diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive')
| -rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2017-14166.patch | 37 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/bug929.patch | 38 |
2 files changed, 75 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2017-14166.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2017-14166.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e85fec40aa --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2017-14166.patch @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +libarchive-3.3.2: Fix CVE-2017-14166 + +[No upstream tracking] -- https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/pull/935 + +archive_read_support_format_xar: heap-based buffer overflow in xml_data + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/fa7438a0ff4033e4741c807394a9af6207940d71] +CVE: CVE-2017-14166 +Bug: 935 +Signed-off-by: Andrej Valek <andrej.valek@siemens.com> + +diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_xar.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_xar.c +index 7a22beb..93eeacc 100644 +--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_xar.c ++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_xar.c +@@ -1040,6 +1040,9 @@ atol10(const char *p, size_t char_cnt) + uint64_t l; + int digit; + ++ if (char_cnt == 0) ++ return (0); ++ + l = 0; + digit = *p - '0'; + while (digit >= 0 && digit < 10 && char_cnt-- > 0) { +@@ -1054,7 +1057,10 @@ atol8(const char *p, size_t char_cnt) + { + int64_t l; + int digit; +- ++ ++ if (char_cnt == 0) ++ return (0); ++ + l = 0; + while (char_cnt-- > 0) { + if (*p >= '0' && *p <= '7') diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/bug929.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/bug929.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2f3254c8dc --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/bug929.patch @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +libarchive-3.3.2: Fix bug929 + +[No upstream tracking] -- https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/pull/929 + +archive_read_support_format_cpio: header_newc(): Avoid overflow when reading corrupt +cpio archive + +A cpio "newc" archive with a namelength of "FFFFFFFF", if read on a +system with a 32-bit size_t, would result in namelength + name_pad +overflowing 32 bits and libarchive attempting to copy 2^32-1 bytes +from a 2-byte buffer, with appropriately hilarious results. + +Check for this overflow and fail; there's no legitimate reason for a +cpio archive to contain a file with a name over 4 billion characters +in length. + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/bac4659e0b970990e7e3f3a3d239294e96311630] +Bug: 929 +Signed-off-by: Andrej Valek <andrej.valek@siemens.com> + +diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_cpio.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_cpio.c +index ad9f782..1faa64d 100644 +--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_cpio.c ++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_cpio.c +@@ -633,6 +633,13 @@ header_newc(struct archive_read *a, struct cpio *cpio, + /* Pad name to 2 more than a multiple of 4. */ + *name_pad = (2 - *namelength) & 3; + ++ /* Make sure that the padded name length fits into size_t. */ ++ if ((size_t)(*namelength + *name_pad) < *namelength) { ++ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT, ++ "cpio archive has invalid namelength"); ++ return (ARCHIVE_FATAL); ++ } ++ + /* + * Note: entry_bytes_remaining is at least 64 bits and + * therefore guaranteed to be big enough for a 33-bit file |