From 9db41b45beae7224ba928f9267046f1b6a8288a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhixiong Chi Date: Thu, 22 Sep 2016 15:54:27 +0800 Subject: wpa_supplicant: Security Advisory-CVE-2016-4477 Add CVE-2016-4477 patch for avoiding \n and \r characters in passphrase parameters, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (daemon outage) via a crafted WPS operation. Patches came from http://w1.fi/security/2016-1/ (From OE-Core rev: d4d4ed5f31c687b2b2b716ff0fb8ca6c7aa29853) Signed-off-by: Zhixiong Chi Signed-off-by: Ross Burton Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster --- ...parameter-set-with-invalid-passphrase-cha.patch | 55 ++++++++++++++++++ ...CRED-commands-with-newline-characters-in-.patch | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++ ...commands-with-newline-characters-in-the-s.patch | 54 ++++++++++++++++++ .../wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.5.bb | 3 + 4 files changed, 178 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-Reject-psk-parameter-set-with-invalid-passphrase-cha.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0002-Reject-SET_CRED-commands-with-newline-characters-in-.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0003-Reject-SET-commands-with-newline-characters-in-the-s.patch diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-Reject-psk-parameter-set-with-invalid-passphrase-cha.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-Reject-psk-parameter-set-with-invalid-passphrase-cha.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..dd7d5f7267 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-Reject-psk-parameter-set-with-invalid-passphrase-cha.patch @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +From 73e4abb24a936014727924d8b0b2965edfc117dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2016 18:46:41 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 1/3] Reject psk parameter set with invalid passphrase + character + +WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase is not allowed to include control +characters. Reject a passphrase configuration attempt if that passphrase +includes an invalid passphrase. + +This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the +configuration file psk parameter with arbitrary data from the control +interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be +accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that +an untrusted user has access to a management software component that +does not validate the passphrase value before passing it to +wpa_supplicant. + +This could allow such an untrusted user to inject up to 63 characters of +almost arbitrary data into the configuration file. Such configuration +file could result in wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., +opensc_engine_path, pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, +load_dynamic_eap) from user controlled location when starting again. +This would allow code from that library to be executed under the +wpa_supplicant process privileges. + +Upstream-Status: Backport + +CVE: CVE-2016-4477 + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +Signed-off-by: Zhixiong Chi +--- + wpa_supplicant/config.c | 6 ++++++ + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c +index b1c7870..fdd9643 100644 +--- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c +@@ -478,6 +478,12 @@ static int wpa_config_parse_psk(const struct parse_data *data, + } + wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PSK (ASCII passphrase)", + (u8 *) value, len); ++ if (has_ctrl_char((u8 *) value, len)) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, ++ "Line %d: Invalid passphrase character", ++ line); ++ return -1; ++ } + if (ssid->passphrase && os_strlen(ssid->passphrase) == len && + os_memcmp(ssid->passphrase, value, len) == 0) { + /* No change to the previously configured value */ +-- +1.9.1 diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0002-Reject-SET_CRED-commands-with-newline-characters-in-.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0002-Reject-SET_CRED-commands-with-newline-characters-in-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cad7425c36 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0002-Reject-SET_CRED-commands-with-newline-characters-in-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +From b166cd84a77a6717be9600bf95378a0055d6f5a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2016 23:33:10 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 2/3] Reject SET_CRED commands with newline characters in the + string values + +Most of the cred block parameters are written as strings without +filtering and if there is an embedded newline character in the value, +unexpected configuration file data might be written. + +This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the +configuration file cred parameter with arbitrary data from the control +interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be +accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that +an untrusted user has access to a management software component that +does not validate the credential value before passing it to +wpa_supplicant. + +This could allow such an untrusted user to inject almost arbitrary data +into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in +wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path, +pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user +controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that +library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges. + +Upstream-Status: Backport + +CVE: CVE-2016-4477 + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +Signed-off-by: Zhixiong Chi +--- + wpa_supplicant/config.c | 9 ++++++++- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c +index eb97cd5..69152ef 100644 +--- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c +@@ -2896,6 +2896,8 @@ int wpa_config_set_cred(struct wpa_cred *cred, const char *var, + + if (os_strcmp(var, "password") == 0 && + os_strncmp(value, "ext:", 4) == 0) { ++ if (has_newline(value)) ++ return -1; + str_clear_free(cred->password); + cred->password = os_strdup(value); + cred->ext_password = 1; +@@ -2946,9 +2948,14 @@ int wpa_config_set_cred(struct wpa_cred *cred, const char *var, + } + + val = wpa_config_parse_string(value, &len); +- if (val == NULL) { ++ if (val == NULL || ++ (os_strcmp(var, "excluded_ssid") != 0 && ++ os_strcmp(var, "roaming_consortium") != 0 && ++ os_strcmp(var, "required_roaming_consortium") != 0 && ++ has_newline(val))) { + wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Line %d: invalid field '%s' string " + "value '%s'.", line, var, value); ++ os_free(val); + return -1; + } + +-- +1.9.1 diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0003-Reject-SET-commands-with-newline-characters-in-the-s.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0003-Reject-SET-commands-with-newline-characters-in-the-s.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5375db74b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0003-Reject-SET-commands-with-newline-characters-in-the-s.patch @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +From 2a3f56502b52375c3bf113cf92adfa99bad6b488 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2016 23:55:48 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Reject SET commands with newline characters in the + string values + +Many of the global configuration parameters are written as strings +without filtering and if there is an embedded newline character in the +value, unexpected configuration file data might be written. + +This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the +configuration file global parameter with arbitrary data from the control +interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be +accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that +an untrusted user has access to a management software component that +does not validate the value of a parameter before passing it to +wpa_supplicant. + +This could allow such an untrusted user to inject almost arbitrary data +into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in +wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path, +pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user +controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that +library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges. + +Upstream-Status: Backport + +CVE: CVE-2016-4477 + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +Signed-off-by: Zhixiong Chi +--- + wpa_supplicant/config.c | 6 ++++++ + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c +index 69152ef..d9a1603 100644 +--- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c +@@ -3764,6 +3764,12 @@ static int wpa_global_config_parse_str(const struct global_parse_data *data, + return -1; + } + ++ if (has_newline(pos)) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Line %d: invalid %s value with newline", ++ line, data->name); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ + tmp = os_strdup(pos); + if (tmp == NULL) + return -1; +-- +1.9.1 diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.5.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.5.bb index bfcc6cca63..a4160e1c5c 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.5.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.5.bb @@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ SRC_URI = "http://w1.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://99_wpa_supplicant \ file://0001-WPS-Reject-a-Credential-with-invalid-passphrase.patch \ file://0002-Remove-newlines-from-wpa_supplicant-config-network-o.patch \ + file://0001-Reject-psk-parameter-set-with-invalid-passphrase-cha.patch \ + file://0002-Reject-SET_CRED-commands-with-newline-characters-in-.patch \ + file://0003-Reject-SET-commands-with-newline-characters-in-the-s.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "96ff75c3a514f1f324560a2376f13110" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "cce55bae483b364eae55c35ba567c279be442ed8bab5b80a3c7fb0d057b9b316" -- cgit 1.2.3-korg