndc can trigger assertion failure CVE-2016-1286 bind: malformed signature records for DNAME records can trigger assertion failure [YOCTO #9400] External References: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2016-1285 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2016-1286 https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-1285 https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-1286 References to the Upstream commits and Security Advisories: =========================================================== CVE-2016-1285: https://kb.isc.org/article/AA-01352 https://source.isc.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=bind9.git;a=patch; h=70037e040e587329cec82123e12b9f4f7c945f67 CVE-2016-1286_1: https://kb.isc.org/article/AA-01353 https://source.isc.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=bind9.git;a=patch; h=a3d327bf1ceaaeabb20223d8de85166e940b9f12 CVE-2016-1286_2: https://kb.isc.org/article/AA-01353 https://source.isc.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=bind9.git;a=patch; h=7602be276a73a6eb5431c5acd9718e68a55e8b61 Signed-off-by: Sona Sarmadi <sona.sarmadi@enea.com> Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'meta/recipes-connectivity')
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2016-1285.patch154
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2016-1286_1.patch79
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2016-1286_2.patch314
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.10.3-P3.bb3
4 files changed, 550 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2016-1285.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2016-1285.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2149bd180d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2016-1285.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+From 70037e040e587329cec82123e12b9f4f7c945f67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
+Date: Thu, 18 Feb 2016 12:11:27 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] 4318. [security] Malformed control messages can
+ trigger assertions in named and rndc. (CVE-2016-1285)
+ [RT #41666]
+
+(cherry picked from commit a2b15b3305acd52179e6f3dc7d073b07fbc40b8e)
+
+CVE: CVE-2016-1285
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[Removed doc/arm/notes.xml changes from upstream patch]
+
+Signed-off-by: Sona Sarmadi <sona.sarmadi@enea.com>
+---
+ CHANGES | 3 +++
+ bin/named/control.c | 2 +-
+ bin/named/controlconf.c | 2 +-
+ bin/rndc/rndc.c | 8 ++++----
+ doc/arm/notes.xml | 11 +++++++++++
+ lib/isccc/cc.c | 14 +++++++-------
+ 6 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
+index b9bd9ef..2c727d5 100644
+--- a/CHANGES
++++ b/CHANGES
+@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
++4318. [security] Malformed control messages can trigger assertions
++ in named and rndc. (CVE-2016-1285) [RT #41666]
++
+ --- 9.10.3-P3 released ---
+
+ 4288. [bug] Fixed a regression in resolver.c:possibly_mark()
+diff --git a/bin/named/control.c b/bin/named/control.c
+index 8554335..81340ca 100644
+--- a/bin/named/control.c
++++ b/bin/named/control.c
+@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ ns_control_docommand(isccc_sexpr_t *message, isc_buffer_t *text) {
+ #endif
+
+ data = isccc_alist_lookup(message, "_data");
+- if (data == NULL) {
++ if (!isccc_alist_alistp(data)) {
+ /*
+ * No data section.
+ */
+diff --git a/bin/named/controlconf.c b/bin/named/controlconf.c
+index 765afdd..a39ab8b 100644
+--- a/bin/named/controlconf.c
++++ b/bin/named/controlconf.c
+@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ control_recvmessage(isc_task_t *task, isc_event_t *event) {
+ * Limit exposure to replay attacks.
