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authorArmin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>2016-02-05 08:57:11 -0800
committerJoshua Lock <joshua.g.lock@intel.com>2016-02-29 15:05:16 +0000
commitb8df558ece47e51653e1fc0fb0637ec2cdf2907b (patch)
tree0ac767513190085b296663e7390872fe3d5a4d7c
parent88ba5ea3f3a421ac91d670e450f4b0645a53d733 (diff)
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curl: Security fix CVE-2016-0754
CVE-2016-0754 curl: remote file name path traversal in curl tool for Windows (From OE-Core master rev: b2c9b48dea2fd968c307a809ff95f2e686435222) minor tweak to tool_operate.c to get it to apply Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com> Signed-off-by: Joshua Lock <joshua.g.lock@intel.com>
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2016-0754.patch384
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.40.0.bb3
2 files changed, 386 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2016-0754.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2016-0754.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b4683f435a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2016-0754.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,384 @@
+From b1bb4ca6d8777683b6a549fb61dba36759da26f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ray Satiro <raysatiro@yahoo.com>
+Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2016 23:23:15 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] curl: avoid local drive traversal when saving file (Windows)
+
+curl does not sanitize colons in a remote file name that is used as the
+local file name. This may lead to a vulnerability on systems where the
+colon is a special path character. Currently Windows/DOS is the only OS
+where this vulnerability applies.
+
+CVE-2016-0754
+
+Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20160127B.html
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+http://curl.haxx.se/CVE-2016-0754.patch
+
+CVE: CVE-2016-0754
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+---
+ src/tool_cb_hdr.c | 40 ++++++------
+ src/tool_doswin.c | 174 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
+ src/tool_doswin.h | 2 +-
+ src/tool_operate.c | 29 ++++++---
+ 4 files changed, 187 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-)
+
+Index: curl-7.40.0/src/tool_cb_hdr.c
+===================================================================
+--- curl-7.40.0.orig/src/tool_cb_hdr.c
++++ curl-7.40.0/src/tool_cb_hdr.c
+@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
+ #include "curlx.h"
+
+ #include "tool_cfgable.h"
++#include "tool_doswin.h"
+ #include "tool_msgs.h"
+ #include "tool_cb_hdr.h"
+
+@@ -111,18 +112,24 @@ size_t tool_header_cb(void *ptr, size_t
+ */
+ len = (ssize_t)cb - (p - str);
+ filename = parse_filename(p, len);
+- if(filename) {
+- outs->filename = filename;
+- outs->alloc_filename = TRUE;
+- outs->is_cd_filename = TRUE;
+- outs->s_isreg = TRUE;
+- outs->fopened = FALSE;
+- outs->stream = NULL;
+- hdrcbdata->honor_cd_filename = FALSE;
+- break;
+- }
+- else
++ if(!filename)
++ return failure;
++
++#if defined(MSDOS) || defined(WIN32)
++ if(sanitize_file_name(&filename)) {
++ free(filename);
+ return failure;
++ }
++#endif /* MSDOS || WIN32 */
++
++ outs->filename = filename;
++ outs->alloc_filename = TRUE;
++ outs->is_cd_filename = TRUE;
++ outs->s_isreg = TRUE;
++ outs->fopened = FALSE;
++ outs->stream = NULL;
++ hdrcbdata->honor_cd_filename = FALSE;
++ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+@@ -178,15 +185,12 @@ static char *parse_filename(const char *
+ }
+
+ /* scan for the end letter and stop there */
+- q = p;
+- while(*q) {
+- if(q[1] && (q[0] == '\\'))
+- q++;
+- else if(q[0] == stop)
++ for(q = p; *q; ++q) {
++ if(*q == stop) {
++ *q = '\0';
+ break;
+- q++;
++ }
+ }
+- *q = '\0';
+
+ /* make sure the file name doesn't end in \r or \n */
+ q = strchr(p, '\r');
+Index: curl-7.40.0/src/tool_doswin.c
+===================================================================
+--- curl-7.40.0.orig/src/tool_doswin.c
++++ curl-7.40.0/src/tool_doswin.c
+@@ -85,42 +85,106 @@ __pragma(warning(pop))
+ # include <fcntl.h> /* _use_lfn(f) prototype */
+ #endif
+
+-static const char *msdosify (const char *file_name);
+-static char *rename_if_dos_device_name (char *file_name);
++static char *msdosify(const char *file_name);
++static char *rename_if_dos_device_name(const char *file_name);
+
+-/*
+- * sanitize_dos_name: returns a newly allocated string holding a
+- * valid file name which will be a transformation of given argument
+- * in case this wasn't already a valid file name.
+- *
+- * This function takes ownership of given argument, free'ing it before
+- * returning. Caller is responsible of free'ing returned string. Upon
+- * out of memory condition function returns NULL.
+- */
+
+-char *sanitize_dos_name(char *file_name)
++/*
++Sanitize *file_name.
++Success: (CURLE_OK) *file_name points to a sanitized version of the original.
++ This function takes ownership of the original *file_name and frees it.
