From e4b6a39bdf1b660233a7145599cd4fc3e971fc8f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Tran Date: Fri, 20 Sep 2019 18:46:57 +0000 Subject: qemu: Fix 4 CVEs Fixes CVE-2018-18954, CVE-2019-3812, CVE-2019-6778, and CVE-2019-8934. Also deleted duplicated patch and cleanup. Signed-off-by: Dan Tran [fixup for thud-next] Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster --- .../qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-10839.patch | 2 +- .../qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-17958.patch | 52 ----- .../qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-18954.patch | 50 +++++ .../recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2019-3812.patch | 39 ++++ .../recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2019-6778.patch | 41 ++++ .../recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2019-8934.patch | 215 +++++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu_3.0.0.bb | 6 +- 7 files changed, 351 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-17958.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-18954.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2019-3812.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2019-6778.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2019-8934.patch diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-10839.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-10839.patch index 7e1e442a41..81607c9505 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-10839.patch +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-10839.patch @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Jason Wang Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff ;h=fdc89e90fac40c5ca2686733df17b6423fb8d8fb#patch1] -CVE: CVE-2018-10839 +CVE: CVE-2018-10839 CVE-2018-17958 Signed-off-by: Changqing Li --- diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-17958.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-17958.patch deleted file mode 100644 index af40ff275a..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-17958.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,52 +0,0 @@ -From 06e88ca78d056ea4de885e3a1496805179dc47bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Changqing Li -Date: Mon, 15 Oct 2018 16:33:04 +0800 -Subject: [PATCH] ne2000: fix possible out of bound access in ne2000_receive - -In ne2000_receive(), we try to assign size_ to size which converts -from size_t to integer. This will cause troubles when size_ is greater -INT_MAX, this will lead a negative value in size and it can then pass -the check of size < MIN_BUF_SIZE which may lead out of bound access of -for both buf and buf1. - -Fixing by converting the type of size to size_t. - -CC: address@hidden -Reported-by: Daniel Shapira -Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin -Signed-off-by: Jason Wang - -Upstream-Status: Backport [https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2018-09/msg03273.html] - -CVE: CVE-2018-17958 - -Signed-off-by: Changqing Li ---- - hw/net/ne2000.c | 4 ++-- - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/hw/net/ne2000.c b/hw/net/ne2000.c -index 07d79e3..869518e 100644 ---- a/hw/net/ne2000.c -+++ b/hw/net/ne2000.c -@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ static int ne2000_buffer_full(NE2000State *s) - ssize_t ne2000_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size_) - { - NE2000State *s = qemu_get_nic_opaque(nc); -- int size = size_; -+ size_t size = size_; - uint8_t *p; - unsigned int total_len, next, avail, len, index, mcast_idx; - uint8_t buf1[60]; -@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ ssize_t ne2000_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size_) - { 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff }; - - #if defined(DEBUG_NE2000) -- printf("NE2000: received len=%d\n", size); -+ printf("NE2000: received len=%zu\n", size); - #endif - - if (s->cmd & E8390_STOP || ne2000_buffer_full(s)) --- -2.7.4 - diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-18954.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-18954.