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authorPaul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>2014-06-09 11:26:53 +0100
committerPaul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>2014-06-09 13:57:13 +0100
commit2a9e46a319d32e99266fd44e1ea1ca2b5e7c9a6a (patch)
tree907250f0f9ffdbac3a93f5cc11653aff4c69e1b0 /meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch
parent26a6e230ebb4f69c992ec909d46d586ee42bfdf6 (diff)
downloadopenembedded-core-2a9e46a319d32e99266fd44e1ea1ca2b5e7c9a6a.tar.gz
openssl: fix CVE-2014-0221
From the OpenSSL Security Advisory [05 Jun 2014] http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140605.txt DTLS recursion flaw (CVE-2014-0221) By sending an invalid DTLS handshake to an OpenSSL DTLS client the code can be made to recurse eventually crashing in a DoS attack. Only applications using OpenSSL as a DTLS client are affected. (Patch borrowed from Fedora.) Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch')
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch38
1 files changed, 38 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bf730a8124
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+commit d30e582446b027868cdabd0994681643682045a4
+Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
+Date: Fri May 16 13:00:45 2014 +0100
+
+ Fix CVE-2014-0221
+
+ Unnecessary recursion when receiving a DTLS hello request can be used to
+ crash a DTLS client. Fixed by handling DTLS hello request without recursion.
+
+ Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue.
+
+Patch borrowed from Fedora
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
+
+diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
+index 07f67f8..4c2fd03 100644
+--- a/ssl/d1_both.c
++++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
+@@ -793,6 +793,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
+ int i,al;
+ struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
+
++ redo:
+ /* see if we have the required fragment already */
+ if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s,max,ok)) || *ok)
+ {
+@@ -851,8 +852,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
+ s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ s->init_num = 0;
+- return dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn,
+- max, ok);
++ goto redo;
+ }
+ else /* Incorrectly formated Hello request */
+ {
+