++Failure: (!= CURLE_OK) *file_name is unchanged.
++*/
++CURLcode sanitize_file_name(char **file_name)
+ {
+- char new_name[PATH_MAX];
++ size_t len;
++ char *p, *sanitized;
++
++ /* Calculate the maximum length of a filename.
++ FILENAME_MAX is often the same as PATH_MAX, in other words it does not
++ discount the path information. PATH_MAX size is calculated based on:
++ <drive-letter><colon><path-sep><max-filename-len><NULL> */
++ const size_t max_filename_len = PATH_MAX - 3 - 1;
++
++ if(!file_name || !*file_name)
++ return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT;
++
++ len = strlen(*file_name);
++
++ if(len >= max_filename_len)
++ len = max_filename_len - 1;
++
++ sanitized = malloc(len + 1);
+
+- if(!file_name)
+- return NULL;
++ if(!sanitized)
++ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+
+- if(strlen(file_name) >= PATH_MAX)
+- file_name[PATH_MAX-1] = '\0'; /* truncate it */
++ strncpy(sanitized, *file_name, len);
++ sanitized[len] = '\0';
+
+- strcpy(new_name, msdosify(file_name));
++ for(p = sanitized; *p; ++p ) {
++ const char *banned;
++ if(1 <= *p && *p <= 31) {
++ *p = '_';
++ continue;
++ }
++ for(banned = "|<>/\\\":?*"; *banned; ++banned) {
++ if(*p == *banned) {
++ *p = '_';
++ break;
++ }
++ }
++ }
+
+- Curl_safefree(file_name);
++#ifdef MSDOS
++ /* msdosify checks for more banned characters for MSDOS, however it allows
++ for some path information to pass through. since we are sanitizing only a
++ filename and cannot allow a path it's important this call be done in
++ addition to and not instead of the banned character check above. */
++ p = msdosify(sanitized);
++ if(!p) {
++ free(sanitized);
++ return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT;
++ }
++ sanitized = p;
++ len = strlen(sanitized);
++#endif
++
++ p = rename_if_dos_device_name(sanitized);
++ if(!p) {
++ free(sanitized);
++ return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT;
++ }
++ sanitized = p;
++ len = strlen(sanitized);
+
+- return strdup(rename_if_dos_device_name(new_name));
++ /* dos_device_name rename will rename a device name, possibly changing the
++ length. If the length is too long now we can't truncate it because we
++ could end up with a device name. In practice this shouldn't be a problem
++ because device names are short, but you never know. */
++ if(len >= max_filename_len) {
++ free(sanitized);
++ return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT;
++ }
++
++ *file_name = sanitized;
++ return CURLE_OK;
+ }
+
+-/* The following functions are taken with modification from the DJGPP
+- * port of tar 1.12. They use algorithms originally from DJTAR. */
++/* The functions msdosify, rename_if_dos_device_name and __crt0_glob_function
++ * were taken with modification from the DJGPP port of tar 1.12. They use
++ * algorithms originally from DJTAR.
++ */
+
+-static const char *msdosify (const char *file_name)
++/*
++Extra sanitization MSDOS for file_name.
++Returns a copy of file_name that is sanitized by MSDOS standards.
++Warning: path information may pass through. For sanitizing a filename use
++sanitize_file_name which calls this function after sanitizing path info.
++*/
++static char *msdosify(const char *file_name)
+ {
+- static char dos_name[PATH_MAX];
++ char dos_name[PATH_MAX];
+ static const char illegal_chars_dos[] = ".+, ;=[]" /* illegal in DOS */
+ "|<>\\\":?*"; /* illegal in DOS & W95 */
+ static const char *illegal_chars_w95 = &illegal_chars_dos[8];
+@@ -201,15 +265,20 @@ static const char *msdosify (const char
+ }
+
+ *d = '\0';
+- return dos_name;
++ return strdup(dos_name);
+ }
+
+-static char *rename_if_dos_device_name (char *file_name)
++/*
++Rename file_name if it's a representation of a device name.
++Returns a copy of file_name, and the copy will have contents different from the
++original if a device name was found.
++*/
++static char *rename_if_dos_device_name(const char *file_name)
+ {
+ /* We could have a file whose name is a device on MS-DOS. Trying to
+ * retrieve such a file would fail at best and wedge us at worst. We need
+ * to rename such files. */
+- char *base;
++ char *p, *base;
+ struct_stat st_buf;
+ char fname[PATH_MAX];
+
+@@ -219,7 +288,7 @@ static char *rename_if_dos_device_name (
+ if(((stat(base, &st_buf)) == 0) && (S_ISCHR(st_buf.st_mode))) {
+ size_t blen = strlen(base);
+
+- if(strlen(fname) >= PATH_MAX-1) {
++ if(strlen(fname) == PATH_MAX-1) {
+ /* Make room for the '_' */
+ blen--;
+ base[blen] = '\0';
+@@ -227,9 +296,54 @@ static char *rename_if_dos_device_name (
+ /* Prepend a '_'. */
+ memmove(base + 1, base, blen + 1);
+ base[0] = '_';
+- strcpy(file_name, fname);
+ }
+- return file_name;
++
++ /* The above stat check does not identify devices for me in Windows 7. For
++ example a stat on COM1 returns a regular file S_IFREG. According to MSDN
++ stat doc that is the correct behavior, so I assume the above code is
++ legacy, maybe MSDOS or DJGPP specific? */
++
++ /* Rename devices.
