aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorArmin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>2016-09-23 23:16:30 -0700
committerRichard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>2016-10-06 08:47:58 +0100
commitd6e1a56f4e764832ac84b842fa2696b56d850ee9 (patch)
tree096780466d54e3781a1d30f7ea3eec1dd7f42658
parentdf7e4fdba42e9fcb799e812f6706bd56967858d9 (diff)
downloadopenembedded-core-d6e1a56f4e764832ac84b842fa2696b56d850ee9.tar.gz
openembedded-core-d6e1a56f4e764832ac84b842fa2696b56d850ee9.tar.bz2
openembedded-core-d6e1a56f4e764832ac84b842fa2696b56d850ee9.zip
openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-6304
affects openssl < 1.0.1i Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-6304.patch75
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb1
2 files changed, 76 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-6304.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-6304.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..64508b57c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-6304.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+From ea39b16b71e4e72a228a4535bd6d6a02c5edbc1f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Fri, 9 Sep 2016 10:08:45 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix OCSP Status Request extension unbounded memory growth
+
+A malicious client can send an excessively large OCSP Status Request
+extension. If that client continually requests renegotiation,
+sending a large OCSP Status Request extension each time, then there will
+be unbounded memory growth on the server. This will eventually lead to a
+Denial Of Service attack through memory exhaustion. Servers with a
+default configuration are vulnerable even if they do not support OCSP.
+Builds using the "no-ocsp" build time option are not affected.
+
+I have also checked other extensions to see if they suffer from a similar
+problem but I could not find any other issues.
+
+CVE-2016-6304
+
+Issue reported by Shi Lei.
+
+Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2016-6304
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+---
+ ssl/t1_lib.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+index fbcf2e6..e4b4e27 100644
+--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+@@ -2316,6 +2316,23 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
+ size -= 2;
+ if (dsize > size)
+ goto err;
++
++ /*
++ * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
++ * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
++ */
++ sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
++ OCSP_RESPID_free);
++ if (dsize > 0) {
++ s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
++ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
++ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++ return 0;
++ }
++ } else {
++ s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
++ }
++
+ while (dsize > 0) {
+ OCSP_RESPID *id;
+ int idsize;
+@@ -2335,13 +2352,6 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
+ OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
+ goto err;
+ }
+- if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
+- && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
+- sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
+- OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
+- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+- return 0;
+- }
+ if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
+ OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+--
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb
index 436b37c69c..1fe0cb20b7 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://configure-targets.patch \
file://CVE-2016-2182.patch \
file://CVE-2016-6302.patch \
file://CVE-2016-6303.patch \
+ file://CVE-2016-6304.patch \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "9392e65072ce4b614c1392eefc1f23d0"