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authorArmin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>2016-09-23 23:09:29 -0700
committerRichard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>2016-10-06 08:46:30 +0100
commitc3d4cc8e452b29d4ca620b5c93d22a88c5aa1f03 (patch)
treedaa835f50ab248279d976b0febf16269f21416d7
parented8bed3bf2d2460ff93bdaa255091e0d388a8209 (diff)
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openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-2181
affects openssl < 1.0.1i Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2181_p1.patch91
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2181_p2.patch239
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2181_p3.patch30
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb3
4 files changed, 363 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2181_p1.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2181_p1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9149dbe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2181_p1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+From 20744f6b40b5ded059a848f66d6ba922f2a62eb3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2016 11:46:26 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix DTLS unprocessed records bug
+
+During a DTLS handshake we may get records destined for the next epoch
+arrive before we have processed the CCS. In that case we can't decrypt or
+verify the record yet, so we buffer it for later use. When we do receive
+the CCS we work through the queue of unprocessed records and process them.
+
+Unfortunately the act of processing wipes out any existing packet data
+that we were still working through. This includes any records from the new
+epoch that were in the same packet as the CCS. We should only process the
+buffered records if we've not got any data left.
+
+Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2016-2180 patch 1
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+---
+ ssl/d1_pkt.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+index fe30ec7..1fb119d 100644
+--- a/ssl/d1_pkt.c
++++ b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+@@ -319,6 +319,7 @@ static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
+ static int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
+ {
+ pitem *item;
++ SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
+
+ item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
+ if (item) {
+@@ -326,6 +327,19 @@ static int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
+ if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
+ return (1); /* Nothing to do. */
+
++ rb = &s->s3->rbuf;
++
++ if (rb->left > 0) {
++ /*
++ * We've still got data from the current packet to read. There could
++ * be a record from the new epoch in it - so don't overwrite it
++ * with the unprocessed records yet (we'll do it when we've
++ * finished reading the current packet).
++ */
++ return 1;
++ }
++
++
+ /* Process all the records. */
+ while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q)) {
+ dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
+@@ -581,6 +595,7 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
+
+ rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
+
++ again:
+ /*
+ * The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the pending records.
+ * This is a non-blocking operation.
+@@ -593,7 +608,6 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
+ return 1;
+
+ /* get something from the wire */
+- again:
+ /* check if we have the header */
+ if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
+ (s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
+@@ -1830,8 +1844,13 @@ static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
+ if (rr->epoch == s->d1->r_epoch)
+ return &s->d1->bitmap;
+
+- /* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */
++ /*
++ * Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch and only if we
++ * have already processed all of the unprocessed records from the last
++ * epoch
++ */
+ else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->d1->r_epoch + 1) &&
++ s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch &&
+ (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
+ *is_next_epoch = 1;
+ return &s->d1->next_bitmap;
+--
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2181_p2.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2181_p2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ecf138a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2181_p2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,239 @@
+From 3884b47b7c255c2e94d9b387ee83c7e8bb981258 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2016 12:04:37 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix DTLS replay protection
+
+The DTLS implementation provides some protection against replay attacks
+in accordance with RFC6347 section 4.1.2.6.
+
+A sliding "window" of valid record sequence numbers is maintained with
+the "right" hand edge of the window set to the highest sequence number we
+have received so far. Records that arrive that are off the "left" hand
+edge of the window are rejected. Records within the window are checked
+against a list of records received so far. If we already received it then
+we also reject the new record.
+
+If we have not already received the record, or the sequence number is off
+the right hand edge of the window then we verify the MAC of the record.
+If MAC verification fails then we discard the record. Otherwise we mark
+the record as received. If the sequence number was off the right hand edge
+of the window, then we slide the window along so that the right hand edge
+is in line with the newly received sequence number.
+
+Records may arrive for future epochs, i.e. a record from after a CCS being
+sent, can arrive before the CCS does if the packets get re-ordered. As we
+have not yet received the CCS we are not yet in a position to decrypt or
+validate the MAC of those records. OpenSSL places those records on an
+unprocessed records queue. It additionally updates the window immediately,
+even though we have not yet verified the MAC. This will only occur if
+currently in a handshake/renegotiation.
+
+This could be exploited by an attacker by sending a record for the next
+epoch (which does not have to decrypt or have a valid MAC), with a very
+large sequence number. This means the right hand edge of the window is
+moved very far to the right, and all subsequent legitimate packets are
+dropped causing a denial of service.
+
+A similar effect can be achieved during the initial handshake. In this
+case there is no MAC key negotiated yet. Therefore an attacker can send a
+message for the current epoch with a very large sequence number. The code
+will process the record as normal. If the hanshake message sequence number
+(as opposed to the record sequence number that we have been talking about
+so far) is in the future then the injected message is bufferred to be
+handled later, but the window is still updated. Therefore all subsequent
+legitimate handshake records are dropped. This aspect is not considered a
+security issue because there are many ways for an attacker to disrupt the
+initial handshake and prevent it from completing successfully (e.g.
+injection of a handshake message will cause the Finished MAC to fail and
+the handshake to be aborted). This issue comes about as a result of trying
+to do replay protection, but having no integrity mechanism in place yet.
+Does it even make sense to have replay protection in epoch 0? That
+issue isn't addressed here though.
+
+This addressed an OCAP Audit issue.