+ */
+ _ctrl = isccc_alist_lookup(request, "_ctrl");
+- if (_ctrl == NULL) {
++ if (!isccc_alist_alistp(_ctrl)) {
+ log_invalid(&conn->ccmsg, ISC_R_FAILURE);
+ goto cleanup_request;
+ }
+diff --git a/bin/rndc/rndc.c b/bin/rndc/rndc.c
+index cb17050..b6e05c8 100644
+--- a/bin/rndc/rndc.c
++++ b/bin/rndc/rndc.c
+@@ -255,8 +255,8 @@ rndc_recvdone(isc_task_t *task, isc_event_t *event) {
+ isccc_cc_fromwire(&source, &response, algorithm, &secret));
+
+ data = isccc_alist_lookup(response, "_data");
+- if (data == NULL)
+- fatal("no data section in response");
++ if (!isccc_alist_alistp(data))
++ fatal("bad or missing data section in response");
+ result = isccc_cc_lookupstring(data, "err", &errormsg);
+ if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
+ failed = ISC_TRUE;
+@@ -321,8 +321,8 @@ rndc_recvnonce(isc_task_t *task, isc_event_t *event) {
+ isccc_cc_fromwire(&source, &response, algorithm, &secret));
+
+ _ctrl = isccc_alist_lookup(response, "_ctrl");
+- if (_ctrl == NULL)
+- fatal("_ctrl section missing");
++ if (!isccc_alist_alistp(_ctrl))
++ fatal("bad or missing ctrl section in response");
+ nonce = 0;
+ if (isccc_cc_lookupuint32(_ctrl, "_nonce", &nonce) != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+ nonce = 0;
+diff --git a/lib/isccc/cc.c b/lib/isccc/cc.c
+index 47a3b74..2bb961e 100644
+--- a/lib/isccc/cc.c
++++ b/lib/isccc/cc.c
+@@ -403,13 +403,13 @@ verify(isccc_sexpr_t *alist, unsigned char *data, unsigned int length,
+ * Extract digest.
+ */
+ _auth = isccc_alist_lookup(alist, "_auth");
+- if (_auth == NULL)
++ if (!isccc_alist_alistp(_auth))
+ return (ISC_R_FAILURE);
+ if (algorithm == ISCCC_ALG_HMACMD5)
+ hmac = isccc_alist_lookup(_auth, "hmd5");
+ else
+ hmac = isccc_alist_lookup(_auth, "hsha");
+- if (hmac == NULL)
++ if (!isccc_sexpr_binaryp(hmac))
+ return (ISC_R_FAILURE);
+ /*
+ * Compute digest.
+@@ -728,7 +728,7 @@ isccc_cc_createack(isccc_sexpr_t *message, isc_boolean_t ok,
+ REQUIRE(ackp != NULL && *ackp == NULL);
+
+ _ctrl = isccc_alist_lookup(message, "_ctrl");
+- if (_ctrl == NULL ||
++ if (!isccc_alist_alistp(_ctrl) ||
+ isccc_cc_lookupuint32(_ctrl, "_ser", &serial) != ISC_R_SUCCESS ||
+ isccc_cc_lookupuint32(_ctrl, "_tim", &t) != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+ return (ISC_R_FAILURE);
+@@ -773,7 +773,7 @@ isccc_cc_isack(isccc_sexpr_t *message)
+ isccc_sexpr_t *_ctrl;
+
+ _ctrl = isccc_alist_lookup(message, "_ctrl");
+- if (_ctrl == NULL)
++ if (!isccc_alist_alistp(_ctrl))
+ return (ISC_FALSE);
+ if (isccc_cc_lookupstring(_ctrl, "_ack", NULL) == ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+ return (ISC_TRUE);
+@@ -786,7 +786,7 @@ isccc_cc_isreply(isccc_sexpr_t *message)
+ isccc_sexpr_t *_ctrl;
+
+ _ctrl = isccc_alist_lookup(message, "_ctrl");
+- if (_ctrl == NULL)
++ if (!isccc_alist_alistp(_ctrl))
+ return (ISC_FALSE);
+ if (isccc_cc_lookupstring(_ctrl, "_rpl", NULL) == ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+ return (ISC_TRUE);
+@@ -806,7 +806,7 @@ isccc_cc_createresponse(isccc_sexpr_t *message, isccc_time_t now,
+
+ _ctrl = isccc_alist_lookup(message, "_ctrl");
+ _data = isccc_alist_lookup(message, "_data");
+- if (_ctrl == NULL || _data == NULL ||
++ if (!isccc_alist_alistp(_ctrl) || !isccc_alist_alistp(_data) ||
+ isccc_cc_lookupuint32(_ctrl, "_ser", &serial) != ISC_R_SUCCESS ||