++ Examples: CON => _CON, CON.EXT => CON_EXT, CON:ADS => CON_ADS */
++ for(p = fname; p; p = (p == fname && fname != base ? base : NULL)) {
++ size_t p_len;
++ int x = (curl_strnequal(p, "CON", 3) ||
++ curl_strnequal(p, "PRN", 3) ||
++ curl_strnequal(p, "AUX", 3) ||
++ curl_strnequal(p, "NUL", 3)) ? 3 :
++ (curl_strnequal(p, "CLOCK$", 6)) ? 6 :
++ (curl_strnequal(p, "COM", 3) || curl_strnequal(p, "LPT", 3)) ?
++ (('1' <= p[3] && p[3] <= '9') ? 4 : 3) : 0;
++
++ if(!x)
++ continue;
++
++ /* the devices may be accessible with an extension or ADS, for
++ example CON.AIR and CON:AIR both access console */
++ if(p[x] == '.' || p[x] == ':') {
++ p[x] = '_';
++ continue;
++ }
++ else if(p[x]) /* no match */
++ continue;
++
++ p_len = strlen(p);
++
++ if(strlen(fname) == PATH_MAX-1) {
++ /* Make room for the '_' */
++ p_len--;
++ p[p_len] = '\0';
++ }
++ /* Prepend a '_'. */
++ memmove(p + 1, p, p_len + 1);
++ p[0] = '_';
++
++ /* if fname was just modified then the basename pointer must be updated */
++ if(p == fname)
++ base = basename(fname);
++ }
++
++ return strdup(fname);
+ }
+
+ #if defined(MSDOS) && (defined(__DJGPP__) || defined(__GO32__))
+Index: curl-7.40.0/src/tool_doswin.h
+===================================================================
+--- curl-7.40.0.orig/src/tool_doswin.h
++++ curl-7.40.0/src/tool_doswin.h
+@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
+
+ #if defined(MSDOS) || defined(WIN32)
+
+-char *sanitize_dos_name(char *file_name);
++CURLcode sanitize_file_name(char **filename);
+
+ #if defined(MSDOS) && (defined(__DJGPP__) || defined(__GO32__))
+
+Index: curl-7.40.0/src/tool_operate.c
+===================================================================
+--- curl-7.40.0.orig/src/tool_operate.c
++++ curl-7.40.0/src/tool_operate.c
+@@ -543,26 +543,37 @@ static CURLcode operate_do(struct Global
+ result = get_url_file_name(&outfile, this_url);
+ if(result)
+ goto show_error;
++
++#if defined(MSDOS) || defined(WIN32)
++ result = sanitize_file_name(&outfile);
++ if(result) {
++ Curl_safefree(outfile);
++ goto show_error;
++ }
++#endif /* MSDOS || WIN32 */
++
+ if(!*outfile && !config->content_disposition) {
+ helpf(global->errors, "Remote file name has no length!\n");
+ result = CURLE_WRITE_ERROR;
+ goto quit_urls;
+ }
+-#if defined(MSDOS) || defined(WIN32)
+- /* For DOS and WIN32, we do some major replacing of
+- bad characters in the file name before using it */
+- outfile = sanitize_dos_name(outfile);
+- if(!outfile) {
+- result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+- goto show_error;
+- }
+-#endif /* MSDOS || WIN32 */
+ }
+ else if(urls) {
+ /* fill '#1' ... '#9' terms from URL pattern */
+ char *storefile = outfile;
+ result = glob_match_url(&outfile, storefile, urls);
+ Curl_safefree(storefile);
++
++#if defined(MSDOS) || defined(WIN32)
++ if(!result) {
++ result = sanitize_file_name(&outfile);
++ if(result) {
++ Curl_safefree(outfile);
++ goto show_error;
++ }
++ }
++#endif /* MSDOS || WIN32 */
++
+ if(result) {
+ /* bad globbing */
+ warnf(config, "bad output glob!\n");
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.40.0.bb b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.40.0.bb
index e6a6a42ea1..01c201e18a 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.40.0.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.40.0.bb
@@ -16,7 +16,8 @@ SRC_URI = "http://curl.haxx.se/download/curl-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
# curl likes to set -g0 in CFLAGS, so we stop it
# from mucking around with debug options
#
-SRC_URI += " file://configure_ac.patch"
+SRC_URI += " file://configure_ac.patch \
+ file://CVE-2016-0754.patch"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "8d30594212e65657a5c32030f0998fa9"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "899109eb3900fa6b8a2f995df7f449964292776a04763e94fae640700f883fba"