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-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2017-14167.patch70
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 70 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2017-14167.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2017-14167.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 969ad877d6..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2017-14167.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
-From ed4f86e8b6eff8e600c69adee68c7cd34dd2cccb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Date: Thu, 7 Sep 2017 12:02:56 +0530
-Subject: [PATCH] multiboot: validate multiboot header address values
-
-While loading kernel via multiboot-v1 image, (flags & 0x00010000)
-indicates that multiboot header contains valid addresses to load
-the kernel image. These addresses are used to compute kernel
-size and kernel text offset in the OS image. Validate these
-address values to avoid an OOB access issue.
-
-This is CVE-2017-14167.
-
-Reported-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Message-Id: <20170907063256.7418-1-ppandit@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-[https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=ed4f86e8b6eff8e600c69adee68c7cd34dd2cccb]
-
-CVE: CVE-2017-14167
-
-Signed-off-by: Yi Zhao <yi.zhao@windriver.com>
----
- hw/i386/multiboot.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/hw/i386/multiboot.c b/hw/i386/multiboot.c
-index 6001f4c..c7b70c9 100644
---- a/hw/i386/multiboot.c
-+++ b/hw/i386/multiboot.c
-@@ -221,15 +221,34 @@ int load_multiboot(FWCfgState *fw_cfg,
- uint32_t mh_header_addr = ldl_p(header+i+12);
- uint32_t mh_load_end_addr = ldl_p(header+i+20);
- uint32_t mh_bss_end_addr = ldl_p(header+i+24);
-+
- mh_load_addr = ldl_p(header+i+16);
-+ if (mh_header_addr < mh_load_addr) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "invalid mh_load_addr address\n");
-+ exit(1);
-+ }
-+
- uint32_t mb_kernel_text_offset = i - (mh_header_addr - mh_load_addr);
- uint32_t mb_load_size = 0;
- mh_entry_addr = ldl_p(header+i+28);
-
- if (mh_load_end_addr) {
-+ if (mh_bss_end_addr < mh_load_addr) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "invalid mh_bss_end_addr address\n");
-+ exit(1);
-+ }
- mb_kernel_size = mh_bss_end_addr - mh_load_addr;
-+
-+ if (mh_load_end_addr < mh_load_addr) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "invalid mh_load_end_addr address\n");
-+ exit(1);
-+ }
- mb_load_size = mh_load_end_addr - mh_load_addr;
- } else {
-+ if (kernel_file_size < mb_kernel_text_offset) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "invalid kernel_file_size\n");
-+ exit(1);
-+ }
- mb_kernel_size = kernel_file_size - mb_kernel_text_offset;
- mb_load_size = mb_kernel_size;
- }
---
-2.7.4
-