+
+CVE-2016-2181
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2016-2181 patch2
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+
+Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
+---
+ ssl/d1_pkt.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
+ ssl/ssl.h | 1 +
+ ssl/ssl_err.c | 4 +++-
+ 3 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+
+Index: openssl-1.0.2h/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.2h.orig/ssl/d1_pkt.c
++++ openssl-1.0.2h/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(
+ #endif
+ static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q,
+ unsigned char *priority);
+-static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s);
++static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
+
+ /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
+ static int dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
+@@ -320,13 +320,18 @@ static int dtls1_process_buffered_record
+ {
+ pitem *item;
+ SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
++ SSL3_RECORD *rr;
++ DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
++ unsigned int is_next_epoch;
++ int replayok = 1;
+
+ item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
+ if (item) {
+ /* Check if epoch is current. */
+ if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
+- return (1); /* Nothing to do. */
++ return 1; /* Nothing to do. */
+
++ rr = &s->s3->rrec;
+ rb = &s->s3->rbuf;
+
+ if (rb->left > 0) {
+@@ -343,11 +348,41 @@ static int dtls1_process_buffered_record
+ /* Process all the records. */
+ while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q)) {
+ dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
+- if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
+- return (0);
++ bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
++ if (bitmap == NULL) {
++ /*
++ * Should not happen. This will only ever be NULL when the
++ * current record is from a different epoch. But that cannot
++ * be the case because we already checked the epoch above
++ */
++ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_BUFFERED_RECORDS,
++ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++ return 0;
++ }
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
++ /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
++ if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
++#endif
++ {
++ /*
++ * Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. We did this
++ * check once already when we first received the record - but
++ * we might have updated the window since then due to
++ * records we subsequently processed.
++ */
++ replayok = dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap);
++ }
++
++ if (!replayok || !dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) {
++ /* dump this record */
++ rr->length = 0;
++ s->packet_length = 0;
++ continue;
++ }
++
+ if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds),
+ s->s3->rrec.seq_num) < 0)
+- return -1;
++ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+@@ -358,7 +393,7 @@ static int dtls1_process_buffered_record
+ s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch;
+ s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1;
+
+- return (1);
++ return 1;
+ }
+
+ #if 0
+@@ -405,7 +440,7 @@ static int dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL
+
+ #endif
+
+-static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
++static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
+ {
+ int i, al;
+ int enc_err;
+@@ -565,6 +600,10 @@ static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
+
+ /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
+ s->packet_length = 0;
++
++ /* Mark receipt of record. */
++ dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);
++
+ return (1);
+
+ f_err:
+@@ -600,7 +639,7 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
+ * The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the pending records.
+ * This is a non-blocking operation.
+ */
+- if (dtls1_process_buffered_records(s) < 0)
++ if (!dtls1_process_buffered_records(s))
+ return -1;
+
+ /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
+@@ -735,20 +774,17 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
+ if (dtls1_buffer_record
+ (s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num) < 0)
+ return -1;
+- /* Mark receipt of record. */
+- dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);
+ }
+ rr->length = 0;
+ s->packet_length = 0;
+ goto again;
+ }
+
+- if (!dtls1_process_record(s)) {
++ if (!dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) {
+ rr->length = 0;
+ s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
+ goto again; /* get another record */
+ }
+- dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap); /* Mark receipt of record. */
+
+ return (1);
+
+Index: openssl-1.0.2h/ssl/ssl.h
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.2h.orig/ssl/ssl.h
++++ openssl-1.0.2h/ssl/ssl.h
+@@ -2623,6 +2623,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
+ # define SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT 305
+ # define SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN 255
+ # define SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT 288
++# define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_BUFFERED_RECORDS 404
+ # define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE 256
+ # define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD 257
+ # define SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES 258
+Index: openssl-1.0.2h/ssl/ssl_err.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.2h.orig/ssl/ssl_err.c
++++ openssl-1.0.2h/ssl/ssl_err.c
+@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
+ /* ssl/ssl_err.c */
+ /* ====================================================================
+- * Copyright (c) 1999-2015 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -93,6 +93,8 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT), "dtls1_heartbeat"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN), "dtls1_output_cert_chain"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT), "DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT"},
++ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_BUFFERED_RECORDS),
++ "DTLS1_PROCESS_BUFFERED_RECORDS"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE),
+ "DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD), "DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD"},
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2181_p3.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2181_p3.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a752f89
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2181_p3.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From 26aebca74e38ae09f673c2045cc8e2ef762d265a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Wed, 17 Aug 2016 17:55:36 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Update function error code
+
+A function error code needed updating due to merge issues.
+
+Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2016-2181 patch 3
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+---
+ ssl/ssl.h | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+Index: openssl-1.0.2h/ssl/ssl.h
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.2h.orig/ssl/ssl.h
++++ openssl-1.0.2h/ssl/ssl.h
+@@ -2623,7 +2623,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
+ # define SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT 305
+ # define SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN 255
+ # define SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT 288
+-# define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_BUFFERED_RECORDS 404
++# define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_BUFFERED_RECORDS 424
+ # define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE 256
+ # define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD 257
+ # define SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES 258
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb
index 764f1a2..d97b771 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb
@@ -41,6 +41,9 @@ SRC_URI += "file://configure-targets.patch \
file://CVE-2016-2177.patch \
file://CVE-2016-2178.patch \
file://CVE-2016-2180.patch \
+ file://CVE-2016-2181_p1.patch \
+ file://CVE-2016-2181_p2.patch \
+ file://CVE-2016-2181_p3.patch \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "9392e65072ce4b614c1392eefc1f23d0"