+ isccc_cc_lookupstring(_data, "type", &type) != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+ return (ISC_R_FAILURE);
+@@ -995,7 +995,7 @@ isccc_cc_checkdup(isccc_symtab_t *symtab, isccc_sexpr_t *message,
+ isccc_sexpr_t *_ctrl;
+
+ _ctrl = isccc_alist_lookup(message, "_ctrl");
+- if (_ctrl == NULL ||
++ if (!isccc_alist_alistp(_ctrl) ||
+ isccc_cc_lookupstring(_ctrl, "_ser", &_ser) != ISC_R_SUCCESS ||
+ isccc_cc_lookupstring(_ctrl, "_tim", &_tim) != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+ return (ISC_R_FAILURE);
+--
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2016-1286_1.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2016-1286_1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ae5cc48d9c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2016-1286_1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+From a3d327bf1ceaaeabb20223d8de85166e940b9f12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mukund Sivaraman <muks@isc.org>
+Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2016 12:22:43 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix resolver assertion failure due to improper DNAME handling
+ (CVE-2016-1286) (#41753)
+
+(cherry picked from commit 5995fec51cc8bb7e53804e4936e60aa1537f3673)
+
+CVE: CVE-2016-1286
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+[Removed doc/arm/notes.xml changes from upstream patch.]
+
+Signed-off-by: Sona Sarmadi <sona.sarmadi@enea.com>
+---
+diff -ruN a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
+--- a/CHANGES 2016-04-13 07:28:44.940873629 +0200
++++ b/CHANGES 2016-04-13 07:38:38.923167851 +0200
+@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
++4319. [security] Fix resolver assertion failure due to improper
++ DNAME handling when parsing fetch reply messages.
++ (CVE-2016-1286) [RT #41753]
++
+ 4318. [security] Malformed control messages can trigger assertions
+ in named and rndc. (CVE-2016-1285) [RT #41666]
+
+diff -ruN a/lib/dns/resolver.c b/lib/dns/resolver.c
+--- a/lib/dns/resolver.c 2016-04-13 07:28:43.088953790 +0200
++++ b/lib/dns/resolver.c 2016-04-13 07:38:20.411968925 +0200
+@@ -6967,21 +6967,26 @@
+ isc_boolean_t found_dname = ISC_FALSE;
+ dns_name_t *dname_name;
+
++ /*
++ * Only pass DNAME or RRSIG(DNAME).
++ */
++ if (rdataset->type != dns_rdatatype_dname &&
++ (rdataset->type != dns_rdatatype_rrsig ||
++ rdataset->covers != dns_rdatatype_dname))
++ continue;
++
++ /*
++ * If we're not chaining, then the DNAME and
++ * its signature should not be external.
++ */
++ if (!chaining && external) {
++ log_formerr(fctx, "external DNAME");
++ return (DNS_R_FORMERR);
++ }
++
+ found = ISC_FALSE;
+ aflag = 0;
+ if (rdataset->type == dns_rdatatype_dname) {
+- /*
+- * We're looking for something else,
+- * but we found a DNAME.
+- *
+- * If we're not chaining, then the
+- * DNAME should not be external.
+- */
+- if (!chaining && external) {
+- log_formerr(fctx,
+- "external DNAME");
+- return (DNS_R_FORMERR);
+- }
+ found = ISC_TRUE;
+ want_chaining = ISC_TRUE;
+ POST(want_chaining);
+@@ -7010,9 +7015,7 @@
+ &fctx->domain)) {
+ return (DNS_R_SERVFAIL);
+ }
+- } else if (rdataset->type == dns_rdatatype_rrsig
+- && rdataset->covers ==
+- dns_rdatatype_dname) {
++ } else {
+ /*
+ * We've found a signature that
+ * covers the DNAME.
