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Upstream-Status: Backport
Signed-off-by: Kai Kang <kai.kang@windriver.com>
From b38ec5ee7a581776bbce0bdaecb397632c3c4791 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2015 15:07:00 +0000
Subject: xen/MSI-X: limit error messages
Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/787547
Limit error messages resulting from bad guest behavior to avoid allowing
the guest to cause the control domain's disk to fill.
The first message in pci_msix_write() can simply be deleted, as this
is indeed bad guest behavior, but such out of bounds writes don't
really need to be logged.
The second one is more problematic, as there guest behavior may only
appear to be wrong: For one, the old logic didn't take the mask-all bit
into account. And then this shouldn't depend on host device state (i.e.
the host may have masked the entry without the guest having done so).
Plus these writes shouldn't be dropped even when an entry is unmasked.
Instead, if they can't be made take effect right away, they should take
effect on the next unmasking or enabling operation - the specification
explicitly describes such caching behavior. Until we can validly drop
the message (implementing such caching/latching behavior), issue the
message just once per MSI-X table entry.
Note that the log message in pci_msix_read() similar to the one being
removed here is not an issue: "addr" being of unsigned type, and the
maximum size of the MSI-X table being 32k, entry_nr simply can't be
negative and hence the conditonal guarding issuing of the message will
never be true.
This is XSA-130.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
---
hw/xen/xen_pt.h | 1 +
hw/xen/xen_pt_msi.c | 12 +++++++-----
2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt.h b/hw/xen/xen_pt.h
index 52ceb85..8c9b6c2 100644
--- a/hw/xen/xen_pt.h
+++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt.h
@@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ typedef struct XenPTMSIXEntry {
uint32_t data;
uint32_t vector_ctrl;
bool updated; /* indicate whether MSI ADDR or DATA is updated */
+ bool warned; /* avoid issuing (bogus) warning more than once */
} XenPTMSIXEntry;
typedef struct XenPTMSIX {
uint32_t ctrl_offset;
diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt_msi.c b/hw/xen/xen_pt_msi.c
index 9ed9321..68db623 100644
--- a/hw/xen/xen_pt_msi.c
+++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt_msi.c
@@ -434,11 +434,10 @@ static void pci_msix_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
XenPCIPassthroughState *s = opaque;
XenPTMSIX *msix = s->msix;
XenPTMSIXEntry *entry;
- int entry_nr, offset;
+ unsigned int entry_nr, offset;
entry_nr = addr / PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_SIZE;
- if (entry_nr < 0 || entry_nr >= msix->total_entries) {
- XEN_PT_ERR(&s->dev, "asked MSI-X entry '%i' invalid!\n", entry_nr);
+ if (entry_nr >= msix->total_entries) {
return;
}
entry = &msix->msix_entry[entry_nr];
@@ -460,8 +459,11 @@ static void pci_msix_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
+ PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_VECTOR_CTRL;
if (msix->enabled && !(*vec_ctrl & PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_CTRL_MASKBIT)) {
- XEN_PT_ERR(&s->dev, "Can't update msix entry %d since MSI-X is"
- " already enabled.\n", entry_nr);
+ if (!entry->warned) {
+ entry->warned = true;
+ XEN_PT_ERR(&s->dev, "Can't update msix entry %d since MSI-X is"
+ " already enabled.\n", entry_nr);
+ }
return;
}
--
2.1.4
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