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authorJagadeesh Krishnanjanappa <jkrishnanjanappa@mvista.com>2018-07-30 15:32:36 +0530
committerRichard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>2018-08-15 10:22:32 +0100
commitbdf13518e79ab949c4320226a399ee4a3913ee30 (patch)
treea781a29d4e6c7fab95c8a87ae3cefe7ee2776d01
parent4b022a62998e38dbefe1f882bcb9a229485ac9da (diff)
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libxcursor: CVE-2017-16612
affects: <= 1.1.14 CVE-2017-16612: Fix heap overflows when parsing malicious files It is possible to trigger heap overflows due to an integer overflow while parsing images and a signedness issue while parsing comments. The integer overflow occurs because the chosen limit 0x10000 for dimensions is too large for 32 bit systems, because each pixel takes 4 bytes. Properly chosen values allow an overflow which in turn will lead to less allocated memory than needed for subsequent reads. The signedness bug is triggered by reading the length of a comment as unsigned int, but casting it to int when calling the function XcursorCommentCreate. Turning length into a negative value allows the check against XCURSOR_COMMENT_MAX_LEN to pass, and the following addition of sizeof (XcursorComment) + 1 makes it possible to allocate less memory than needed for subsequent reads. Signed-off-by: Jagadeesh Krishnanjanappa <jkrishnanjanappa@mvista.com> Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxcursor/CVE-2017-16612.patch75
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxcursor_1.1.14.bb2
2 files changed, 77 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxcursor/CVE-2017-16612.patch b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxcursor/CVE-2017-16612.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9a1b12e4f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxcursor/CVE-2017-16612.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+From 4794b5dd34688158fb51a2943032569d3780c4b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
+Date: Sat, 21 Oct 2017 23:47:52 +0200
+Subject: Fix heap overflows when parsing malicious files. (CVE-2017-16612)
+
+It is possible to trigger heap overflows due to an integer overflow
+while parsing images and a signedness issue while parsing comments.
+
+The integer overflow occurs because the chosen limit 0x10000 for
+dimensions is too large for 32 bit systems, because each pixel takes
+4 bytes. Properly chosen values allow an overflow which in turn will
+lead to less allocated memory than needed for subsequent reads.
+
+The signedness bug is triggered by reading the length of a comment
+as unsigned int, but casting it to int when calling the function
+XcursorCommentCreate. Turning length into a negative value allows the
+check against XCURSOR_COMMENT_MAX_LEN to pass, and the following
+addition of sizeof (XcursorComment) + 1 makes it possible to allocate
+less memory than needed for subsequent reads.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport from v1.1.15
+CVE: CVE-2017-16612
+
+Signed-off-by: Jagadeesh Krishnanjanappa <jkrishnanjanappa@mvista.com>
+---
+ src/file.c | 12 ++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/file.c b/src/file.c
+index 43163c2..da16277 100644
+--- a/src/file.c
++++ b/src/file.c
+@@ -29,6 +29,11 @@ XcursorImageCreate (int width, int height)
+ {
+ XcursorImage *image;
+
++ if (width < 0 || height < 0)
++ return NULL;
++ if (width > XCURSOR_IMAGE_MAX_SIZE || height > XCURSOR_IMAGE_MAX_SIZE)
++ return NULL;
++
+ image = malloc (sizeof (XcursorImage) +
+ width * height * sizeof (XcursorPixel));
+ if (!image)
+@@ -101,7 +106,7 @@ XcursorCommentCreate (XcursorUInt comment_type, int length)
+ {
+ XcursorComment *comment;
+
+- if (length > XCURSOR_COMMENT_MAX_LEN)
++ if (length < 0 || length > XCURSOR_COMMENT_MAX_LEN)
+ return NULL;
+
+ comment = malloc (sizeof (XcursorComment) + length + 1);
+@@ -448,7 +453,8 @@ _XcursorReadImage (XcursorFile *file,
+ if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.delay))
+ return NULL;
+ /* sanity check data */
+- if (head.width >= 0x10000 || head.height > 0x10000)
++ if (head.width > XCURSOR_IMAGE_MAX_SIZE ||
++ head.height > XCURSOR_IMAGE_MAX_SIZE)
+ return NULL;
+ if (head.width == 0 || head.height == 0)
+ return NULL;
+@@ -457,6 +463,8 @@ _XcursorReadImage (XcursorFile *file,
+
+ /* Create the image and initialize it */
+ image = XcursorImageCreate (head.width, head.height);
++ if (image == NULL)
++ return NULL;
+ if (chunkHeader.version < image->version)
+ image->version = chunkHeader.version;
+ image->size = chunkHeader.subtype;
+--
+cgit v1.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxcursor_1.1.14.bb b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxcursor_1.1.14.bb
index 17629047b7..ccc4347820 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxcursor_1.1.14.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxcursor_1.1.14.bb
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ BBCLASSEXTEND = "native nativesdk"
PE = "1"
+SRC_URI += "file://CVE-2017-16612.patch"
+
XORG_PN = "libXcursor"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "1e7c17afbbce83e2215917047c57d1b3"