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2016-1286_2.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2016-1286_2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a31ea81f87
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2016-1286_2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,314 @@
+From 7602be276a73a6eb5431c5acd9718e68a55e8b61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
+Date: Mon, 29 Feb 2016 07:16:48 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] Part 2 of: 4319. [security] Fix resolver assertion
+ failure due to improper DNAME handling when parsing
+ fetch reply messages. (CVE-2016-1286) [RT #41753]
+
+(cherry picked from commit 2de89ee9de8c8da9dc153a754b02dcdbb7fe2374)
+Signed-off-by: Sona Sarmadi <sona.sarmadi@enea.com>
+---
+ lib/dns/resolver.c | 192 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 93 insertions(+), 99 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/dns/resolver.c b/lib/dns/resolver.c
+index 70aba87..41e9df4 100644
+--- a/lib/dns/resolver.c
++++ b/lib/dns/resolver.c
+@@ -6074,14 +6074,11 @@ cname_target(dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, dns_name_t *tname) {
+ }
+
+ static inline isc_result_t
+-dname_target(fetchctx_t *fctx, dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, dns_name_t *qname,
+- dns_name_t *oname, dns_fixedname_t *fixeddname)
++dname_target(dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, dns_name_t *qname,
++ unsigned int nlabels, dns_fixedname_t *fixeddname)
+ {
+ isc_result_t result;
+ dns_rdata_t rdata = DNS_RDATA_INIT;
+- unsigned int nlabels;
+- int order;
+- dns_namereln_t namereln;
+ dns_rdata_dname_t dname;
+ dns_fixedname_t prefix;
+
+@@ -6096,21 +6093,6 @@ dname_target(fetchctx_t *fctx, dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, dns_name_t *qname,
+ if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+ return (result);
+
+- /*
+- * Get the prefix of qname.
+- */
+- namereln = dns_name_fullcompare(qname, oname, &order, &nlabels);
+- if (namereln != dns_namereln_subdomain) {
+- char qbuf[DNS_NAME_FORMATSIZE];
+- char obuf[DNS_NAME_FORMATSIZE];
+-
+- dns_rdata_freestruct(&dname);
+- dns_name_format(qname, qbuf, sizeof(qbuf));
+- dns_name_format(oname, obuf, sizeof(obuf));
+- log_formerr(fctx, "unrelated DNAME in answer: "
+- "%s is not in %s", qbuf, obuf);
+- return (DNS_R_FORMERR);
+- }
+ dns_fixedname_init(&prefix);
+ dns_name_split(qname, nlabels, dns_fixedname_name(&prefix), NULL);
+ dns_fixedname_init(fixeddname);
+@@ -6736,13 +6718,13 @@ static isc_result_t
+ answer_response(fetchctx_t *fctx) {
+ isc_result_t result;
+ dns_message_t *message;
+- dns_name_t *name, *qname, tname, *ns_name;
++ dns_name_t *name, *dname, *qname, tname, *ns_name;
+ dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, *ns_rdataset;
+ isc_boolean_t done, external, chaining, aa, found, want_chaining;
+ isc_boolean_t have_answer, found_cname, found_type, wanted_chaining;
+ unsigned int aflag;
+ dns_rdatatype_t type;
+- dns_fixedname_t dname, fqname;
++ dns_fixedname_t fdname, fqname;
+ dns_view_t *view;
+
+ FCTXTRACE("answer_response");
+@@ -6770,10 +6752,15 @@ answer_response(fetchctx_t *fctx) {
+ view = fctx->res->view;
+ result = dns_message_firstname(message, DNS_SECTION_ANSWER);
+ while (!done && result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
++ dns_namereln_t namereln;
++ int order;
++ unsigned int nlabels;
++
+ name = NULL;
+ dns_message_currentname(message, DNS_SECTION_ANSWER, &name);
+ external = ISC_TF(!dns_name_issubdomain(name, &fctx->domain));
+- if (dns_name_equal(name, qname)) {
++ namereln = dns_name_fullcompare(qname, name, &order, &nlabels);
++ if (namereln == dns_namereln_equal) {
+ wanted_chaining = ISC_FALSE;
+ for (rdataset = ISC_LIST_HEAD(name->list);
+ rdataset != NULL;
+@@ -6898,10 +6885,11 @@ answer_response(fetchctx_t *fctx) {
+ */
+ INSIST(!external);
+ if (aflag ==
+- DNS_RDATASETATTR_ANSWER)
++ DNS_RDATASETATTR_ANSWER) {
+ have_answer = ISC_TRUE;
+- name->attributes |=
+- DNS_NAMEATTR_ANSWER;
++ name->attributes |=
++ DNS_NAMEATTR_ANSWER;
++ }
+ rdataset->attributes |= aflag;
+ if (aa)
+ rdataset->trust =
+@@ -6956,6 +6944,8 @@ answer_response(fetchctx_t *fctx) {
+ if (wanted_chaining)
+ chaining = ISC_TRUE;
+ } else {
++ dns_rdataset_t *dnameset = NULL;
++
+ /*
+ * Look for a DNAME (or its SIG). Anything else is
+ * ignored.
