1 files changed, 0 insertions, 63 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.7/CVE-2013-4242.patch b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.7/CVE-2013-4242.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index f0667741c8..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.7/CVE-2013-4242.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-From e2202ff2b704623efc6277fb5256e4e15bac5676 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
-Date: Thu, 25 Jul 2013 11:17:52 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Mitigate a flush+reload cache attack on RSA secret
- exponents.
-
-commit e2202ff2b704623efc6277fb5256e4e15bac5676 from
-git://git.gnupg.org/libgcrypt.git
-
-* mpi/mpi-pow.c (gcry_mpi_powm): Always perfrom the mpi_mul for
-exponents in secure memory.
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-CVE: CVE-2013-4242
-
-Signed-off-by: Kai Kang <kai.kang@windriver.com>
---
-
-The attack is published as http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/448 :
-
-Flush+Reload: a High Resolution, Low Noise, L3 Cache Side-Channel
-Attack by Yuval Yarom and Katrina Falkner. 18 July 2013.
-
-  Flush+Reload is a cache side-channel attack that monitors access to
-  data in shared pages. In this paper we demonstrate how to use the
-  attack to extract private encryption keys from GnuPG.  The high
-  resolution and low noise of the Flush+Reload attack enables a spy
-  program to recover over 98% of the bits of the private key in a
-  single decryption or signing round. Unlike previous attacks, the
-  attack targets the last level L3 cache. Consequently, the spy
-  program and the victim do not need to share the execution core of
-  the CPU. The attack is not limited to a traditional OS and can be
-  used in a virtualised environment, where it can attack programs
-  executing in a different VM.
-
-Index: gnupg-1.4.7/mpi/mpi-pow.c
-===================================================================
---- gnupg-1.4.7.orig/mpi/mpi-pow.c
-+++ gnupg-1.4.7/mpi/mpi-pow.c
-@@ -212,7 +212,13 @@ mpi_powm( MPI res, MPI base, MPI exponen
- 		tp = rp; rp = xp; xp = tp;
- 		rsize = xsize;
- 
--		if( (mpi_limb_signed_t)e < 0 ) {
-+            /* To mitigate the Yarom/Falkner flush+reload cache
-+             * side-channel attack on the RSA secret exponent, we do
-+             * the multiplication regardless of the value of the
-+             * high-bit of E.  But to avoid this performance penalty
-+             * we do it only if the exponent has been stored in secure
-+             * memory and we can thus assume it is a secret exponent.  */
-+		if (esec || (mpi_limb_signed_t)e < 0) {
- 		    /*mpihelp_mul( xp, rp, rsize, bp, bsize );*/
- 		    if( bsize < KARATSUBA_THRESHOLD ) {
- 			mpihelp_mul( xp, rp, rsize, bp, bsize );
-@@ -227,6 +233,8 @@ mpi_powm( MPI res, MPI base, MPI exponen
- 			mpihelp_divrem(xp + msize, 0, xp, xsize, mp, msize);
- 			xsize = msize;
- 		    }
-+		}
-+		if ( (mpi_limb_signed_t)e < 0 ) {
- 
- 		    tp = rp; rp = xp; xp = tp;
- 		    rsize = xsize;