diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch | 40 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 40 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 0c43919427..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,40 +0,0 @@ -commit 208d54db20d58c9a5e45e856a0650caadd7d9612 -Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> -Date: Tue May 13 18:48:31 2014 +0100 - - Fix for CVE-2014-0195 - - A buffer overrun attack can be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments - to an OpenSSL DTLS client or server. This is potentially exploitable to - run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client or server. - - Fixed by adding consistency check for DTLS fragments. - - Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue. - -Patch borrowed from Fedora -Upstream-Status: Backport -Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com> - -diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c -index 2e8cf68..07f67f8 100644 ---- a/ssl/d1_both.c -+++ b/ssl/d1_both.c -@@ -627,7 +627,16 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok) - frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0; - } - else -+ { - frag = (hm_fragment*) item->data; -+ if (frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len) -+ { -+ item = NULL; -+ frag = NULL; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ - - /* If message is already reassembled, this must be a - * retransmit and can be dropped. - |