+@@ -6963,10 +6953,8 @@ answer_response(fetchctx_t *fctx) {
+ wanted_chaining = ISC_FALSE;
+ for (rdataset = ISC_LIST_HEAD(name->list);
+ rdataset != NULL;
+- rdataset = ISC_LIST_NEXT(rdataset, link)) {
+- isc_boolean_t found_dname = ISC_FALSE;
+- dns_name_t *dname_name;
+-
++ rdataset = ISC_LIST_NEXT(rdataset, link))
++ {
+ /*
+ * Only pass DNAME or RRSIG(DNAME).
+ */
+@@ -6980,20 +6968,41 @@ answer_response(fetchctx_t *fctx) {
+ * its signature should not be external.
+ */
+ if (!chaining && external) {
+- log_formerr(fctx, "external DNAME");
++ char qbuf[DNS_NAME_FORMATSIZE];
++ char obuf[DNS_NAME_FORMATSIZE];
++
++ dns_name_format(name, qbuf,
++ sizeof(qbuf));
++ dns_name_format(&fctx->domain, obuf,
++ sizeof(obuf));
++ log_formerr(fctx, "external DNAME or "
++ "RRSIG covering DNAME "
++ "in answer: %s is "
++ "not in %s", qbuf, obuf);
++ return (DNS_R_FORMERR);
++ }
++
++ if (namereln != dns_namereln_subdomain) {
++ char qbuf[DNS_NAME_FORMATSIZE];
++ char obuf[DNS_NAME_FORMATSIZE];
++
++ dns_name_format(qname, qbuf,
++ sizeof(qbuf));
++ dns_name_format(name, obuf,
++ sizeof(obuf));
++ log_formerr(fctx, "unrelated DNAME "
++ "in answer: %s is "
++ "not in %s", qbuf, obuf);
+ return (DNS_R_FORMERR);
+ }
+
+- found = ISC_FALSE;
+ aflag = 0;
+ if (rdataset->type == dns_rdatatype_dname) {
+- found = ISC_TRUE;
+ want_chaining = ISC_TRUE;
+ POST(want_chaining);
+ aflag = DNS_RDATASETATTR_ANSWER;
+- result = dname_target(fctx, rdataset,
+- qname, name,
+- &dname);
++ result = dname_target(rdataset, qname,
++ nlabels, &fdname);
+ if (result == ISC_R_NOSPACE) {
+ /*
+ * We can't construct the
+@@ -7005,14 +7014,12 @@ answer_response(fetchctx_t *fctx) {
+ } else if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+ return (result);
+ else
+- found_dname = ISC_TRUE;
++ dnameset = rdataset;
+
+- dname_name = dns_fixedname_name(&dname);
++ dname = dns_fixedname_name(&fdname);
+ if (!is_answertarget_allowed(view,
+- qname,
+- rdataset->type,
+- dname_name,
+- &fctx->domain)) {
++ qname, rdataset->type,
++ dname, &fctx->domain)) {
+ return (DNS_R_SERVFAIL);
+ }
+ } else {
+@@ -7020,73 +7027,60 @@ answer_response(fetchctx_t *fctx) {
+ * We've found a signature that
+ * covers the DNAME.
