From fdc89e90fac40c5ca2686733df17b6423fb8d8fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jason Wang Date: Wed, 30 May 2018 13:08:15 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] ne2000: fix possible out of bound access in ne2000_receive In ne2000_receive(), we try to assign size_ to size which converts from size_t to integer. This will cause troubles when size_ is greater INT_MAX, this will lead a negative value in size and it can then pass the check of size < MIN_BUF_SIZE which may lead out of bound access of for both buf and buf1. Fixing by converting the type of size to size_t. CC: qemu-stable@nongnu.org Reported-by: Daniel Shapira Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Signed-off-by: Jason Wang Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff ;h=fdc89e90fac40c5ca2686733df17b6423fb8d8fb#patch1] CVE: CVE-2018-10839 CVE-2018-17958 Signed-off-by: Changqing Li --- hw/net/ne2000.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/hw/net/ne2000.c b/hw/net/ne2000.c index 07d79e3..869518e 100644 --- a/hw/net/ne2000.c +++ b/hw/net/ne2000.c @@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ static int ne2000_buffer_full(NE2000State *s) ssize_t ne2000_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size_) { NE2000State *s = qemu_get_nic_opaque(nc); - int size = size_; + size_t size = size_; uint8_t *p; unsigned int total_len, next, avail, len, index, mcast_idx; uint8_t buf1[60]; @@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ ssize_t ne2000_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size_) { 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff }; #if defined(DEBUG_NE2000) - printf("NE2000: received len=%d\n", size); + printf("NE2000: received len=%zu\n", size); #endif if (s->cmd & E8390_STOP || ne2000_buffer_full(s)) -- 1.8.3.1