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9fe136455f --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-18954.patch @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +From 3c9fd43da473a324f6cc7a0d3db58f651a2d262c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Prasad J Pandit +Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2018 18:03:58 +0530 +Subject: [PATCH] ppc/pnv: check size before data buffer access +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +While performing PowerNV memory r/w operations, the access length +'sz' could exceed the data[4] buffer size. Add check to avoid OOB +access. + +Reported-by: Moguofang +Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit +Reviewed-by: Cédric Le Goater +Signed-off-by: David Gibson + +CVE: CVE-2018-18954 +Upstream-Status: Backport +[https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=d07945e78eb6b593cd17a4640c1fc9eb35e3245d] + +Signed-off-by: Dan Tran +--- + hw/ppc/pnv_lpc.c | 8 +++++++- + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/hw/ppc/pnv_lpc.c b/hw/ppc/pnv_lpc.c +index d7721320a2..172a915cfc 100644 +--- a/hw/ppc/pnv_lpc.c ++++ b/hw/ppc/pnv_lpc.c +@@ -155,9 +155,15 @@ static void pnv_lpc_do_eccb(PnvLpcController *lpc, uint64_t cmd) + /* XXX Check for magic bits at the top, addr size etc... */ + unsigned int sz = (cmd & ECCB_CTL_SZ_MASK) >> ECCB_CTL_SZ_LSH; + uint32_t opb_addr = cmd & ECCB_CTL_ADDR_MASK; +- uint8_t data[4]; ++ uint8_t data[8]; + bool success; + ++ if (sz > sizeof(data)) { ++ qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, ++ "ECCB: invalid operation at @0x%08x size %d\n", opb_addr, sz); ++ return; ++ } ++ + if (cmd & ECCB_CTL_READ) { + success = opb_read(lpc, opb_addr, data, sz); + if (success) { +-- +2.22.0.vfs.1.1.57.gbaf16c8 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2019-3812.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2019-3812.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0e11ad288c --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2019-3812.patch @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From b664d9d003d1a98642dcfb8e6fceef6dbf3d52d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Gerd Hoffmann +Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2019 11:23:01 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] i2c-ddc: fix oob read +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +Suggested-by: Michael Hanselmann +Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann +Reviewed-by: Michael Hanselmann +Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +Message-id: 20190108102301.1957-1-kraxel@redhat.com + +CVE: CVE-2019-3812 +Upstream-Status: Backport +[https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=b05b267840515730dbf6753495d5b7bd8b04ad1c] + +Signed-off-by: Dan Tran +--- + hw/i2c/i2c-ddc.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/hw/i2c/i2c-ddc.c b/hw/i2c/i2c-ddc.c +index bec0c91e2d..89e659288e 100644 +--- a/hw/i2c/i2c-ddc.c ++++ b/hw/i2c/i2c-ddc.c +@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ static int i2c_ddc_rx(I2CSlave *i2c) + I2CDDCState *s = I2CDDC(i2c); + + int value; +- value = s->edid_blob[s->reg]; ++ value = s->edid_blob[s->reg % sizeof(s->edid_blob)]; + s->reg++; + return value; + } +-- +2.22.0.vfs.1.1.57.gbaf16c8 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2019-6778.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2019-6778.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5b14596042 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2019-6778.patch @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +From b6c0fa3b435375918714e107b22de2ef13a41c26 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Prasad J Pandit +Date: Sun, 13 Jan 2019 23:29:48 +0530 +Subject: [PATCH] slirp: check data length while emulating ident function + +While emulating identification protocol, tcp_emu() does not check +available space in the 'sc_rcv->sb_data' buffer. It could lead to +heap buffer overflow issue. Add check to avoid it. + +Reported-by: Kira <864786842@qq.com> +Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit +Signed-off-by: Samuel Thibault + +CVE: CVE-2019-6778 +Upstream-Status: Backport +[https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=a7104eda7dab99d0cdbd3595c211864cba415905] + +Signed-off-by: Dan Tran +--- + slirp/tcp_subr.c | 5 +++++ + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/slirp/tcp_subr.c b/slirp/tcp_subr.c +index 8d0f94b75f..7277aadfdf 100644 +--- a/slirp/tcp_subr.c ++++ b/slirp/tcp_subr.c +@@ -640,6 +640,11 @@ tcp_emu(struct socket *so, struct mbuf *m) + socklen_t addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); + struct sbuf *so_rcv = &so->so_rcv; + ++ if (m->m_len > so_rcv->sb_datalen ++ - (so_rcv->sb_wptr - so_rcv->sb_data)) { ++ return 1; ++ } ++ + memcpy(so_rcv->sb_wptr, m->m_data, m->m_len); + so_rcv->sb_wptr += m->m_len; + so_rcv->sb_rptr += m->m_len; +-- +2.22.0.vfs.1.1.57.gbaf16c8 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2019-8934.