+ */
+- found = ISC_TRUE;
+ aflag = DNS_RDATASETATTR_ANSWERSIG;
+ }
+
+- if (found) {
++ /*
++ * We've found an answer to our
++ * question.
++ */
++ name->attributes |= DNS_NAMEATTR_CACHE;
++ rdataset->attributes |= DNS_RDATASETATTR_CACHE;
++ rdataset->trust = dns_trust_answer;
++ if (!chaining) {
+ /*
+- * We've found an answer to our
+- * question.
++ * This data is "the" answer to
++ * our question only if we're
++ * not chaining.
+ */
+- name->attributes |=
+- DNS_NAMEATTR_CACHE;
+- rdataset->attributes |=
+- DNS_RDATASETATTR_CACHE;
+- rdataset->trust = dns_trust_answer;
+- if (!chaining) {
+- /*
+- * This data is "the" answer
+- * to our question only if
+- * we're not chaining.
+- */
+- INSIST(!external);
+- if (aflag ==
+- DNS_RDATASETATTR_ANSWER)
+- have_answer = ISC_TRUE;
++ INSIST(!external);
++ if (aflag == DNS_RDATASETATTR_ANSWER) {
++ have_answer = ISC_TRUE;
+ name->attributes |=
+ DNS_NAMEATTR_ANSWER;
+- rdataset->attributes |= aflag;
+- if (aa)
+- rdataset->trust =
+- dns_trust_authanswer;
+- } else if (external) {
+- rdataset->attributes |=
+- DNS_RDATASETATTR_EXTERNAL;
+- }
+-
+- /*
+- * DNAME chaining.
+- */
+- if (found_dname) {
+- /*
+- * Copy the dname into the
+- * qname fixed name.
+- *
+- * Although we check for
+- * failure of the copy
+- * operation, in practice it
+- * should never fail since
+- * we already know that the
+- * result fits in a fixedname.
+- */
+- dns_fixedname_init(&fqname);
+- result = dns_name_copy(
+- dns_fixedname_name(&dname),
+- dns_fixedname_name(&fqname),
+- NULL);
+- if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+- return (result);
+- wanted_chaining = ISC_TRUE;
+- name->attributes |=
+- DNS_NAMEATTR_CHAINING;
+- rdataset->attributes |=
+- DNS_RDATASETATTR_CHAINING;
+- qname = dns_fixedname_name(
+- &fqname);
+ }
++ rdataset->attributes |= aflag;
++ if (aa)
++ rdataset->trust =
++ dns_trust_authanswer;
++ } else if (external) {
++ rdataset->attributes |=
++ DNS_RDATASETATTR_EXTERNAL;
+ }
+ }
++
++ /*
++ * DNAME chaining.
++ */
++ if (dnameset != NULL) {
++ /*
++ * Copy the dname into the qname fixed name.
++ *
++ * Although we check for failure of the copy
++ * operation, in practice it should never fail
++ * since we already know that the result fits
++ * in a fixedname.
++ */
++ dns_fixedname_init(&fqname);
++ qname = dns_fixedname_name(&fqname);
++ result = dns_name_copy(dname, qname, NULL);
++ if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
++ return (result);
++ wanted_chaining = ISC_TRUE;
++ name->attributes |= DNS_NAMEATTR_CHAINING;
++ dnameset->attributes |=
++ DNS_RDATASETATTR_CHAINING;
++ }
+ if (wanted_chaining)
+ chaining = ISC_TRUE;
+ }
+--
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.10.3-P3.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.10.3-P3.bb
index fa057d52cf..3ad14b235f 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.10.3-P3.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.10.3-P3.bb
@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ SRC_URI = "ftp://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind9/${PV}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz \
file://bind-ensure-searching-for-json-headers-searches-sysr.patch \
file://0001-gen.c-extend-DIRNAMESIZE-from-256-to-512.patch \
file://0001-lib-dns-gen.c-fix-too-long-error.patch \
+ file://CVE-2016-1285.patch \
+ file://CVE-2016-1286_1.patch \
+ file://CVE-2016-1286_2.patch \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "bcf7e772b616f7259420a3edc5df350a"