1 files changed, 0 insertions, 108 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0002-fix-CVE-2018-0734.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0002-fix-CVE-2018-0734.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 2a3e03fe2a..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0002-fix-CVE-2018-0734.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
-Backport patch to fix CVE-2018-0734. Remove a section which only remove a
-space. It can't be applied because the context is different.
-
-CVE: CVE-2018-0734
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-
-Signed-off-by: Kai Kang <kai.kang@windriver.com>
-
-From 8abfe72e8c1de1b95f50aa0d9134803b4d00070f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Pauli <paul.dale@oracle.com>
-Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2018 07:42:46 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH] Timing vulnerability in DSA signature generation
- (CVE-2018-0734).
-
-Avoid a timing attack that leaks information via a side channel that
-triggers when a BN is resized.  Increasing the size of the BNs
-prior to doing anything with them suppresses the attack.
-
-Thanks due to Samuel Weiser for finding and locating this.
-
-Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7486)
-
-(cherry picked from commit a9cfb8c2aa7254a4aa6a1716909e3f8cb78049b6)
----
- crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c | 28 +++++++++++++++-------------
- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
-index ca20811200..2dd2d7489a 100644
---- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
-+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
-@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
- 
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-+#include "internal/bn_int.h"
- #include <openssl/bn.h>
- #include <openssl/sha.h>
- #include "dsa_locl.h"
-@@ -180,9 +181,9 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
- {
-     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-     BIGNUM *k, *kinv = NULL, *r = *rp;
--    BIGNUM *l, *m;
-+    BIGNUM *l;
-     int ret = 0;
--    int q_bits;
-+    int q_bits, q_words;
- 
-     if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
-         DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
-@@ -191,8 +192,7 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
- 
-     k = BN_new();
-     l = BN_new();
--    m = BN_new();
--    if (k == NULL || l == NULL || m == NULL)
-+    if (k == NULL || l == NULL)
-         goto err;
- 
-     if (ctx_in == NULL) {
-@@ -203,9 +203,9 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
- 
-     /* Preallocate space */
-     q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
--    if (!BN_set_bit(k, q_bits)
--        || !BN_set_bit(l, q_bits)
--        || !BN_set_bit(m, q_bits))
-+    q_words = bn_get_top(dsa->q);
-+    if (!bn_wexpand(k, q_words + 2)
-+        || !bn_wexpand(l, q_words + 2))
-         goto err;
- 
-     /* Get random k */
-@@ -240,14 +240,17 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
-      * small timing information leakage.  We then choose the sum that is
-      * one bit longer than the modulus.
-      *
--     * TODO: revisit the BN_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic
--     * conditional copy.
-+     * There are some concerns about the efficacy of doing this.  More
-+     * specificly refer to the discussion starting with:
-+     *     https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7486#discussion_r228323705
-+     * The fix is to rework BN so these gymnastics aren't required.
-      */
-     if (!BN_add(l, k, dsa->q)
--        || !BN_add(m, l, dsa->q)
--        || !BN_copy(k, BN_num_bits(l) > q_bits ? l : m))
-+        || !BN_add(k, l, dsa->q))
-         goto err;
- 
-+    BN_consttime_swap(BN_is_bit_set(l, q_bits), k, l, q_words + 2);
-+
-     if ((dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp != NULL) {
-             if (!dsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(dsa, r, dsa->g, k, dsa->p, ctx,
-                                        dsa->method_mont_p))
-@@ -275,7 +278,6 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
-         BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-     BN_clear_free(k);
-     BN_clear_free(l);
--    BN_clear_free(m);
-     return ret;
- }
- 
--- 
-2.17.0
-