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2019-8934.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..db3201c505 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2019-8934.patch @@ -0,0 +1,215 @@ +From 13e153f01b4f2a3e199202b34a247d83c176f21a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Prasad J Pandit +Date: Mon, 18 Feb 2019 23:43:49 +0530 +Subject: [PATCH] ppc: add host-serial and host-model machine attributes + (CVE-2019-8934) +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +On ppc hosts, hypervisor shares following system attributes + + - /proc/device-tree/system-id + - /proc/device-tree/model + +with a guest. This could lead to information leakage and misuse.[*] +Add machine attributes to control such system information exposure +to a guest. + +[*] https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0028 + +Reported-by: Daniel P. Berrangé +Fix-suggested-by: Daniel P. Berrangé +Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit +Message-Id: <20190218181349.23885-1-ppandit@redhat.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé +Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz +Signed-off-by: David Gibson + +CVE: CVE-2019-8934 +Upstream-Status: Backport +[https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/27461d69a0f108dea756419251acc3ea65198f1b] + +Signed-off-by: Dan Tran +--- + hw/ppc/spapr.c | 128 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- + include/hw/ppc/spapr.h | 2 + + 2 files changed, 123 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/hw/ppc/spapr.c b/hw/ppc/spapr.c +index 421b2dd09b..069d678ee0 100644 +--- a/hw/ppc/spapr.c ++++ b/hw/ppc/spapr.c +@@ -1266,13 +1266,30 @@ static void *spapr_build_fdt(sPAPRMachineState *spapr, + * Add info to guest to indentify which host is it being run on + * and what is the uuid of the guest + */ +- if (kvmppc_get_host_model(&buf)) { +- _FDT(fdt_setprop_string(fdt, 0, "host-model", buf)); +- g_free(buf); ++ if (spapr->host_model && !g_str_equal(spapr->host_model, "none")) { ++ if (g_str_equal(spapr->host_model, "passthrough")) { ++ /* -M host-model=passthrough */ ++ if (kvmppc_get_host_model(&buf)) { ++ _FDT(fdt_setprop_string(fdt, 0, "host-model", buf)); ++ g_free(buf); ++ } ++ } else { ++ /* -M host-model= */ ++ _FDT(fdt_setprop_string(fdt, 0, "host-model", spapr->host_model)); ++ } + } +- if (kvmppc_get_host_serial(&buf)) { +- _FDT(fdt_setprop_string(fdt, 0, "host-serial", buf)); +- g_free(buf); ++ ++ if (spapr->host_serial && !g_str_equal(spapr->host_serial, "none")) { ++ if (g_str_equal(spapr->host_serial, "passthrough")) { ++ /* -M host-serial=passthrough */ ++ if (kvmppc_get_host_serial(&buf)) { ++ _FDT(fdt_setprop_string(fdt, 0, "host-serial", buf)); ++ g_free(buf); ++ } ++ } else { ++ /* -M host-serial= */ ++ _FDT(fdt_setprop_string(fdt, 0, "host-serial", spapr->host_serial)); ++ } + } + + buf = qemu_uuid_unparse_strdup(&qemu_uuid); +@@ -3027,6 +3044,73 @@ static void spapr_set_vsmt(Object *obj, Visitor *v, const char *name, + visit_type_uint32(v, name, (uint32_t *)opaque, errp); + } + ++static char *spapr_get_ic_mode(Object *obj, Error **errp) ++{ ++ sPAPRMachineState *spapr = SPAPR_MACHINE(obj); ++ ++ if (spapr->irq == &spapr_irq_xics_legacy) { ++ return g_strdup("legacy"); ++ } else if (spapr->irq == &spapr_irq_xics) { ++ return g_strdup("xics"); ++ } else if (spapr->irq == &spapr_irq_xive) { ++ return g_strdup("xive"); ++ } else if (spapr->irq == &spapr_irq_dual) { ++ return g_strdup("dual"); ++ } ++ g_assert_not_reached(); ++} ++ ++static void spapr_set_ic_mode(Object *obj, const char *value, Error **errp) ++{ ++ sPAPRMachineState *spapr = SPAPR_MACHINE(obj); ++ ++ if (SPAPR_MACHINE_GET_CLASS(spapr)->legacy_irq_allocation) { ++ error_setg(errp, "This machine only uses the legacy XICS backend, don't pass ic-mode"); ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ /* The legacy IRQ backend can not be set */ ++ if (strcmp(value, "xics") == 0) { ++ spapr->irq = &spapr_irq_xics; ++ } else if (strcmp(value, "xive") == 0) { ++ spapr->irq = &spapr_irq_xive; ++ } else if (strcmp(value, "dual") == 0) { ++ spapr->irq = &spapr_irq_dual; ++ } else { ++ error_setg(errp, "Bad value for \"ic-mode\" property"); ++ } ++} ++ ++static char *spapr_get_host_model(Object *obj, Error **errp) ++{ ++ sPAPRMachineState *spapr = SPAPR_MACHINE(obj); ++ ++ return g_strdup(spapr->host_model); ++} ++ ++static void spapr_set_host_model(Object *obj, const char *value, Error **errp) ++{ ++ sPAPRMachineState *spapr = SPAPR_MACHINE(obj); ++ ++ g_free(spapr->host_model); ++ spapr->host_model = g_strdup(value); ++} ++ ++static char *spapr_get_host_serial(Object *obj, Error **errp) ++{ ++ sPAPRMachineState *spapr = SPAPR_MACHINE(obj); ++ ++ return g_strdup(spapr->host_serial); ++} ++ ++static void spapr_set_host_serial(Object *obj, const char *value, Error **errp) ++{ ++ sPAPRMachineState *spapr = SPAPR_MACHINE(obj); ++ ++ g_free(spapr->host_serial); ++ spapr->host_serial = g_strdup(value); ++} ++ + static void spapr_instance_init(Object *obj) + { + sPAPRMachineState *spapr = SPAPR_MACHINE(obj); +@@ -3063,6 +3147,25 @@ static void spapr_instance_init(Object *obj) + " the host's SMT mode", &error_abort); + object_property_add_bool(obj, "vfio-no-msix-emulation", + spapr_get_msix_emulation, NULL, NULL); ++ ++ /* The machine class defines the default interrupt controller mode */ ++ spapr->irq = smc->irq; ++ object_property_add_str(obj, "ic-mode", spapr_get_ic_mode, ++ spapr_set_ic_mode, NULL); ++ object_property_set_description(obj, "ic-mode", ++ "Specifies the interrupt controller mode (xics, xive, dual)", ++ NULL); ++ ++ object_property_add_str(obj, "host-model", ++ spapr_get_host_model, spapr_set_host_model, ++ &error_abort); ++ object_property_set_description(obj, "host-model", ++ "Set host's model-id to use - none|passthrough|string", &error_abort); ++ object_property_add_str(obj, "host-serial", ++ spapr_get_host_serial, spapr_set_host_serial, ++ &error_abort); ++ object_property_set_description(obj, "host-serial", ++ "Set host's system-id to use - none|passthrough|string", &error_abort); + } + + static void spapr_machine_finalizefn(Object *obj) +@@ -4067,7 +4170,18 @@ static void spapr_machine_3_0_instance_options(MachineState *machine) + + static void spapr_machine_3_0_class_options(MachineClass *mc) + { +- /* Defaults for the latest behaviour inherited from the base class */ ++ sPAPRMachineClass *smc = SPAPR_MACHINE_CLASS(mc); ++ static GlobalProperty compat[] = { ++ { TYPE_SPAPR_MACHINE, "host-model", "passthrough" }, ++ { TYPE_SPAPR_MACHINE, "host-serial", "passthrough" }, ++ }; ++ ++ spapr_machine_4_0_class_options(mc); ++ compat_props_add(mc->compat_props, hw_compat_3_1, hw_compat_3_1_len); ++ compat_props_add(mc->compat_props, compat, G_N_ELEMENTS(compat)); ++ ++ mc->default_cpu_type = POWERPC_CPU_TYPE_NAME("power8_v2.0"); ++ smc->update_dt_enabled = false; + } + + DEFINE_SPAPR_MACHINE(3_0, "3.0", true); +diff --git a/include/hw/ppc/spapr.h b/include/hw/ppc/spapr.h +index 7e5de1a6fd..4c69a55374 100644 +--- a/include/hw/ppc/spapr.h ++++ b/include/hw/ppc/spapr.h +@@ -165,6 +165,8 @@ struct sPAPRMachineState { + + /*< public >*/ + char *kvm_type; ++ char *host_model; ++ char *host_serial; + + const char *icp_type; + +-- +2.22.0.vfs.1.1.57.gbaf16c8 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu_3.0.0.bb b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu_3.0.0.bb index f02e3120cc..6c3049b40e 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu_3.0.0.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu_3.0.0.bb @@ -21,8 +21,8 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \ file://0009-apic-fixup-fallthrough-to-PIC.patch \ file://0010-linux-user-Fix-webkitgtk-hangs-on-32-bit-x86-target.patch \ file://0011-Revert-linux-user-fix-mmap-munmap-mprotect-mremap-sh.patch \ + file://CVE-2018-10839.patch\ file://CVE-2018-15746.patch \ - file://CVE-2018-17958.patch \ file://CVE-2018-17962.patch \ file://CVE-2018-17963.patch \ file://CVE-2018-16867.patch \ @@ -36,6 +36,10 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \ file://CVE-2018-20815_p2.patch \ file://CVE-2019-9824.patch \ file://0014-linux-user-fix-to-handle-variably-sized-SIOCGSTAMP-w.patch \ + file://CVE-2018-18954.patch \ + file://CVE-2019-3812.patch \ + file://CVE-2019-6778.patch \ + file://CVE-2019-8934.patch \ " UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar" -- cgit 1.2.3-korg