diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/openssh-CVE-2014-2653.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/openssh-CVE-2014-2653.patch | 114 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 114 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/openssh-CVE-2014-2653.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/openssh-CVE-2014-2653.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 674d186044..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/openssh-CVE-2014-2653.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,114 +0,0 @@ -Upstream-Status: Backport - -This CVE could be removed if openssh is upgrade to 6.6 or higher. -Below are some details. - -Attempt SSHFP lookup even if server presents a certificate - -Reference: -https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=742513 - -If an ssh server presents a certificate to the client, then the client -does not check the DNS for SSHFP records. This means that a malicious -server can essentially disable DNS-host-key-checking, which means the -client will fall back to asking the user (who will just say "yes" to -the fingerprint, sadly). - -This patch means that the ssh client will, if necessary, extract the -server key from the proffered certificate, and attempt to verify it -against the DNS. The patch was written by Mark Wooding -<mdw@distorted.org.uk>. I modified it to add one debug2 call, reviewed -it, and tested it. - -Signed-off-by: Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org> -Signed-off-by: Chen Qi <Qi.Chen@windriver.com> ---- ---- a/sshconnect.c -+++ b/sshconnect.c -@@ -1210,36 +1210,63 @@ fail: - return -1; - } - -+static int -+check_host_key_sshfp(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key) -+{ -+ int rc = -1; -+ int flags = 0; -+ Key *raw_key = NULL; -+ -+ if (!options.verify_host_key_dns) -+ goto done; -+ -+ /* XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS; try looking the raw key -+ * up in the DNS anyway. -+ */ -+ if (key_is_cert(host_key)) { -+ debug2("Extracting key from cert for SSHFP lookup"); -+ raw_key = key_from_private(host_key); -+ if (key_drop_cert(raw_key)) -+ fatal("Couldn't drop certificate"); -+ host_key = raw_key; -+ } -+ -+ if (verify_host_key_dns(host, hostaddr, host_key, &flags)) -+ goto done; -+ -+ if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) { -+ -+ if (options.verify_host_key_dns == 1 && -+ flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH && -+ flags & DNS_VERIFY_SECURE) { -+ rc = 0; -+ } else if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH) { -+ matching_host_key_dns = 1; -+ } else { -+ warn_changed_key(host_key); -+ error("Update the SSHFP RR in DNS with the new " -+ "host key to get rid of this message."); -+ } -+ } -+ -+done: -+ if (raw_key) -+ key_free(raw_key); -+ return rc; -+} -+ - /* returns 0 if key verifies or -1 if key does NOT verify */ - int - verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key) - { -- int flags = 0; - char *fp; - - fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); - debug("Server host key: %s %s", key_type(host_key), fp); - free(fp); - -- /* XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS */ -- if (!key_is_cert(host_key) && options.verify_host_key_dns && -- verify_host_key_dns(host, hostaddr, host_key, &flags) == 0) { -- if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) { -- -- if (options.verify_host_key_dns == 1 && -- flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH && -- flags & DNS_VERIFY_SECURE) -- return 0; -- -- if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH) { -- matching_host_key_dns = 1; -- } else { -- warn_changed_key(host_key); -- error("Update the SSHFP RR in DNS with the new " -- "host key to get rid of this message."); -- } -- } -- } -+ if (check_host_key_sshfp(host, hostaddr, host_key) == 0) -+ return 0; - - return check_host_key(host, hostaddr, options.port, host_key, RDRW, - options.user_hostfiles, options.num_user_hostfiles, --- -1.7.9.5 - |