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authorPaul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>2014-06-09 16:53:45 +0100
committerRichard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>2014-06-10 17:05:53 +0100
commit6506f8993c84b966642ef857bb15cf96eada32e8 (patch)
tree75bc3360b616ada9641fbe533b07dd08e522eecc
parent21fa437a37dad14145b6c8c8c16c95f1b074e09c (diff)
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openssl: fix CVE-2014-0221
http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140605.txt DTLS recursion flaw (CVE-2014-0221) By sending an invalid DTLS handshake to an OpenSSL DTLS client the code can be made to recurse eventually crashing in a DoS attack. Only applications using OpenSSL as a DTLS client are affected. (Patch borrowed from Fedora.) Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch38
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb1
2 files changed, 39 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bf730a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+commit d30e582446b027868cdabd0994681643682045a4
+Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
+Date: Fri May 16 13:00:45 2014 +0100
+
+ Fix CVE-2014-0221
+
+ Unnecessary recursion when receiving a DTLS hello request can be used to
+ crash a DTLS client. Fixed by handling DTLS hello request without recursion.
+
+ Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue.
+
+Patch borrowed from Fedora
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
+
+diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
+index 07f67f8..4c2fd03 100644
+--- a/ssl/d1_both.c
++++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
+@@ -793,6 +793,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
+ int i,al;
+ struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
+
++ redo:
+ /* see if we have the required fragment already */
+ if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s,max,ok)) || *ok)
+ {
+@@ -851,8 +852,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
+ s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ s->init_num = 0;
+- return dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn,
+- max, ok);
++ goto redo;
+ }
+ else /* Incorrectly formated Hello request */
+ {
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb
index 38cdb3f..dc77330 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://configure-targets.patch \
file://CVE-2014-0160.patch \
file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch \
file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0198.patch \
+ file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "66bf6f10f060d561929de96f9dfe5b8c"