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authorSakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>2020-07-14 15:51:16 -0400
committerRichard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>2020-07-18 11:06:27 +0100
commit3a95b5a67ce981b8949d9e5067762b7127d15353 (patch)
treee5844335f688b0687ceba9a386938878e24a2ba2 /meta/recipes-devtools
parent7934ed49179242f15b413c0275040a3bb6b68876 (diff)
downloadopenembedded-core-contrib-3a95b5a67ce981b8949d9e5067762b7127d15353.tar.gz
qemu: fix CVE-2020-13362
Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'meta/recipes-devtools')
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc1
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13362.patch55
2 files changed, 56 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc
index d41cc8f200..98bdff7ac6 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \
file://CVE-2020-13361.patch \
file://find_datadir.patch \
file://CVE-2020-10761.patch \
+ file://CVE-2020-13362.patch \
"
UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13362.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13362.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..af8d4ba8f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13362.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+From f50ab86a2620bd7e8507af865b164655ee921661 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Thu, 14 May 2020 00:55:38 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] megasas: use unsigned type for reply_queue_head and check
+ index
+
+A guest user may set 'reply_queue_head' field of MegasasState to
+a negative value. Later in 'megasas_lookup_frame' it is used to
+index into s->frames[] array. Use unsigned type to avoid OOB
+access issue.
+
+Also check that 'index' value stays within s->frames[] bounds
+through the while() loop in 'megasas_lookup_frame' to avoid OOB
+access.
+
+Reported-by: Ren Ding <rding@gatech.edu>
+Reported-by: Hanqing Zhao <hanqing@gatech.edu>
+Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Acked-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
+Message-Id: <20200513192540.1583887-2-ppandit@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [f50ab86a2620bd7e8507af865b164655ee921661]
+CVE: CVE-2020-13362
+Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
+---
+ hw/scsi/megasas.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/scsi/megasas.c b/hw/scsi/megasas.c
+index af18c88b65..6ce598cd69 100644
+--- a/hw/scsi/megasas.c
++++ b/hw/scsi/megasas.c
+@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ typedef struct MegasasState {
+ uint64_t reply_queue_pa;
+ void *reply_queue;
+ int reply_queue_len;
+- int reply_queue_head;
++ uint16_t reply_queue_head;
+ int reply_queue_tail;
+ uint64_t consumer_pa;
+ uint64_t producer_pa;
+@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ static MegasasCmd *megasas_lookup_frame(MegasasState *s,
+
+ index = s->reply_queue_head;
+
+- while (num < s->fw_cmds) {
++ while (num < s->fw_cmds && index < MEGASAS_MAX_FRAMES) {
+ if (s->frames[index].pa && s->frames[index].pa == frame) {
+ cmd = &s->frames[index];
+ break;
+--
+2.20.1
+